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Growth in passenger traffic on rail corridors shared with freight trains, and expanded rail 
transport of hazardous materials have both increased the imperative to understand the factors 
affecting railway transportation safety and risk. A source of risk that has received relatively little 
attention are railroad train accidents that may cause collisions with trains operating on adjacent 
tracks. These adjacent track accidents (ATAs) occur when one train derails in multiple-track 
territory and its equipment or lading intrudes onto an adjacent track and strikes, or is struck by, 
another train operating on that track. This dissertation develops data and a formal analytical 
framework to evaluate the risk of ATAs.  Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment methodologies 
such as Fault Tree Analysis, an ATA is divided into its three principal constituent events: the 
initial train derailment, the intrusion of derailed rail vehicles onto an adjacent track, and the 
presence of another train on that track that may collide with the intruding equipment. The 
probability of each event is assessed, the factors affecting those probabilities are identified, their 
effects are investigated and discussed, and a formal qualitative and quantitative framework is 
developed into a comprehensive probability assessment model for ATA occurrences. 
Particular attention is given to passenger trains because of their expanded operation on 
shared-use rail corridors (SRCs) with freight train traffic and consequent exposure to ATA risk.  
Passenger train accidents are analyzed and the important factors contributing to their frequency 
and consequences investigated. Derailments and collisions were analyzed to identify and 
quantify accident causes that have higher frequency and/or severity in terms of casualties to 
onboard passengers and crew. 
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Factors affecting train intrusion probability including track center spacing, track 
alignment, train speed, adjacent structures, elevation differential, and presence of intrusion 
barriers or containment systems are identified and their effects on intrusion probability 
investigated. These factors serve as important elements in developing a comprehensive ATA 
probability assessment model. A semi-quantitative model is developed as a screening-level risk 
assessment tool for ATAs, accounting for factors affecting the probabilities of the initial train 
derailment, the intrusion of derailed vehicles onto an adjacent track, and the presence of another 
train on the adjacent track.  
A quantitative model is developed to estimate the probability of train presence on an 
adjacent track when and where a train intrusion occurs, which is affected by the frequency and 
operational characteristics of train traffic on both lines. This model also estimates the probability 
of an adjacent track collision based on traffic control, intrusion prevention or warning systems, 
point of derailment, train braking capability, and other factors. 
The ATA probability assessment framework results in the development of the Adjacent 
Track Accident Probability Assessment Model (ATAPAM). The ATAPAM provides a step-by-
step procedure to assess the probability of ATAs in both quantitative and qualitative forms. The 
probability of an ATA on a multiple-track segment is evaluated with a qualitative risk indicator 
showing additional intrusion risk. A case study of the application of ATAPAM on a hypothetical 
SRC is presented. The ATAPAM can be used as a tool in a decision analysis framework in 
which risk mitigation strategies for ATAs can be evaluated based on their effectiveness, 
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1.1 Shared-Use Rail Corridor Safety  
Increasing demand for passenger rail transport in the United States (Figure 1.1) 
has led to the growth of faster and more frequent passenger rail services. Funding and 
legislative support for the improvement of existing passenger rail services and new 
passenger rail corridors has been provided by the federal government (Passenger Rail 
Investment and Improvement Act, 2008; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
2009; Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, 2010; FAST Act, 2015; 
Passenger Rail Reform and Investment Act, 2015; Peterman, 2018). High-level rail 
transportation plans to achieve these goals have also been proposed at the state level 
(WIDOT, 2014; WSDOT, 2014; MnDOT, 2015; Peterman, 2017; CADOT, 2018; IDOT, 
2018). The high-speed rail1 project in California is now under construction (CHSRA, 
2018), and the high-speed rail project in Texas is in its planning process (FRA, 2015). 
Speed, frequency, and service improvement projects are being implemented to achieve 
higher-speed rail2 corridors in the Midwest and on the Northeast Corridor (Peterman, 
2016). New intercity passenger rail services have also been constructed or proposed in 
Florida (OPPAGA, 2018), Massachusetts (MassDOT, 2018a) and other states (Peterman, 
2016; National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 2018a). In addition, transit and regional 
                                                          
1 The International Union of Railways (Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (UIC)) (2018) defines 
high-speed rail as passenger rail systems whose commercial operating speed is greater than 155 miles per 
hour (mph) (250 kilometers per hour (km/h)). The United States generally refers to passenger rail systems 
with maximum operating speed greater than 150 mph (240 km/h) as high-speed rail. 
2 In the United States, passenger rail systems with maximum operating speed between 90 (mph) and 150 
mph (140 (km/h) to 240 km/h) are termed “higher-speed rail” (Peterman et al., 2013). 
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passenger rail systems are being improved or expanded (Central Puget Sound Regional 
Transit Authority, 2018; MassDOT, 2018b; WMATA, 2018; Metra, 2019).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Amtrak ridership by million unlinked trips3: 1996 – 2018  
(National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 2018b) 
 
Two approaches are being used to undertake these passenger rail projects and 
initiatives: incremental upgrade of existing railroad infrastructure and construction of 
new, dedicated passenger rail lines (Peterman et al., 2013). Both approaches lead to the 
development of shared-use rail corridors (SRCs) where passenger trains share track, 
right-of-way (ROW) or railroad corridors with freight trains and other types of passenger 
trains (Ullman and Bing, 1995; Bing et al., 2010). The United States Department of 
Transportation (USDOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) defines three types of 
                                                          
3 An unlinked passenger trip is a trip on one train regardless of the type of fare paid or transfer presented. A 
person riding only one train from origin to destination takes one unlinked passenger trip; a person who 
transfers to a second train takes two unlinked passenger trips; a person who transfers to a third train takes 



































SRCs based on whether or not different types of trains share trackage and the separation 
distance between adjacent tracks of different railroad systems (Resor, 2003) (Figure 1.2).  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Three types of shared-use rail corridors (Resor, 2003)  
 
SRCs offer benefits compared to the construction of new, completely dedicated 
passenger rail lines. These include: lower capital costs, less economic, environmental and 
social impact, and easier accessibility to core urban areas (Nash, 2003). However, 
implementation of SRCs also raises challenges, including safety concerns due to more 
frequent and higher-speed operations of passenger trains in close proximity to freight 
trains and maintenance-of-way (MOW) personnel, reduced line capacity due to 
heterogeneous train traffic, trade-offs in infrastructure and rolling stock designs due to 
different characteristics of passenger and freight trains, and a number of other factors 
(Saat and Barkan, 2013) (Table 1.1).  
Shared Track Shared ROW
Shared Corridor
Adjacent track spacing ≤ 25 feet (7.6 meters)




Table 1.1: Shared-use rail corridor challenges (Saat and Barkan, 2013) 
 
Type of Challenges Specific Issues 
Safety 
Adjacent Track Accident (ATA) 
Loss of Shunt Problem 
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings 
Pedestrian Risk 




Slab Track/Ballasted Track Design 
Special Trackwork  
Curve Superelevation 
Track Stiffness Transition Zones 
Track Surfacing Cycles 
Rail Wear and Defect Rate 
Electrification 
Tilting Train Design 
Level Boarding of Rolling Stock 
Vehicle-Track Interaction 
Wheel Load Characteristics 
Planning and 
Operation 
Infrastructure Upgrade Prioritization 
Rail Capacity Planning 
MOW Scheduling 
Train Scheduling Patterns 
Train Scheduling Reliability 
Economic 
Capacity Cost Allocation 
New SRC Line Construction 
Homogenous Freight Operations 
Impact of Reduced Industry Access 
Passenger Train Service Sustainability 
Institutional 
Track Safety Standards 
Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards 
Liability and Indemnification 
Grant Agreement Structure 
 
 
Safety is the most important aspect of any railroad operation and among the 
important safety issues of SRC implementation is the potential intrusion of derailed rail 
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equipment onto adjacent railroad tracks. The intruding equipment may strike or be struck 
by another train running on an adjacent track, resulting in a collision leading to more 
derailed equipment, infrastructure and rolling stock damage, and potential casualties and 
releases of hazardous material. This type of collision is referred to as an adjacent track 
accident (ATA).  
 
Previous FRA-sponsored research identified ATAs as the top-ranked safety 
concern for SRCs (Saat and Barkan, 2013). Several recent high-profile ATAs further 
highlighted the need to address ATA risk. In one case, a grain train derailed and 
equipment intruded onto the adjacent track. An oncoming petroleum crude oil train on 
that track collided with the intruding rail vehicles, derailing 21 tank cars and causing a 
number of them to release product and catch on fire (NTSB, 2015a) (Figure 1.3a). In 
another incident, a passenger train derailed and intruded onto an adjacent track leading to 
a collision and derailment of another passenger train approaching from the opposite 
direction on that track and resulting in 65 passenger injuries and severe equipment and 







(a) December 30th, 2013, Casselton, ND 
(photo credit: Michael Vosburg) 
(b) May 17th, 2013, Bridgeport, CT 
(photo from the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) report) 
Figure 1.3: Adjacent track accident scenes for (a) two freight trains and (b) two 
passenger trains (NTSB, 2015a; b) 
 
1.2 Equipment Loading Gauge and Clearance Envelope  
A critical event in ATA occurrence is the intrusion of a train onto an adjacent 
track. In order to define an intrusion, it is first necessary to understand two related 
concepts: the equipment loading gauge of a train and the clearance envelope of the track. 
Railroad equipment loading gauge (also referred to as the “clearance plate” in North 
American parlance) is a series of standards that define the maximum height and width of 
locomotives and rolling stock (including lading if it is a freight car) (Figure 1.4a).  These 
are complimented by standards for the infrastructure clearance envelope along a rail line 
(AREMA, 2016a; b). The clearance envelope, or “clearances”, are the height and width 
limits of railroad structures to assure safe passage of trains without any possibility of 
impacting elements of the infrastructure above, below, or beside the track (Figure 1.4b). 
Clearance specifications must account for dynamic effects of superelevation, track 
irregularities, and rail vehicle suspension and movement (Hay, 1982). This combination 
of equipment and infrastructure standards ensures safe passage of trains through tunnels, 
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bridges, and adjacent railroad structures. With this background knowledge, I define train 
intrusion and ATAs in the next subsection.   
 
 
Figure 1.4: Examples of (a) loading gauge (Kratville, 1997) and (b) clearance 
envelope (Union Pacific Railroad, 2016) 
 
1.3 Adjacent Track Accidents 
Railroad equipment and infrastructure is designed so that, in normal operations, 
the equipment is well clear of equipment operating on an adjacent track (Figure 1.5a). 
However, if a train derails, the derailed equipment’s loading gauge will nearly always 
exceed its own track’s clearance envelope (Figure 1.5b). If the derailed equipment enters 
an adjacent track’s clearance envelope, it is called an intrusion (Figure 1.5c). When an 
intrusion occurs, there is a possibility that another train is running on the adjacent track, 
either next to, or approaching, the intrusion location. If so, there is a chance that the train 




resulting from the sequence of events described above is referred to as an adjacent track 
accident, or ATA. 
 
 
Figure 1.5: A typical ATA event sequence  
 
ATAs can occur in any multiple track territory, but they become more complex 
and potentially more hazardous on SRCs. As more high-speed and higher-speed 
passenger train services are introduced, the probability of an ATA increases, because, 
ceteris paribus, at higher speed, it takes more time and distance to stop a train if there is 
an intrusion ahead. Different speeds, frequencies, and other operational characteristics 
between passenger and freight trains increase the frequency of train meets and passes, 
which also increases the probability of trains being close to an intrusion location should 
one occur. In addition, higher speed also implies greater kinetic energy in collisions, 
meaning more damage to rail equipment, infrastructure, and potential onboard passenger 
and crew casualties. Train operation by multiple operators on shared trackage or ROW 
may also present more opportunities for communication errors, resulting in delayed or 
failed delivery of a warning to trains on adjacent tracks in a sufficiently timely manner to 
Normal Operation Derailment Intrusion






(a) (b) (c) (d)
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avoid a collision if an intrusion occurs. If hazardous materials are transported on an SRC, 
the potential consequences of an ATA are further increased if these materials released in 
an accident. 
 
Risk is generally defined as the probability of a particular event multiplied by its 
consequence (Elvik and Voll, 2014). From this perspective, the risk of ATA consists of 
its probability and consequence. The probability of an ATA considers the occurrence of 
an initial train derailment, its intrusion onto another track after it derails, and the collision 
between the intruding train and another train operating on an adjacent track during or 
after the intrusion. The potential consequences of an ATA include casualties, releases of 
hazardous materials, environmental impacts, equipment and infrastructure damage, 
system disruptions, and unfavorable publicity or perception of rail transportation safety.   
 
 In the field of risk management there are four main elements for addressing risk: 
identification, analysis, evaluation and mitigation (or treatment) (ISO, 2018). Applying 
these steps to ATA risk assessment involves identifying the specific factors affecting the 
probability and consequences of ATAs. These are assessed using qualitative, semi-
quantitative, and quantitative methods, depending on the available data and scope of 
analysis. The risk of an ATA is evaluated for different railroad track segments based on 
their characteristics using models developed in previous investigations of rail 
transportation safety and risk. Risk mitigation strategies for ATAs are identified and their 
effects evaluated using the model developed in the risk assessment. These risk mitigation 
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strategies are then implemented on track segments with high ATA risk based on the 
results of risk evaluation and the cost effectiveness of different risk reduction strategies. 
 
 There are two ways of reducing risk – addressing the probability and addressing 
the consequence. In general, reducing the probability component of the risk so that the 
hazardous event does not occur is preferable because the consequences are eliminated. 
Consequently, many railroad safety studies have focused on assessing the probability of 
the hazardous event, including freight train derailments and collisions (Dennis, 2002; 
Anderson and Barkan, 2004; Liu et al., 2011; 2012; Li et al., 2013; Liu, 2015), hazardous 
material releases (Saccomanno and El-Hage, 1989; Liu et al., 2014; Liu, 2017a), 
highway-rail grade crossing incidents (Benekohal and Elzohairy, 2001; Mok and Savage, 
2005; Raub, 2009; Evans, 2011a), and trespasser incidents (Silla and Luoma, 2011; 
Havârneanu et al., 2015; Savage, 2016). In the context of ATAs, understanding what can 
lead to an ATA and how to prevent it can help identify a means of reducing ATA risk. 
 
1.4 Research Objective 
The principal objective of my dissertation research is to improve our 
understanding of how to quantify and reduce the risk of ATAs through development and 
application of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) (Modarres et al., 2010) and decision 
analysis techniques (Clemen and Reilly, 2001) that can be used to evaluate and identify 
the most effective strategies to improve safety on SRCs. The main contribution of my 
dissertation research is development of a new, quantitative model to calculate the 
probability of ATAs by assessing three major probability components in an ATA event 
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sequence: initial train derailments, intrusion of derailed rail vehicles, and collisions 
between a train on an adjacent track with derailed equipment. The chapters in my 
dissertation focus on the development of models to identify and quantify factors that 
affect one or more of these probability components in ATA probability. The organization 
and sequence of steps to achieve my research objectives is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 1.6.  
 
 
Figure 1.6: ATA research framework 
 
In summary, these steps include: 
1) Use Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to identify all 
scenarios and factors leading to an ATA  
Fault Tree Analysis
(Chapter 2)
- Identify all factors leading to an ATA
- Derive the total probability equation of ATA
Train Accident Rate Analysis
(Chapter 3)
- Passenger train accident analysis
- Causal analysis of derailments/collisions
Intrusion Probability Analysis
(Chapter 4)
- Identify affecting factors for intrusion
- Investigate the effect of affecting factors
Train Presence Analysis
(Chapter 5)
- Identify affecting factors for train presence
- Derive train presence probability
ATA Probability Assessment Model
(Chapter 6)
- Combine three probability components
- Develop a quantitative ATA probability model
- Develop a risk indicator for additional ATA risk
- Develop ATA probability assessment guidance
Introduction
(Chapter 1)
- Introduce ATA risk
- Justify the importance of ATA risk analysis
Conclusions and Future Work
(Chapter 7)
- Summarize previous research work
- Explore future research opportunities
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2) Quantify the probability of initial train derailments on SRCs for different types 
and combinations of train traffic by conducting statistical and causal train  
accident analyses 
3) Identify factors that affect the probability of train intrusions in derailment 
scenarios and investigate their effects 
4) Identify and quantify the factors that affect the probability of train presence on 
adjacent tracks when an intrusion occurs 
5) Develop an ATA probability assessment model by combining probabilities of 
initial derailment, train intrusion, and train presence on adjacent tracks.  
6) Develop a procedure and guidance for ATA probability assessment  
 
Each of these steps represents a chapter in this dissertation except that steps five 
and six are combined into a single chapter. Taken as a whole, the chapters provide the 
types of data and models necessary for the development of the complete ATA probability 
assessment model. I expect my research to contribute to improving the safety of SRC 
operation by addressing ATA probability. This will allow passenger and freight rail 
operators to more effectively manage risk while taking advantage of benefits SRCs offer. 
I envision my research to be implemented by railroad corridor planners and designers to 
avoid or reduce high-potential-ATA-risk situations when planning and constructing new 
SRCs, and to more effectively manage ATA risk on existing SRCs. The effectiveness of 
the proposed risk mitigation strategies can be evaluated using my model and it has the 
potential to be incorporated with other risk assessment models such as highway-rail grade 
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crossing risk assessment model (Chadwick, 2017) for more general safety and risk 
analyses on SRCs.  
 
1.5 Organization of Dissertation 
There are 7 chapters in my dissertation (Figure 1.6); summaries of each chapter 
and explanations of how each chapter contributes to the development of the ATA 
probability assessment model follow.  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces SRC and ATA and presents the motivation and objectives 
of my dissertation and a description of each chapter. 
 
Chapter 2: Fault Tree Analysis of Adjacent Track Accidents 
This chapter presents the event tree and fault tree analyses for ATAs. FTA is a 
systematic, logical methodology to deduct a hazardous event into a set of basic events 
such that the probability of the event can be estimated by calculating the probability of 
each individual basic event. I use FTA to explore all possible basic events leading to the 
occurrence of ATAs and construct a fault tree to show how each basic event affects the 
probability of ATAs. Boolean algebra is used to develop the logical relationship among 
contributing basic events, and the importance and potential application of FTA is 
discussed. I derive the probability of ATA based on the results of FTA. The FTA 
developed in this chapter serves as a foundation for further development of quantitative 
probability assessment and the evaluation of risk mitigation strategies for ATAs. 
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Chapter 3: Mainline Passenger Train Accident Analysis 
This chapter presents the results of a study to identify the most important factors 
contributing to the risk of passenger train accidents by analyzing the USDOT FRA train 
accident data. I identify the train accident types posing the greatest risk to onboard 
passengers and train crews and the primary causes leading to those accidents. The 
frequency and severity of each type of train accident and their different causes are 
analyzed. I also consider the effect of train speed on accident causes and Positive-Train-
Control-preventable accidents (PPAs) in terms of both frequency and severity. This 
statistical and causal analysis of passenger train accident is important for rational 
allocation of resources to most efficiently and effectively reduce passenger train accident 
occurrences and consequences and provides a foundation for further improvement in 
passenger train safety. The passenger train accident rates developed in this chapter are 
used to assess the initial derailment probability in the ATA probability assessment model 
presented in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 4: Intrusion Probability Analysis 
When a train derails in multiple track territory, there is a chance that the derailed 
equipment will intrude onto an adjacent track. The distance between adjacent tracks, 
track alignment, and other infrastructure and geographic characteristics affect this 
probability. In this chapter, I explore the factors affecting intrusion probability and 
discuss their quantitative and qualitative effects. The quantitative intrusion probability 
identified in this chapter is a key component in the ATA probability assessment model 
presented in chapter 6. The factors affecting intrusion probability that are not quantified 
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are incorporated as qualitative risk indicators in that model. In this chapter, I also develop 
a semi-quantitative risk assessment model to provide a screening-level ATA risk 
evaluation, considering both the probability and consequence. Factors affecting the 
probability of initial derailment, intrusion, train presence on adjacent tracks, and 
consequence are identified, and their effects expressed using a scoring and ranking 
system to indicate whether these factors increase or reduce ATA risk. I then develop a 
risk index to allow the evaluation and comparison of relative ATA risk among different 
railroad track segments. 
 
Chapter 5: Train Presence and Adjacent Track Collision Probability Analysis in  
Intrusion Scenarios 
When an intrusion occurs, the most undesirable consequence is that the derailed 
equipment intruding onto an adjacent track strikes or is struck by another train operating 
on that track. There are several factors affecting the probability of such adjacent track 
collisions: the frequency of train meets and passes on adjacent tracks, the distance 
between the derailed train on one track and another train on an adjacent track, the 
position of the first derailed equipment in the intruding train, and braking capability of 
the train on the adjacent track. When an intrusion occurs, if the train on the adjacent track 
is more than a certain distance away from the intrusion, there is a chance that the train 
may be able to stop before colliding with the intruding equipment. Train speed, train type 
and consist, track grade, and the type of braking system affect the distance required to 
stop a train. These factors combined with the distance between trains on adjacent tracks 
and derailed equipment affect the probability of an adjacent track collision. In this 
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chapter, I develop a generalized model to calculate the probability of collision between 
intruding derailed equipment and trains on adjacent tracks. This model also serves as a 
key probability component in the comprehensive ATA risk assessment model presented 
in chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6: Adjacent Track Accident Probability Assessment Model 
In this chapter, I develop an ATA probability assessment model by combining the 
three probability models for initial derailment, intrusion, and train presence on adjacent 
tracks. Track, train, and operational inputs are identified for the model to evaluate the 
probability. The model presents the ATA probability in two forms: a quantitative 
probability value and a qualitative risk indicator. I present a case study to demonstrate 
how the model works using a hypothetical SRC. I also present a standard ATA 
probability assessment procedure and guidance for the model so users can customize the 
model to best suit their needs. In addition, I discuss the appropriate circumstances for use 
of the semi-quantitative ATA risk screening model presented in chapter 4 and the 
quantitative ATA probability assessment model presented in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter summarizes the contribution of my research work and identifies 
questions needing further investigation and opportunities for research to further refine the 





CHAPTER 2  
 
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF 
ADJACENT TRACK ACCIDENTS 
 
Adapted from 
Lin, C.Y., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2016. Fault tree analysis of adjacent track 
accidents on shared-use rail corridors. Transportation Research Record: Journal of 
Transportation Research Record, 2546: 129 – 136. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive process used to identify all potential 
failure paths and factors that lead to an undesirable event (Modarres et al., 2010). A fault 
tree consists of two elements – events and logic gates. Events are connected by logic 
gates to show their logical relationships. FTA is an important step in probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) for two main reasons: it embodies all failure modes that contribute to 
the occurrence of the undesirable event, and it allows the calculation of total probability 
of the undesirable event. In my research, the “undesirable event” is an adjacent track 
accident (ATA). 
 
 FTA has been extensively applied to railroad safety in a variety of contexts. Li et 
al. (2013) used FTA to evaluate rear-end train collision accidents and developed models 
to calculate their probability of occurrence. Wang et al. (2014) used FTA to address the 
risk of train derailments on urban rail transit systems. Huang et al. (2000) combined FTA 
and fuzzy theory in general railroad safety analysis. Jafarian and Rezvani (2012) also 
used the fuzzy fault tree to analyze train derailments and identify the causes that 
contribute the most to overall derailment probability. European Railway Agency (2015) 
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applied FTA to various railroad hazards in order to allocate preventive resources most 
effectively. The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) (Taig and Hunt, 2012; Fowler 
et al., 2013; RSSB, 2014) conducted FTA on six major types of train accidents in Europe 
and used historical train accident data to identify causes with the greatest effect on each 
type of accident. As part of their work the RSSB developed a fault tree for train-to-train 
collisions (Figure 2.1). The RSSB used their train database to develop a color-coded 
relative ranking for each accident cause. Accident causes highlighted in red have the 
highest risk ranking, meaning that they are most in need of attention. Accident causes 
highlighted in yellow have medium risk and the ones in green have the lowest risk. 
  
 
Figure 2.1: RSSB fault tree for train-to-train collision (RSSB, 2014) 
 
 In this chapter, I use FTA to assess the probability of ATAs. I first identify 
scenarios and event sequences leading to ATAs by conducting Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), and then I construct a fault tree to identify the elements that contribute to such 
accidents. The quantitative probability of an ATA is derived using Boolean algebra based 
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improving the safety of existing SRCs is also discussed. This chapter also establishes the 
PRA framework for the rest of the chapters in my dissertation. 
 
2.2 Event Tree Analysis  
An ATA is a sequential event in which an initial derailment occurs on multiple 
track territory resulting in an intrusion onto an adjacent track, followed by the collision 
between another train on the adjacent track and the derailed equipment (Figure 1.5). The 
probability of this sequential event can be formally described using ETA (Figure 2.2). 
ETA is a logical methodology to explore all possible outcomes of a system due to the 
occurrence of an initiating event and calculate the probabilities of each outcome 
(Modarres et al., 2010). ETA is a powerful tool to identify and assess the probability of 
system failures when the system is complex, or the system failure consists of multiple 
events. It is widely used in risk analyses of complex systems such as nuclear plants 
(Kaplan, 1982), tunnel boring machines (Hong et al., 2009), and oil or gas drilling 





Figure 2.2: Event tree analysis for ATA 
 
An event tree is the product of the ETA that contains an initiating event, 
intermediate events, and end states. In the context of ATAs, the initiating event is the 
derailment of a train in multiple-track territory, denoted as D. It can be caused by a 
derailment, or by a collision of two trains on the same track. Thus, D is the rate of 
derailments, head-on collisions, or rear-end collisions in multiple-track territory. These 
are generally measured in terms of number of accidents per unit of traffic exposure such 
as train-miles or ton-miles. The first intermediate event, an intrusion, occurs when the 
adjacent track is “fouled” by equipment derailed in the initial derailment and is denoted 
as I. The second intermediate event where another train on an adjacent track is either next 
to, or approaching, the intrusion location, is denoted as T. The black square nodes in the 
event tree represent divergence points indicating whether an event occurs or not. Each 












Define success (S) to be the non-occurrence of an accident (safe operation), and failure (F) to be the occurrence of 
an accident or a hazardous situation (system failure).
The descriptions for each end state are as follows:
S1: Train does not derail. Railroad system operates normally.
F1: Train derails but does not intrude onto adjacent track. Although the railroad system is interrupted, this
does not result in an ATA. 
F2: Train derails and intrudes onto adjacent track but no other trains are at, or approaching, the intrusion 
location on the adjacent track at the time. Although service on multiple tracks is affected, there is no 
collision between trains on adjacent tracks.
F3: Train derails and intrudes onto the adjacent track and collides with another train operating on that track.
     
      
        








A “success” in the event tree is defined as an event where hazardous situations do 
not occur, i.e. the safe alternative.  A “failure” means that the hazardous event(s) do 
occur and represents the unsafe alternative. For instance, the first black node on the left 
of the event tree indicates whether an initial derailment occurs (Figure 2.2). If it does, it is 
considered a “failure” because the occurrence may lead to an intrusion, which is the next 
stage of an ATA. Therefore, the path for the probability of the occurrence of the initial 
derailment event, D, goes downward (the direction of occurrence), while the path for its 
complement probability, D , goes to the right (the direction of non-occurrence and results 
in a success scenario (no accident). I define the “success” of the system as the non-
occurrence of an accident (end state S1 in Figure 2.2), and the “failure” of the system as 
the occurrence of an accident (end states F1, F2 and F3 in Figure 2.2). The event tree is 
divided into four end states and each of them is introduced as follows. 
 
End State S1 
When an initial derailment does not occur, the train runs normally, and the system 
is safe. The probability of S1 is simply the non-occurrence of the initial derailment 
(denoted as D ). The subsequent probability components are not examined in this case 
because the initiating event does not occur.  
 
End State F1 
If the initial derailment occurs but does not result in an intrusion, the derailed 
train will not collide with trains on adjacent tracks. Although this scenario may still cause 
infrastructure or rolling stock damage and system disturbance, it will not result in an 
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ATA. The probability associated with this end state is the probability of the occurrence of 
an initial derailment multiplied by the probability of the non-occurrence of an intrusion 
(denoted as D ∙ I).  
 
End State F2 
When both the initial derailment and an intrusion occur, the derailed train is 
exposed to a hazardous situation in which another train on the adjacent track may not be 
able to stop before colliding with derailed equipment. This may be because the engineer 
(train driver) of the train on the adjacent track is unaware of the intrusion, or because of 
insufficient braking distance. The probability that there is no train on, or approaching on, 
the adjacent track when the intrusion occurs is denoted as D ∙ I ∙ T. 
 
End State F3 
The probability that there is a train at, or approaching, the location where and 
when the intrusion occurs that results in a collision between the intruding rail equipment 
and the train on the adjacent track, is denoted as D ∙ I ∙ T and is labeled as end state F3. 
End state F3 representing the event sequence for ATAs and is the focus of my 
dissertation research. In the next subsection, I use FTA to further analyze the factors 
contributing to this end state. 
 
2.3 Event Tree Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis 
The ETA identifies the event path toward occurrence of an ATA and the three 
probability components, and derives the equation for the total probability of ATAs. To 
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assess the individual probability components in more detail, FTA is used. FTA provides a 
logical and graphical presentation of various combinations of the basic events that can 
lead to the top event (Ericson, 2005). Each of the three probability components can be 
considered as a top event and broken down into basic events, allowing easier data 
collection and probability calculation. The combination of ETA and FTA provides a 
comprehensive PRA method and structure to address the probability of ATA (Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 PRA structure for ATAs 
 
2.4 Fault Tree Construction 
A fault tree consists of events and logic gates (Figure 2.4). Different logic gates 
represent different probability calculation processes (Table 2.1). For example, an AND 
gate connecting event F and event G with event B means that both event F and event G 
have to occur to trigger the occurrence of event B. An OR gate connecting events C, D 
























D or E occurs. Events C, D, E, F and G, are basic events and are the lowest level of event 
that contribute to the occurrence of the top event whose probability can be evaluated. 
Events A and B are intermediate events between the top event and basic events. The top 
event is the hazard of interest whose probability is to be assessed. In my research, the top 
event is an ATA. Conditioning events specify the order for a sequence of events to occur. 
External events are those that contribute to the occurrence of the top event from outside 
the defined system. 
 
 
















The development of the ATA fault tree is based on: a) existing fault trees 
developed for train accidents on typical railroad systems, b) analysis of previous ATA 
reports, and c) expert judgment. Fault trees have previously been developed for various 
types of train accidents as discussed in the literature review. These were used as a 
reference for developing an ATA-specific fault tree. For example, train accidents in 
Europe have been broken down into causes (aka, “deducted”) by the RSSB (2014). I used 
a similar approach based on the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Rail Equipment Accident database to deduct the 
initial derailment data into accident causes. I treated these accident causes and other 
factors that lead to an ATA as basic events and connected them with logic gates. A fault 
Name Symbol Description
Events
Basic Event An event requiring no further deduction
Intermediate Event
An event that occurs because the lower-level events 
connected with it occur through certain logic gates
External Event An event which is normally expected to occur
Conditioning Event
An event with specific conditions or restrictions applying to 
any logic gates connected with it
Logic Gates
AND
The higher-level event occurs only when all lower-level events 
connected through logic gate occur
OR
The higher-level event occurs if at least one of the lower-level 
events connected through logic gate occur
PRIORITY AND
The higher-level event occurs only when all lower-level events 
connected through logic gate occur in a specified sequence
TRANSFER The connection to other fault trees
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tree is developed for an ATA (Figure 2.5). The initial derailment, the intrusion and the 
train presence on an adjacent track are connected by the AND gate to the top event (an 
ATA), meaning that all three intermediate events have to occur so that an ATA will occur 
as illustrated by the event tree (Figure 2.2). Although each of the three probability 
components can be considered as a top event, they are treated as intermediate events in 
the ATA fault tree so that the probabilistic relationship between them and the top event 
ATA can be established. I introduce the branches for the three intermediate events in the 
fault tree in the following paragraphs.  
 
2.4.1 Initial Derailment (D) 
The initial derailment results from various train derailment causes. Thus, this 
intermediate event is deducted into five types of accident causes: infrastructure (DT), 
equipment (DE), signal and communication (DS), human factor (DH), and miscellaneous 
(DM) as defined by the FRA (2011). Each type of accident cause is further deducted into 
accident-cause subgroups. For instance, infrastructure caused derailment events (DT) are 
deducted into seven accident-cause subgroups: track geometry (T1), broken rail or welds 
(T2), rail defects (T3), turnout defects (T4), buckled track (T5), roadbed defects (T6), and 
other track and structure defects (T7). These accident-cause subgroups are treated here as 
basic events due to the resolution of the data currently available; however, any accident-
cause subgroup can be further deducted if more in-depth analyses are required or more 
detailed data become available. Statistical and causal analysis of train accidents are 
presented in chapter 3, and how the result of the analysis is used in the comprehensive 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.2 Intrusion from Derailed Rail Equipment (I) 
The major impact of an intrusion event is the excessive lateral displacement of 
derailed equipment (ID). Some studies have analyzed the probability distribution of 
lateral displacement of rail equipment in derailments (Barkan, 1990; English et al., 2007; 
Clark et al., 2013). When lateral displacement of derailed equipment exceeds the track 
center spacing of two adjacent tracks, the derailed equipment will intrude onto the 
adjacent track. Installation of crash walls or containment may prevent the intrusion by 
keeping the derailed equipment off adjacent tracks. Crash walls are earth berms, concrete 
walls or other types of barrier constructed between tracks that can prevent such intrusions 
(Hadden et al., 1992; Moyer et al., 1994; Ullman and Bing, 1995). Containment is some 
structure located directly on the infrastructure to prevent the train from rolling over and 
intruding onto adjacent tracks, such as a parapet or guard rail (Abtahi, 2013; Bae et al., 
2018a) (Figure 2.6). Crash walls and containment act in similar ways to reduce the 
occurrence of intrusion. There are two circumstances where they cannot protect the 
adjacent track from an intrusion: if they are not present on the track segment where the 
intrusion occurs (LW), or they are installed but are overcome by the impact force of the 
derailed equipment during the intrusion (CC). The probability of intrusion given an initial 
train derailment and the factors affecting this probability are discussed in chapter 4; 
integration of the intrusion probability into the comprehensive ATA probability 





Figure 2.6: Geometric conditions of the containment wall (Bae et al., 2018a) 
 
2.4.3 Train Presence on Adjacent Tracks (T) 
When an intrusion occurs, there may be another train on an adjacent track, 
resulting in a collision between the derailing train and the train on the adjacent track. If 
the train on the adjacent track is right next to the train derailing and intruding its 
equipment onto the adjacent track, a collision is almost inevitable. If the train on the 
adjacent track is at a certain distance away from the intrusion location, there is a 
possibility that the train on the adjacent track can stop before striking the intruding 
equipment. Two factors contribute to the probability of stopping the train on the adjacent 
track before it strikes the intruding equipment: installation of an intrusion detection 
warning (IDW) system and braking capability of the train on the adjacent track. IDW 
systems are special fences or chains that are equipped with sensors located between 
adjacent tracks to detect train intrusions (Figure 2.7). When an intrusion is detected, a 
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warning signal is sent to the train engineer so that they can stop the train, or an automatic 
train protection will apply the train’s brake.  
 
 
Figure 2.7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) trackage 
(center) and CSX trackage (outer) with intrusion detection fence between them 
(Photo credit: Matt Johnson) 
 
The failure or absence of the IDW system increases the probability that the train 
on the adjacent track will be unable to stop soon enough before striking the intruding 
equipment; however, since the failure or absence of the IDW system does not guarantee 
the occurrence of an ATA, they are not included in the fault tree. That said, the IDW 
system is included in the comprehensive ATA probability assessment that I introduce  
in chapter 6.  
 
Braking capability of the train on the adjacent track is another factor affecting the 
train presence probability. Train speed, train type and consist, track grade, and the type of 
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braking system affect the distance required to stop a train. These factors combined with 
the distance between trains on adjacent tracks and derailed equipment when an intrusion 
occurs affect the probability of an adjacent track collision (ND). Another brake-related 
factor is the reliability and failure rate of the train braking systems (FB). If the train 
braking system malfunctions (EB) or the train engineer fails to properly apply the train’s 
brakes (HB), the train on the adjacent track will not be able to avoid the collision even if 
the initial distance between the train and the intruding equipment is long enough for it to 
have stopped. The probability of a train collision occurring, given the distance between 
two trains operating on adjacent tracks when an intrusion occurs, and the braking 
capability of trains is discussed in chapter 5. The reliability of the train braking system, 
and how it affects the probability of train presence and the overall probability of ATA, is 
discussed in chapter 6. 
 
2.5 Boolean Algebra 
Once the fault tree is constructed, the probability of top event occurrence can be 
calculated using Boolean algebra. Each intermediate and basic event is denoted by two-
letter abbreviations, except initial derailment (D), intrusion (I), and train presence on the 
adjacent track (T). In the fault tree, the OR gate represents the union of input events, and 
the Boolean expression for the OR gate is Q = A∪B, or A+B. The AND gate represents 
the intersect of input events, and the Boolean expression for the AND gate is Q = A∩B, 
or A∙B. By definition, the occurrence of an ATA is the intersect of the occurrences of 




𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐴   ∙  ∙                                                                  ( . ) 
 
The rate of the initial derailment is the sum of the rates of the infrastructure (DT), 
equipment (DE), signal and communication (DS), human factor (DH), and miscellaneous 
(DM) caused derailment, head-on collision, and rear-end collision events. Each 
corresponds to the rates of the union of lower level events shown in the fault tree (Figure 
2.5), assuming all basic events are mutually independent: 
 
    +  𝑀 +   +  𝐸 +  𝐻 
     (  +   +  3 +  4 +  5 +  6 +  7) + 𝑀 +   + (𝐸 + 𝐸 + 𝐸3)
+ (𝐻 + 𝐻 + 𝐻3 + 𝐻4 + 𝐻5 + 𝐻6 + 𝐻7)             ( . ) 
 
The probability of an intrusion given an initial derailment is the probability of the 
union of the crash wall and containment failure (CF) intersecting with the excessive 
lateral displacement toward the adjacent track (ID). Assuming all basic events are 
mutually independent, the probability of intrusion can be expressed as: 
 
  𝐶 ∙    (𝐿𝑊 + 𝐶𝐶) ∙    𝐿𝑊 ∙   + 𝐶𝐶 ∙                          ( .3) 
 
Finally, the probability of train presence on adjacent tracks given an intrusion is 
the probability of the union of failing to brake the train (FB) and not enough distance 
between trains on adjacent tracks (ND). Each corresponds to the probability of the union 
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of lower level events shown in the fault tree (Figure 2.5), also assuming that all basic 
events are mutually independent: 
 
   𝐵 + 𝑁  (𝐸𝐵 + 𝐻𝐵) + 𝑁                                                         ( .4) 
 
The probability of an ATA can therefore be expressed in Boolean algebra as: 
 
𝐴 𝐴   ∙  ∙   
 ((  +   +  3 +  4 +  5 +  6 +  7) + 𝑀 +   + (𝐸 + 𝐸 + 𝐸3)
+ (𝐻 + 𝐻 + 𝐻3 + 𝐻4 + 𝐻5 + 𝐻6 + 𝐻7))
∙ (𝐿𝑊 ∙   + 𝐶𝐶 ∙   ) ∙ ((𝐸𝐵 + 𝐻𝐵) + 𝑁 )                ( .5) 
 
The result can be used to identify the minimal cut set of basic events such that 
they guarantee the occurrence of the top event. A cut set is a set of basic events whose 
occurrence ensures that the top event occurs, and the minimal cut set is the cut set that 
cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set (Modarres et al., 2010). For 
example, the cut set “T2∙LW∙ID∙ND” represents an ATA scenario where a broken rail 
derailment occurs (T2) resulting in an intrusion due to excessive lateral displacement of 
derailed equipment (ID) and the lack of crash wall protection (LW), followed by a 
collision between the derailed equipment and another train on an adjacent track because 
there is not enough distance for the train on the adjacent to brake and stop (ND). If any of 
the four events does not occur, the ATA will not occur. Thus, cut set “T2∙LW∙ID∙ND” is 
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a minimal cut set. Assuming that all the basic events are independent of each other, the 
probability of an ATA caused by this minimal cut set is: 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐴,𝑇2∙𝐿𝑊∙𝐼𝐷∙𝑁𝐷  𝑃(  ) × 𝑃(𝐿𝑊) × 𝑃(  ) × 𝑃(𝑁 )             ( .6) 
 
The probability of the union of all minimal cut sets equals the probability of an 
ATA. Once the data for each basic event of the fault tree are acquired, the probability of 
an ATA can be calculated. The mutual independence assumption among each basic event 
needs further testing and verification in order to increase the accuracy of PRA. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1 Data Sources and Analysis Requirements 
In order to implement the FTA and its corresponding probabilistic model, existing 
accident databases such as the FRA’s Rail Equipment Accident database (FRA, 2011) or 
the RSSB’s Safety Management Information System (SMIS) database (RSSB, 2018) can 
be combined with the respective country or region’s rail traffic data to estimate the 
derailment rate for a specific rail line or network. Additional sources needed to estimate 
the probabilities of intrusion and adjacent train presence may include the data collection 
for lateral displacement of derailed equipment, IDW systems, crash walls and 
containment, braking capability of trains and reliability of train braking systems, and 
records of close calls (or near misses) where a collision might have occurred but did not. 
Additional analyses needed include quantitative assessment of the factors affecting 
intrusion probability, the effectiveness and reliability of crash walls and containment in 
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preventing intrusion, effectiveness and reliability of IDW systems, and stochastic 
modeling of train presence at a specific location.  
 
2.6.2 FTA and New Rail System Planning 
When planning a new rail system, safety is a critically important consideration, 
specifically, minimization of potential hazards and mitigation of consequences if they do 
occur. Before these hazards can be addressed, potential causes must be systematically 
identified. When all factors and possible ways for them to result in the hazards are 
explored, the risk of those hazards can be comprehensively addressed, and risk mitigation 
or prevention measures can be deployed effectively and efficiently. The FTA described 
here provides a foundation for the evaluation of ATA on a new rail system.  
 
For a new rail system with multiple track sections or potential SRCs, the FTA and 
corresponding probabilistic model can be implemented to evaluate the ATA probability. 
Factors affecting ATA probability can be evaluated and the relationships among them 
compared to determine the effect of possible design alternatives on ATA probability for 
the new system. ATA risk mitigation strategies can also be evaluated using the FTA. For 
example, the spacing between two tracks affects intrusion probability. Wider track 
spacing reduces the risk of an ATA due to the reduced intrusion probability; however, at 
many locations, the space for railroad right-of-way and construction is constrained, or 
land acquisition is difficult or impractical. In order to mitigate ATA probability at such 
locations, installation of crash walls, barriers or containment systems, or IDW system 
may be considered. The model can be used to evaluate the ATA probability for different 
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track segments of the new rail system and the results used to optimize the design for safe 
and efficient train operations.  
 
2.6.3 FTA and Existing Railroad Network Safety Improvement 
The FTA presented here can also be used to improve existing or expanded 
multiple track sections in a railroad corridor. These can be divided into segments based 
on route characteristics, traffic composition, presence of crash walls and other relevant 
factors, and the FTA can be used to evaluate segment-specific ATA risk. Segments where 
ATA risk is high can be identified and prioritized for risk mitigation. Similar to the 
design of a new rail system, the FTA can also evaluate the effectiveness of risk mitigation 
strategies on existing corridors. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I explored and identified the basic events that contribute to the 
occurrence of ATA and developed a methodological structure to evaluate its probability 
using ETA and FTA. I used Boolean algebra to develop the logical relationships among 
basic events in the ATA fault tree. I also discussed the importance and potential 
application of FTA in the context of ATA probability assessment. The developed ATA 
fault tree serves as a foundation for further development of PRA and the evaluation of 






CHAPTER 3  
 
MAINLINE PASSENGER TRAIN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
 
Adapted from 
Lin, C.Y., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2018. Analysis of mainline passenger train 
accidents in the United States and safety implications on shared-use rail corridors. 
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and 
Rapid Transit (under review). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Research on train-accident analyses in the United States has focused primarily on 
freight train derailments (Birk et al., 1990; Dennis, 2002; Barkan et al., 2003; Anderson 
and Barkan, 2004, 2005; Liu et al., 2011; 2012; 2013a; Liu, 2015; Liu et al., 2017; Li et 
al., 2018), hazardous material releases (Nayak et al., 1983; Saccomanno and El-Hage, 
1989; 1991; Kawprasert and Barkan, 2008; Bagheri et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013b; 2014; 
Liu and Hong, 2015; Liu, 2017a; b) and grade crossing incidents (Benekohal and 
Elzohairy, 2001; Austin and Carson, 2002; Saccomanno et al., 2004; Mok and Savage, 
2005; Saccomanno et al., 2007; Chadwick et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2015a; b). 
Relatively few studies have focused on quantitative analysis of U.S. passenger train 
safety. Much of the research that has been done was investigating passenger rail 
equipment damage resistance and crash energy management systems. These systems are 
intended to reduce casualties in a train collision or derailment (Simons and Kirkpatrick, 
1999; Kirkpatrick et al., 2001; Tyrell 2002a; b; Tyrell and Perlman, 2003). Lin et al. 
(2016) conducted a fault tree analysis to identify major factors that could lead to an 
adjacent track accident on shared passenger and freight rail corridors. Lin and Saat (2014) 
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developed a semi-quantitative risk assessment model to evaluate adjacent track accident 
risk and identified factors that affect train intrusion probability. 
 
Internationally, there have been more quantitative studies of passenger train 
accidents. Niwa (2009) analyzed significant Japanese railway accidents by five major 
aspects, namely liveware-person concerned, liveware-other personnel, hardware, 
software, and work place, and conducted case studies of several severe accidents. Ouyang 
et al. (2010) used System Theoretic Accident Models and Process (STAMP) to analyze a 
severe railway accident on the Jiaoji Railway in China. Chen et al. (2017) used 
Associated Rule and other data mining techniques to analyze Chinese passenger train 
accidents. Britton et al. (2017) conducted causal analysis of train derailments  
in Australia.  
 
Studies of passenger rail safety are especially rich in Europe. Evans (2000) 
conducted a statistical analysis of fatal train accident trends on British railways. The 
author proposed an exponential function to predict the declining trend of train accident 
rates and applied it to other mainline railway systems in Japan, Britain, and Europe 
(Evans, 2007; 2010; 2011b). Silla and Kallberg (2012) studied the development of 
railway safety in Finland and Santos-Reyes and Beard (2006; 2009) used the Systemic 
Safety Management System model to analyze two major passenger train accidents in the 




These studies provide insights into accident analysis methodologies and results 
for reference and comparison; however, there are a number of differences in operating 
practices, rolling stock, and organizational structure that affect passenger train safety in 
the U.S. environment. This is especially so in the context of North American shared-use 
corridors (SRCs) where heavy-axle-load freight trains are the norm, but are rare on most 
other nations’ rail systems. On many European and Asian rail networks, passenger trains 
generally outnumber freight trains and trains usually run on fixed schedules, whereas in 
North America, freight trains are the dominant type, and most of them operate on a 
flexible schedule (Furtado, 2013). Another difference is the design of passenger rolling 
stock. In Europe and Asia passenger cars are lighter weight and run at higher speeds with 
more rapid acceleration and deceleration rates. In North America, passenger rail 
equipment is heavier because it must meet robust crash-worthiness standards because of 
possible collisions with heavy locomotives and freight cars in accidents. Consequently, 
results from previous research on passenger train accidents in other parts of the world are 
not directly transferrable to the U.S. rail environment. Further study of passenger train 
accidents is necessary to understand how to most effectively manage and reduce the risk 
associated with U.S. passenger train operation. 
 
In this chapter, I present an analysis of mainline passenger train accidents in the 
United States from 1996 to 2017. The objective is to understand the general trend of 
mainline passenger train accident rates, quantify the frequency and severity of different 
accident types, and identify the major factors that cause them. In addition, I explore the 
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potential effect of positive train control (PTC) and train speed on passenger train accident 
risk, and the implications of passenger train accident analysis to SRC risk management. 
 
3.2 Passenger Train Accident Analysis 1996 – 2017 
Train accident data from the United States Department of Transportation 
(USDOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) were used for the analysis (FRA, 
2017a). Railroad accidents/incidents that result in monetary loss exceeding a specified 
threshold must be reported to the Rail Equipment Accident (REA) database maintained 
by FRA (2019). This threshold is periodically adjusted for inflation and is low enough so 
that only relatively minor incidents are not included. The FRA categorizes train accidents 
into thirteen types (Table 3.1). For the purpose of the analysis described in this chapter, 
these thirteen types were consolidated into five broad accident categories. Incidents 
caused by defective pantograph or overhead catenary system occur relatively 
infrequently, and although such incidents can cause large monetary damage to railroad 
infrastructure and equipment and thus must be reported, they pose little, if any, hazard to 
on board passengers and crew, which is the principal interest of my research. Therefore, 













Passenger train accident rate is calculated as the number of accidents per million 
passenger train miles. In 1996, the first year of my study period, there were 0.99 
accidents per million passenger train miles. In 2017, the most recent year for which data 
were available, this figure had dropped to 0.90 accidents per million passenger train miles 
(Table 3.2). During the intervening years this rate fluctuated widely, peaking at 1.075 in 
2004 (Figure 3.1a).  
 
To understand what was affecting the rate, the data were broken down by the five 
accident categories defined above: derailment, collision, grade crossing, obstruction, and 
miscellaneous (Figure 3.1b). The fluctuations appear to be driven primarily by grade 
crossing and obstruction accidents, both of which are largely outside of railroads’ control. 
Derailments and collisions showed a weak but generally downward trend. This is 
consistent with the downward trend of mainline freight train derailment and collision 
rates, although the freight railroad trend is more obvious (and in fact, statistically 
significant) (Liu, 2015; 2016). 
Accident/Incident Type Type Code Category in This Chapter
Derailment 1 Derailment
Head-on collision 2 Collision
Rear collision 3 Collision
Side collision 4 Collision
Raking collision 5 Collision
Broken-train collision 6 Collision
Grade crossing incident 7 Grade Crossing
Railroad crossing collision 8 Collision
Obstruction 9 Obstruction
Explosive-detonation 10 Miscellaneous
Fire/violent rupture 11 Miscellaneous
Other impact 12 Miscellaneous






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1: FRA-reportable mainline passenger train accident rates, 1996 – 2017  



















































































































Miscellaneous accidents were uncommon and showed no evident trend. Perhaps 
the most interesting pattern observed is the contrast between passenger train grade 
crossing accident rate and freight train grade crossing accident rate, which has steadily 
declined over the same time period (Mok and Savage, 2005; FRA, 2017b). In the past 
two years the passenger train accident rate has increased evidently due primarily to an 
increase in grade crossing and obstruction accidents. Whether this is simply due to 
random fluctuation associated with the relatively small number of accidents, or indicative 
of an actual increasing trend is not known.  
 
A time series analysis was conducted for the different types of passenger train 
accident data (Table 3.3). Negative binomial and Poisson regressions were used to fit the 
data and passenger train traffic and time trending factors were selected as parameters to 
be estimated. I used the Akaike Information Criterion method (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criterion method (BIC) to determine which regression model provided a 
better fit to the data. The results show that no particular temporal trend was evident for 
the different types or for the overall total. Passenger train traffic has increased over the 
analysis period as suggested above (Table 3.2); however, the effect of passenger train 
traffic is not statistically significant in most of the categories with the exception of 
obstruction incidents. This suggests that the increase in passenger train traffic over time 






Table 3.3: Time series analysis of FRA-reportable mainline passenger train accident 




Risk is generally defined as the probability of a particular event multiplied by its 
consequence (Elvik and Voll, 2014). In order to identify the types of accidents that pose 
greater threat (i.e. higher probability, consequence, or both), accident rate and severity for 
each category of mainline passenger train accident were plotted in a frequency-severity 
graph (Figure 3.2). Frequency-severity graphs are a helpful risk visualization tool for 
train accidents because they enable comparison of the relative frequency and severity of 
different accident types. They have been used in a number of other railroad accident 
Type of Accident Derailment Collision Grade Crossing
Fitted Model Poisson Poisson Negative Binomial
Intercept 2.85 -0.33 21.40
Traffic -2.14E-09 2.07E-08 1.31E-10
(t-statistic) -7.78E-02 3.66E-01 1.32E-04
Time Trending Variable -1.53E-02 -5.55E-02 9.56E-01
(t-statistic) 2.94E-01 5.16E-01 5.09E-01
Log-likelihood -55.5 -43.0 -79.9
AIC 117.0 91.9 167.7
BIC 120.3 95.2 172.1
Type of Accident Obstruction Miscellaneous Total
Fitted Model Poisson Negative Binomial Negative Binomial
Intercept 6.69 0.55 55.10
Traffic -5.30E-08 3.23E-12 1.00E-08
(t-statistic) 2.43E+00 2.54E-11 6.58E-09
Time Trending Variable 1.10E-01 7.62E-03 8.87E-01
(t-statistic) 2.70E+00 3.16E-02 3.08E-01
Log-likelihood -65.8 -23.3 -89.9
AIC 137.6 54.6 187.8
BIC 140.9 59.0 192.1
Number of sample (years) (n)
Number of coefficient (k)
Degree of freedom (n-k-1)
5% critical value for the t-statistic








analyses (Barkan et al., 2003; Dick et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2019). The 
graph is divided into four quadrants on the basis of average frequency (AF) and average 
severity (AS) along each axis.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Frequency-severity graph for FRA-reportable mainline passenger train 
accidents, 1996 – 2017 
 
Frequency in this graph is defined as train accident rate. Several different 
variables were considered to measure passenger train accident severity. The number of 
railcars derailed has often been used as a proxy variable to measure freight train accident 
severity (Saccomanno and El-Hage, 1989; 1991; Barkan et al., 2003; Kawprasert and 
Barkan, 2008; Liu et al., 2012; 2013a; b; 2014; Wang et al., 2019). For passenger trains, 
casualties are another important metric of accident severity (Evans, 2000; 2007; 2010; 












































total number of onboard passenger and crew injuries and fatalities, and were used as the 
primary severity indicator.  
 
To distinguish the difference in severity implied by injuries and fatalities, I used 
the Fatality Weighted Index (FWI). The FWI assigns different weights to a fatality, a 
major injury, and different levels of minor injuries (Bearfield et al., 2013). Weights for 
each category differ by approximately an order of magnitude: one fatality is equivalent to 
ten major injuries, 200 reportable minor injuries, and 1,000 non-reportable minor injuries. 
FWI is used in train accident analyses involving human injuries and fatalities (Aas et al., 
2008; Sadler et al., 2016). There are only two levels of severity for onboard passengers 
and crew recorded in the FRA REA database: a person is either injured or fatally injured. 
Therefore, a ten to one ratio was assigned to a fatality, meaning that one fatality was 
equivalent to ten injuries. 
 
Accident categories in the upper-right quadrant of the frequency-severity graph 
are the most likely to pose the greatest risk because they are both more frequent, and 
more severe, than average. None of the five accident categories fell in this quadrant, but 
derailments and collisions were most likely to result in high-casualty incidents. Together, 
they accounted for about 22% of passenger train accidents, but caused about 63% of total 
casualties (Table 3.4). Derailments and collisions also caused more damage to rail 
equipment and infrastructure and were more likely to result in onboard passenger and 
crew casualties. Although grade crossing incidents had the highest frequency, they were 
among the least severe in terms of consequences to onboard passengers and crew. 
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Obstruction incidents also had above-average frequency and low severity. These are 
incidents in which trains collide with foreign objects such as trees, boulder or vehicles 
that are not at grade crossings (Table 3.5). With few exceptions, obstruction incidents 
were less likely to cause severe onboard passenger and crew casualties. Therefore, in this 
chapter I examine mainline passenger derailments and collisions in more detail. 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of frequency, accident rate, casualties and average casualties 















Grade Crossing 706 49.2% 0.3743 1,311 27.3% 1.86
Obstruction 393 27.4% 0.2084 436 9.1% 1.11
Derailment 261 18.2% 0.1384 1,765 36.7% 6.76
Collision 61 4.3% 0.0323 1,284 26.7% 21.05
Miscellaneous 14 1.0% 0.0074 10 0.2% 0.71
Total 1,435 100.0% 0.1522 4,806 100.0% 3.35
Object Frequency

























3.3 Causal Analysis for Passenger Train Derailment and Collision Accidents 
To further understand which factors contributed the most to passenger train 
derailments and collisions, I conducted a causal analysis (Barkan et al., 2003; Liu et al., 
2011; 2012). When a railroad reports a train accident, they identify the cause using the 
predefined FRA (2011) cause codes. There are two types of accident causes in the FRA 
accident reporting system: primary cause and contributing cause. A primary cause is the 
most direct cause leading to the occurrence of the accident, and a contributing cause is a 
factor that may have directly or indirectly led to the accident, but was not as important as 
the primary cause. The FRA’s accident reporting system allows one primary cause code 
entry and one contributing cause code entry. In some cases, two cause codes may be 
equally important. In these cases, the determination of which one is considered as the 
primary cause is left to the accident reporting personnel’s best judgment. In some cases, 
when the primary cause code for an accident is clear, but multiple contributing causes 
were identified, the most relevant or appropriate one is entered based on the accident 
reporting personnel’s best judgment. 
 
Railroad accidents usually result from two types of causes: direct causes and 
underlying causes. Examples of the former include failure to obey signals, broken rail, 
broken wheel, and signal equipment failure. Underlying causes do not directly lead to the 
occurrence of an accident but may foster a negative environment that makes an operation 
more prone to train accidents. Some examples of underlying causes are: engineer (train 
driver) fatigue (Sussman and Coplen, 2000; Dorrian et al., 2011; Zeinab et al., 2016), 
improper maintenance of infrastructure or rolling stock (Singh and Kumar, 2015), and 
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poor safety culture in the organization (Farrington-Darby et al., 2005; Baysari et al., 
2008). The FRA accident-cause codes capture most of the direct causes but are not as 
effective in identifying underlying causes. Some causes can be both a direct cause and an 
underlying cause of an accident, but in the FRA’s reporting system, those causes are 
primarily used as the former (for example, engineer fatigue). In this analysis, the primary 
accident-cause codes of passenger train derailments and collisions were used to plot the 
frequency-severity graph. 
 
FRA train-accident-cause codes are hierarchically organized and categorized into 
major cause groups – track (infrastructure), equipment (rolling stock), human factor, 
signal, and miscellaneous (FRA, 2011). Each of these major cause groups has subgroups 
that include individual codes for related causes. In this chapter, I use the adjusted FRA 
subgroups developed by Arthur D. Little (ADL) and the Association of American 
Railroads (AAR) in which similar cause codes were grouped based on expert opinion 
(ADL, 1996). The ADL groupings enable greater resolution for certain train accident 
causes. For example, FRA combines broken rails, joint bars and rails anchors in the same 
subgroup, whereas the ADL grouping distinguishes between broken rail and joint bar 
defects (Liu et al., 2012). (A complete list of FRA accident cause codes and ADL cause 
groupings is presented in the Appendix) 
 
The frequency and severity graph of mainline passenger derailments and 
collisions by major accident-cause groups was plotted (Figure 3.3). As in Figure 3.2, the 
graph is divided into four quadrants to enable comparison of the frequency and severity 
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of the different cause groups. The Train Operation Human Factor cause group had above-
average frequency and was the most severe in terms of average casualties, accounting for 
30% of the total derailments and collisions, but 69.6% of the total casualties (Table 3.6). 
Track, Roadbed, and Structures accidents were more frequent than Train Operation 
Human Factor, but less severe (40.1% of the total derailments and collisions and 25.8% 
of the total casualties). Both Train Operation Human Factor and Track, Roadbed, and 
Structure related accident causes consistently represented the most frequent and severe 
accident-cause groups, together accounting for a total of 70.2% of derailments and 
collisions, and 95.3% of casualties; therefore, they were analyzed in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Frequency and severity graph of mainline passenger derailments and 













































Table 3.6: Summary of frequency, accident rate, casualties and average casualties of 




In order to identify trends in specific accident causes, the five-year moving 
average of combined derailment and collision rate was broken down by accident-cause 
group (Figure 3.4). Track, Roadbed and Structure and Train Operation Human Factor 
were consistently the most frequent accident-cause groups over the 22-year study period, 
with Track, Roadbed and Structure being the highest for every five-year interval except 
1998 – 2002, 2008 – 2012, and 2012 – 2016. The trend implies that there is a change in 
the distribution of accident causes for passenger train derailments and collisions over 
time and may reflect the railroad industry’s emphasis on preventing certain types of 
accident causes. For example, prior to 2010, infrastructure-related accidents comprised a 
large fraction of passenger train derailments, but these have been substantially reduced 
since then due to investment in infrastructure and defect detection technologies. The 
decreasing trend of infrastructure-related accidents has led to a shift in focus toward 









Train Operation Human Factor 97 30.1% 0.0514 2,121 69.6% 21.87
Track, Roadbed, and Structure 129 40.1% 0.0684 786 25.8% 6.09
Miscellaneous 38 11.8% 0.0201 97 3.2% 2.55
Mechanical and Electrical Factors 52 16.1% 0.0276 44 1.4% 0.85
Signal and Communication 6 1.9% 0.0032 1 0.0% 0.17




Figure 3.4: Five-year moving average of combined mainline passenger train 
derailment and collision rate, 1996 – 2017, by accident-cause group 
 
The accident-cause groups were further analyzed by preparing a frequency and 
severity graph for the more detailed accident-cause subgroups (Figure 3.5). Each data 
point represents one accident-cause subgroup. Data points with the same color and shape 
indicate that these subgroups are in the same accident-cause group. In terms of average 
casualties, four accident-cause subgroups were in the upper-right quadrant, and thus most 
likely to pose the greatest risk due to their high frequency and severity. All of them are 
from the Train Operation Human Factor group: 
 
• Failure to Display/Obey Signals (05H) 
• Train Speed (10H) 
• Miscellaneous Human Factors (12H) 

































































Figure 3.5: Frequency and severity graph of mainline passenger derailments and 
collisions, 1996-2017, by accident-cause subgroups with average casualties 
 
These four subgroups accounted for 20.8% of the total mainline passenger 
derailments and collisions but 67.5% of total casualties (Table 3.7). Among all the 
subgroups identified in the upper-right quadrant, Misc. Human Factors, had the highest 
average casualties per accident, followed by Failure to Display/Obey Signals, Train 
Speed, and Mainline Rules. Overall, the five most frequent accident-cause subgroups 
were: Turnout Defect – Switches, Failure to Obey/Display Signals, Wide Gauge, Other 
Miscellaneous, and Use of Switches. Combined they accounted for 43.5% of total 
derailments and collisions and 41.9% of total casualties. Two of the top five most 
frequent accident-cause subgroups were infrastructure related, two of them were human 
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Broken Rails or Welds




Table 3.7: Summary of frequency, accident rate, severity and average severity of 
mainline passenger train derailments and collisions, 1996 – 2017, by accident-cause 











Number Percentage Number Percentage Average Number Percentage Average
05T Buckled Track 3 0.9% 0.0016 180 5.9% 60.0 25 2.9% 8.3
02T Infrastructure Damage Causes 4 1.2% 0.0021 173 5.7% 43.3 21 2.4% 5.3
07T Joint Bar Defects 3 0.9% 0.0016 124 4.1% 41.3 22 2.5% 7.3
12H Misc. Human Factors 10 3.1% 0.0053 403 13.2% 40.3 35 4.0% 3.5
05H Failure to Obey/Display Signals 30 9.3% 0.0159 1030 33.8% 34.3 101 11.6% 3.4
10H Train Speed 13 4.0% 0.0069 405 13.3% 31.2 46 5.3% 3.5
08H Mainline Rules 14 4.3% 0.0074 219 7.2% 15.6 21 2.4% 1.5
04H Employee Physical Condition 1 0.3% 0.0005 14 0.5% 14.0 18 2.1% 18.0
06T Rail Defects at Bolted Joint 3 0.9% 0.0016 30 1.0% 10.0 20 2.3% 6.7
01T Roadbed Defects 2 0.6% 0.0011 15 0.5% 7.5 8 0.9% 4.0
09T Other Rail and Joint Defects 2 0.6% 0.0011 10 0.3% 5.0 4 0.5% 2.0
08T Broken Rails or Welds 14 4.3% 0.0074 69 2.3% 4.9 59 6.8% 4.2
05M Other Miscellaneous 22 6.8% 0.0117 86 2.8% 3.9 75 8.6% 3.4
04T Track Geometry (excl. Wide Gauge) 20 6.2% 0.0106 57 1.9% 2.9 47 5.4% 2.4
15E Loco Trucks/Bearings/Wheels 13 4.0% 0.0069 29 1.0% 2.2 18 2.1% 1.4
10T Turnout Defects - Switches 38 11.8% 0.0201 84 2.8% 2.2 75 8.6% 2.0
09E Sidebearing, Suspension Defects (Car) 2 0.6% 0.0011 4 0.1% 2.0 5 0.6% 2.5
11H Use of Switches 22 6.8% 0.0117 43 1.4% 2.0 36 4.1% 1.6
02H Handbrake Operations 4 1.2% 0.0021 7 0.2% 1.8 14 1.6% 3.5
03T Wide Gauge 28 8.7% 0.0148 35 1.1% 1.3 86 9.8% 3.1
11T Turnout Defects - Frogs 1 0.3% 0.0005 1 0.0% 1.0 5 0.6% 5.0
01M Obstructions 11 3.4% 0.0058 10 0.3% 0.9 41 4.7% 3.7
12T Misc. Track and Structure Defects 11 3.4% 0.0058 8 0.3% 0.7 23 2.6% 2.1
18E All Other Car Defects 9 2.8% 0.0048 5 0.2% 0.6 10 1.1% 1.1
04M Track-Train Interaction 2 0.6% 0.0011 1 0.0% 0.5 5 0.6% 2.5
13E Other Wheel Defects (Car) 12 3.7% 0.0064 5 0.2% 0.4 17 1.9% 1.4
06E Centerplate/Carbody Defects (Car) 5 1.6% 0.0027 1 0.0% 0.2 2 0.2% 0.4
01S Signal Failures 6 1.9% 0.0032 1 0.0% 0.2 9 1.0% 1.5
11E Other Axle/Journal Defects (Car) 4 1.2% 0.0021 0 0.0% 0.0 10 1.1% 2.5
17E All Other Locomotive Defects 3 0.9% 0.0016 0 0.0% 0.0 5 0.6% 1.7
07H Switching Rules 3 0.9% 0.0016 0 0.0% 0.0 3 0.3% 1.0
03M Lading Problems 3 0.9% 0.0016 0 0.0% 0.0 0 0.0% 0.0
14E TOFC/COFC Defects 2 0.6% 0.0011 0 0.0% 0.0 6 0.7% 3.0
07E Coupler Defects (Car) 1 0.3% 0.0005 0 0.0% 0.0 1 0.1% 1.0
19E Stiff Truck (Car) 1 0.3% 0.0005 0 0.0% 0.0 1 0.1% 1.0












The frequency and severity for each accident-cause subgroup for mainline 
passenger train derailments and collisions were ranked by average casualties (Table 3.7). 
Buckled Track, Infrastructure Damage Causes, and Joint Bar Defects were the top three 
accident-cause subgroups indicating that although they occurred infrequently, on average 
they had high severity when they did occur. This characteristic is also illustrated by their 
placement in the upper left quadrant of Figure 3.5, indicating that derailments and 
collisions resulting from these accident causes, although infrequent, can lead to severe 
passenger casualties. Misc. Human Factors, Failure to Obey/Display Signals, Train 
Speed, and Mainline Rules were the fourth to seventh ranked accident-cause subgroups. 
They also had high average severity, but they were more frequent than the previous three 
accident-cause subgroups. This is also consistent with the result shown by the frequency-
severity graph (Figure 3.5). 
 
3.3.1 Positive Train Control (PTC) Preventable Accident Causes 
Positive Train Control, or PTC, refers to an advanced train control system that is 
being implemented to prevent train-to-train collisions, overspeed derailments, incursion 
into established work zones, and derailments due to misaligned switches (FRA, 2018). 
Among the most frequent passenger-train accident-cause subgroups are PTC-preventable 
accidents (PPA). For example, accidents due to Failure to Obey/Display Signals (05H), 
Use of Switches (11H), Mainline Rules (08H), Train Speed (10H) will often be PPAs. All 
four accident-cause subgroups identified in the upper-right quadrant in the frequency-
severity graph are also generally PPAs. The average casualties for these PPA cause 
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subgroups are greater than the average severities for all accident-cause subgroups 
combined (Table 3.7). 
 
3.4 Effect of Speed on Passenger Train Derailment and Collision Cause 
Previous research has shown that on average the speed of a train at the time of 
derailment was positively correlated with derailment severity (Nayak et al., 1983; 
Saccomanno and El-Hage, 1989; 1991; Barkan et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2011; 2012; 
2013a). Previous research has also found an inverse relationship between FRA track class 
and freight train derailment rate (Nayak et al., 1983; Anderson and Barkan, 2004; Liu et 
al., 2013a; 2017). 
 
The number and percentage of mainline passenger train derailments and collisions 
by speed range and accident-cause category were plotted (Figure 3.6). The majority of 
train accidents – about 57% – occurred at speeds below 20 mph. This may be related to 
the relatively high frequency of defective-turnout-caused derailments. Turnouts are found 
at stations, terminals, and the ends of sidings where trains are likely to slow down due to 
speed restrictions, scheduled stops, or meet/pass activities. Infrastructure related 
accidents occurred in almost all speed ranges and had the highest percentage except the 
>100 mph category. No specific trends were found for human-factor-caused and 
equipment-caused accidents. The three accidents that occurred above 100 mph were 




Figure 3.6: Number (a) and percentage (b) of mainline passenger train derailments 






































































































To further understand what caused derailments or collisions at different speeds, 
the number of mainline passenger train derailments and collisions by accident-cause 
subgroup in different speed ranges was analyzed (Table 3.8). In the 0-20 mph range, 
Turnout Defects – Switches was the top accident-cause subgroup, consistent with the 
previous suggestion regarding low-speed accident causes. In the 21-40 mph and 41-60 
mph ranges, Failure to Obey/Display Signals was the most frequent subgroup. In the 61-
80 mph and 81-100 mph ranges, some equipment-related accident-cause subgroups, 
namely All Other Car Defects and Other Wheel Defects (Car) were the top causes. The 
three accidents in which speed was above 100 mph were in the following three 
subgroups: All Other Locomotive Defects, Centerplate/Carbody Defect (Car) and Misc. 
Human Factors. Summaries of these three accidents are as follows (in order of  
accident date): 
 
1. April 12th, 2001. Amtrak train was side-swiped by an improperly secured 
locomotive door from a freight train on the adjacent track (accident type: raking collision; 
Amtrak train speed: 110 mph, no cars derailed; no casualties; accident-cause subgroup: 
All Other Locomotive Defects) 
 
2. January 24th, 2004. Amtrak train was side-swiped by an improperly secured 
freight car door from a freight train on the adjacent track (accident type: raking collision; 
Amtrak train speed: 110 mph, no cars derailed, no casualties, accident-cause subgroup: 
Centerplate/Carbody Defect (Car)) 
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3. May 12th, 2015. Amtrak train derailed while traveling at 102 mph in a curve 
with a 50 mph civil speed restriction, resulting in 1 locomotive and 7 passenger cars 
derailed; 229 casualties; accident-cause subgroup: Misc. Human Factors (NTSB, 2015c). 
 
Table 3.8: Most frequent accident-cause subgroups of mainline passenger train 





In this chapter, I analyzed passenger train accidents in the 22-year period from 
1996 to 2017 and identified major accident types and causes. I also investigated the 
relationship between train speed and accident frequency, severity and accident causes. 
These findings provide understanding of factors affecting passenger train accident risk 
and a basis for further improvement in passenger train safety. Based on these results, 
several directions for future research are discussed. 
 
3.5.1 Adjacent Track Accidents on Shared-Use Rail Corridors 
With the development of high-speed rail, as well as continued improvement in the 
conventional passenger rail system in the United States, there will be more SRCs and 
0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 >100
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consequently more mixed passenger and freight train operations (Shih et al., 2015). In 
such an environment, the consequences of train derailments and collisions have important 
implications for passenger safety. Of particular interest are adjacent track accidents (Saat 
and Barkan, 2013). Adjacent track accidents, or ATAs, occur when a train derails and 
intrudes onto adjacent tracks, and then strikes or is struck by, trains on those tracks. With 
more trains operating on a corridor, the probability of train interactions also increases, 
meaning that if a train derails and intrudes onto an adjacent track, there is a greater 
chance that another train will be present or approaching on the adjacent track. 
Furthermore, higher passenger train speed on these SRCs means the potential 
consequences of an accident are also greater. Focusing on the risk of adjacent track 
accidents will help improve our understanding of this risk and lead to more effective risk 
reduction strategies. 
 
ATAs are likely to increase in relative frequency in the coming decade due to the 
expected decline in frequency of PPAs as PTC is fully implemented. Most of the 
accident-cause groups occupying the upper-right quadrant in Figure 3.5 are PPAs 
whereas ATAs will not be substantially affected by PTC, leaving them as a relatively 
more important source of risk on SRCs, especially in multiple track territories.  
 
3.5.2 Comparison of Passenger Train Derailment/Collision and Freight Train 
Derailments/Collisions 
Another important aspect of SRC safety is more accurate estimation of train 
accident rate. Due to different train characteristics, infrastructure, rolling stock designs, 
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and operating practices, the train accident rates and predominant accident causes likely 
differ between passenger and freight rail systems. From the analysis presented in this 
paper some differences in general trends in accident rates were observed. Further study of 
the differences in passenger and freight train derailment and collision rates, as well as the 
distribution of accident causes will inform more effective risk management and 
mitigation strategies. This is particularly important for quantifying and managing the risk 
on SRCs. This can be achieved by combining the statistical findings from this study with 
previously developed freight train derailment and collision statistics. 
 
3.5.3 Accident Precursors 
As safety continues to improve in the railroad system, statistical analyses to 
reliably estimate risk will become more challenging due to the smaller empirical basis for 
analysis (Elvik and Roll, 2014). To address this, accident precursors must be considered. 
An “Accident Precursor” is defined by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) as: 
 
“an anomaly that signals the potential for more severe consequences 
that may occur in the future, due to causes that are discernible from its 
occurrence today (NASA, 2011).” 
 
An example of an accident precursor in a railroad system is a locomotive engineer 
over-running a stop signal, but without any further consequence such as a collision or 
derailment. Train accidents are a subset of accident precursors, meaning that under 
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certain conditions, accident precursors will result in train accidents, but most will not. 
Analyzing accident precursors provides more data and consequently more robust 
predictive risk estimates. Studying accident precursors also allows researchers to identify 
preventive measures that can reduce risk at the precursor event level, and potentially 
further reduce the occurrence of train accidents. For example, if a preventive measure can 
effectively reduce the probability of an engineer passing a stop signal, it can also reduce 
the probability of a train accident caused by Failure to Obey/Display Signal. Positive 
Train Control is an example of a preventive measure that will prevent this type of 
precursor event, as well as accidents associated with this cause, and certain others as 
well. Accident precursor analysis has been implemented in the United Kingdom (Fowler 
et al., 2013) and in the United States. The Confidential Close Call Reporting System has 
been implemented by the FRA to collect close call (or “near miss”) data (FRA, 2017c). 
Analyses of data from such reporting systems are likely to reveal promising candidates 
for safety improvement. 
 
3.5.4 Positive Train Control 
My analysis indicates that PPA causes account for a large proportion of passenger 
train derailment and collision risk, in terms of both frequency and severity. These results 
suggest that reducing the number of accidents due to PPA cause subgroups will reduce 
the overall risk of passenger train derailments and collisions. Current railroad industry 
implementation of PTC is expected to substantially reduce the occurrence of many of 
these accidents (Zhang et al., 2018). PTC is a crucial element in SRC implementation 
because of its potential to reduce the risk of train accidents involving hazardous materials 
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or passengers. Consequently, further research on the specific types and circumstances of 
accidents that PTC is intended to prevent may enable further refinement of its capabilities 
and those circumstances where other approaches to improving train safety will be  
more effective. 
 
3.5.5 Human Factor Analysis 
Train Operation Human Factor was identified as the most frequent and severe 
passenger train accident-cause category. Consequently, addressing these causes will be 
critical to the success of further passenger train risk reduction efforts. In the previous 
subsection, several human-factor causes can be reduced or prevented by implementing 
PTC, including Failure to Obey/Display Signal and Train Speed Violation.  
 
Certain human factor causes, while not the major source of risk that PTC is 
intended to prevent, are also important for railroad operational safety and thus require 
risk assessment. As discussed in the introduction to the FRA accident data reporting 
system, causal analyses presented in this analysis accounted for the direct accident causes 
for passenger train accidents. There are some underlying causes that indirectly contribute 
to the occurrence of these accidents. Examples include, but are not limited to, employee 
fatigue, maintenance error, excessive workload, and organizational safety management 
and safety culture. Although these factors do not directly lead to train accidents, they 
affect a wide range of railroad operations and therefore incur greater overall risk. These 
factors also are the root causes, or common causes, for those direct accident causes. 
Railroad human factor research encompasses a wide spectrum of topics including human 
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fatigue in train operation, ergonomics, and human performance in the train control 
system. Overall, there are important opportunities to reduce passenger train derailments 
and collision risk by addressing human factors. 
 
3.5.6 Data Mining Applications in Railroad Safety Improvement 
Expanded automated data collection systems, combined with rapid advances in 
data mining technology, mean that new methodologies are available for rail safety 
analyses. These include associated rules (Chen et al., 2017), STAMP (Ouyang et al. 
2010), and Maximal Information Coefficient (Shao and Li, 2017). Data mining 
techniques can be implemented to increase risk model accuracy and to handle complex 
effects from multiple (and perhaps correlated) influencing factors. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I presented the results of a study to identify the most important 
factors contributing to the risk of passenger train accidents. Derailments and collisions 
were identified as the most potentially significant train accident types, while human 
factor accidents and track failures were the primary causes of those accidents. Accident 
causes related to human factors and train operations such as train speed violations and 
failure to obey signals are often high-consequence accidents and therefore pose the 
greatest risk. Higher risk infrastructure-related factors include track geometry defects and 
broken rails or welds. PPAs also account for a large portion in terms of both frequency 
and severity. This analysis of train accident causes is important for rational allocation of 
resources to reduce accident occurrence and consequences and provides a foundation for 
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further improvement in passenger train safety. Passenger train accident rate developed in 








INTRUSION PROBABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
When a train derails in multiple-track territory, there is a possibility that derailed 
equipment will intrude onto adjacent tracks. As depicted in the adjacent track accident 
(ATA) event tree (Figure 2.2), intrusion is one of the key events that may lead to 
subsequent collisions with other trains on adjacent tracks; therefore, it is important to 
address its probability while assessing ATA risk.  
 
 Intrusion risk was first formally identified in a study conducted by Booz Allen & 
Hamilton (1989) for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Since then 
Hadden et al. (1992) conducted a qualitative risk assessment of shared-use rail corridors 
(SRCs), including intrusion risk and evaluated the effectiveness of risk mitigation 
measures. Barkan (1990) used data from the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) to quantify the distribution of lateral distance traveled by derailed equipment in 
train accidents. English et al. (2007) extended this work by incorporating data from the 
FRA and the Canadian Transportation Safety Board, in addition to the NTSB data, to 
develop a more sophisticated understanding of the lateral and longitudinal displacements 
of derailed equipment under various conditions. Clark et al. (2013) further developed an 
analytical tool based on English et al.’s work to evaluate lateral distance traveled by 




Cockle (2014) conducted a semi-quantitative risk analysis to address the risk of 
intrusions of conventional trains onto high-speed rail trackage. The assessment 
considered accident rates on conventional railroad tracks and various factors affecting the 
likelihood of intrusion. Cockle’s model calculated the ratio of the derailment rate of a 
conventional track section adjacent to HSR track and the national average derailment 
rate, and multiplied that by estimated traffic volume. This provided a base value for Site-
Specific Derailment Frequency (SSDF). A rating system was developed to evaluate the 
intrusion risk and effects of influencing factors. Factors that affect the probability of 
intrusion were identified and each factor was assigned a rating based on its effect on 
intrusion probability. These factors were assigned to one of three categories: causation 
factors, effect factors, and nullifying factors that conditionally negate the entire SSDF 
(Table 4.1). Finally, a risk index system, the Relative Hazard Frequency Assessment, was 
developed by multiplying SSDF and all ratings assigned from intrusion factors to 










Horizontal Alignment Tangent 0
Horizontal Curve 0.1
Vertical Alignment Grade < 1% 0
Vertical Curve or Grade ≥ 1% 0.1
Type of Movement Through Movement, No Stops 0
Speed Change or Routine Stopping Point 0.1
Yard or Industrial Switching 0.3
Special Track Work None 0
Single 0.1
Multiple 0.2
Movement Authorization Timetable or Special Instruction Only 0
Block Signal System -0.1
Positive Train Control -0.5
Access to Right-of-Way (ROW) Open, No Controls 0
Access-Control Barrier -0.1
Highway-Rail Grade Crossing None 0
Private -0.1
Public -0.3
Train Defect Detectors None 0
Standard Train Defect Detector within Five Miles -0.1
Wheel Impact Load Detector within 50 Miles -0.2
Effect Factors:
Horizontal Alignment Tangent 0
High-Speed Rail Track on Inside of Curve -0.2
High-Speed Rail Track on Outside of Curve 0.2
Speed Less Than 20 mph 0
Between 21 and 40 mph 0.1
Greater Than 40 mph 0.2
Horizontal Distance Greater Than 102 Feet 0
102 Feet to 86 Feet 0.1
85 Feet to 59 Feet 0.3
Less Than 59 Feet 0.6
Elevation At-Grade 0
Elevated Greater Than Ten Feet 0.4
Below-Grade Greater Than Ten Feet -0.4
Adjacent Structure None 0
Deflects Derailment Toward High-Speed Rail Track 0.1
Mitigates Derailment Per TM 2.1.7 Criteria -0.7
Overhead Structure None, or Protected 0
Unprotected Overhead Structure 0.2
Nullifying Factors:
Horizontal Distance 125 Feet or Greater 0
Less Than 125 Feet 1
Horizontal and Vertical Separation Horizontal Separation > 25 Feet and Vertical Separation > 10 Feet 0
Other Than Above 1
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 The aforementioned studies established a foundation for addressing intrusion risk 
by qualitatively identifying the risk and potential mitigation measures and conducting 
preliminary quantitative intrusion probability analysis; however, there is still a gap 
between current research in intrusion risk and a comprehensive risk assessment model for 
ATAs. Specifically, development of a general intrusion probability model that can be 
used for all types of railroad systems and incorporating the intrusion probability model 
into a comprehensive ATA risk assessment model has not been addressed. Cockle’s 
model is a useful attempt to develop an ATA risk assessment model that takes into 
account both the initial derailment rate and intrusion probability, but it does not account 
for the probability of train presence on adjacent tracks. His model focuses on interactions 
between trains operating on conventional rail lines and high-speed trains on adjacent 
trackage and assumes that once an intrusion occurs, a collision between a conventional 
train and a high-speed train on adjacent tracks is inevitable and will result in unacceptable 
consequences. Cockle's model focuses on identifying factors affecting intrusion 
probability but does not delve into factors affecting the initial derailment rate. 
 
In this chapter, I identify the critical factors that affect intrusion probabilities and 
how can they be incorporated in the comprehensive ATA risk assessment mode. I also 
identify factors that affect initial derailment rates, probabilities of train presence, and 
consequences of ATAs. These factors are different from the basic events identified in the 
fault tree analysis in chapter 2, because those are the elements contributing to the 
occurrence of an ATA, while the affecting factors identified in this chapter do not lead 
directly to an ATA, but instead affect its likelihood. The affecting factors identified in 
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this chapter are used to develop the comprehensive ATA probability assessment 
presented in chapter 6. In addition, I present a semi-quantitative ATA risk assessment 
model that considers key factors affecting the probability and consequence of an ATA. I 
develop a risk index system similar to Cockle’s model but consider several additional 
factors that affect all three probability components in an ATA enabling comparison of 
ATA risk among different track segments in any type of railroad system. I also discuss 
the data needed to conduct a fully quantitative risk analysis. This semi-quantitative risk 
model serves two purposes: 1) it is an interim step towards a comprehensive ATA risk 
assessment model, as the intrusion probability derived in this chapter is a key probability 
component in that model and 2) it can also serve as a standalone screening-level ATA 
risk assessment tool to provide high-level risk evaluation to identify locations, track 
segments, or portions of railroad corridors that require more detailed, quantitative risk 
analysis. The factors affecting intrusion probability that are not quantified here will be 
incorporated in qualitative form in chapter 6. 
 
4.2 Semi-Quantitative Risk Analysis 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Semi-quantitative risk assessment is a technique that uses numerical values to 
describe and evaluate relative risk (Gadd et al., 2003). These numerical values may be 
order-of-magnitude risk estimates, some ordinal risk metric, or risk indices. Although 
these values do not reflect the actual probability and/or consequences of hazards, they can 
provide information regarding the relative scale of risk. Semi-quantitative risk analysis is 
useful in relative risk comparison, especially when a full quantitative risk analysis is 
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infeasible due to insufficient data to support a fully quantitative risk calculation. It is also 
used to identify factors contributing most to risk in a system, the portion of a system with 
the highest hazards, and can help managers determine whether quantitative risk 
assessment is needed and in what elements of the system. 
 
Semi-quantitative risk assessment has been implemented in various fields of 
scientific study including veterinary (Delahay et al., 2007), food hygiene (Ross and 
Sumner, 2002; Sumner and Ross, 2002), occupational safety (Jacinto and Silva, 2010), 
supply chain network (Moonis et al., 2010) and transportation safety (Reniers et al. 
2010). In railroad applications, besides Cockle’s model, semi-quantitative risk assessment 
has been used to address railroad human factors on European railroads (Bepperling, 
2008). I am unaware of any previous research focused on semi-quantitative risk 
assessment of ATAs. 
 
4.2.2 Risk Model 
A common definition of risk is the product of the probability of an event and the 
consequence of that event. It is commonly expressed as follows: 
 








The probability, P, is divided into three components corresponding to the three 
major events described in the ATA event tree. The semi-quantitative ATA risk model is 
thus defined using a risk index system as follows: 
 
R = P(D) × P(I|D) × P(T|I|D) × C             (4.2)                    
where: 
R: The risk index for an ATA 
P(D): The probability of an initial derailment on a multiple track section 
P(I|D): The conditional probability of intrusion (CPI) given an initial derailment  
P(T|I|D): The conditional probability of the presence of a train on an adjacent 
track given an intrusion 
C: The consequence of an ATA 
 
The risk index system consists of probability and consequence components. Each 
model component has five levels with corresponding values from one (lowest) to five 
(highest). To obtain the level for each component, various infrastructure, rolling stock, 
train operating characteristics, and any other relevant factors are considered. Selection of 
these characteristics and factors is based on previous studies and expert judgment. Each 
relevant characteristic or factor contributes “scores” to the level of specific model 
component(s), and based on the total score, levels of model component are determined. 
Using these levels, an ATA risk index is assigned (Figure 4.1). A railroad corridor being 
analyzed is divided into multiple segments and risk indices for each segment are 
calculated using equation 4.2. In the following subsections, I introduce and discuss each 





Figure 4.1: Risk score, risk level, and ATA risk index 
 
4.2.3 Probability of Initial Derailment, P(D), and Accident Factors 
The probability of an initial derailment can be estimated by analyzing historical 
train accident data. The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) Rail Equipment Accident/Incident (REA) database 
contains train accident data as well as annual railroad traffic volume data in the US (FRA, 
2011). Five factors affecting the probability of initial derailment are identified and 
discussed below: method of operation, track quality, traffic density, type of equipment, 
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4.2.3.1 Method of Operation 
In the context of this research, method of operation indicates the presence or 
absence of a wayside signal or automatic train control system. Previous research found 
that accident rate on signaled track segments is lower than non-signaled track segments 
(Liu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019). In this study, track segments are classified as either 
signaled or non-signaled based on the results from these studies. 
 
4.2.3.2 Track Quality 
The FRA classifies railroad track into nine classes based on maximum authorized 
speed and maintenance standards. Previous research has found an inverse relationship 
between FRA track class and train derailment rate (Nayak et al., 1983; Anderson and 
Barkan 2004; Liu et al., 2017). In this research, track classes are categorized into five 
groups based on their differences in train derailment rate (Liu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 
2019). Track classes 6 and higher are grouped together because they are primarily used 
for passenger train operation. I am unaware of any quantitative analyses of derailment 
rates for FRA track classes higher than 5 but based on the research cited above, we 
presume that they are at least as low, and probably lower, than class 5. 
 
4.2.3.3 Traffic Density 
Traffic density is measured in annual millions of gross tons (MGTs). It includes 
the total weight of all locomotives, rolling stock, and lading operating on a particular 
segment of track. Higher traffic densities are correlated with lower derailment rates (Liu 
et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019). The exact mechanism for this is not known but it may 
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result from more frequent inspection, maintenance, and frequency of wayside defect 
detection systems on high density rail lines. Dedicated passenger lines also have lower 
derailment rates due to higher track maintenance standards and inspection frequency. In 
addition, lighter axle loads of passenger equipment inflicts relatively less damage to the 
track structure, reducing the potential for accidents due to track defects. Thus, it is 
assumed that, ceteris paribus, dedicated passenger lines have lower derailment rates than 
freight only or mixed freight and passenger traffic lines. 
 
4.2.3.4 Type of Equipment 
Failures of wheels, axles, and other rolling stock components can cause 
derailments. Different component designs may have different failure rates; however, 
there is little quantitative data on how these may affect derailment rates. In this study, I 
assume that passenger railroad equipment has higher reliability than freight rail 
equipment due to the more frequent and detailed equipment inspection and maintenance. 
Future research is needed to better understand the effect of type of equipment on train 
derailment rate. 
 
4.2.3.5 Defect Detectors and Track Inspections 
Wayside defect detection technology is used to identify incipient flaws in various 
rolling stock components before they fail, thereby reducing the likelihood of a 
derailment. For example, Wheel Impact Load Detectors are used to identify wheel defects 
that can lead to a mechanical failure (Johansson and Nielsen, 2003; Stratman et al., 2007; 
Hajibabai et al., 2012; Van Dyk et al., 2013). Similarly, various types of track inspections 
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and technologies are used to identify defects before they result in a failure such as a 
broken rail, thereby reducing the likelihood of infrastructure-related derailments (Dick et 
al., 2003; Barkan et al., 2003; Liu et al. 2012; 2013a; b; c; 2014). Although it is well 
accepted that these technologies and practices are effective at reducing derailment 
likelihood, the quantitative relationship between the use of a particular technology and its 
preventive effect has not been measured. Thus, future research is needed to better 
understand and quantify the effect of wayside defect detectors and track inspections on 
derailment rate reduction. In this study, I assume that track segments with defect 
detectors have lower derailment rates than track segments without  
defect detectors. 
 
I assign an Accident Factor Score (AFS) to each factor affecting derailment 
probability (Table 4.2). The AFS ranges from 1 to 2 for each factor where the base value 
is 1. The higher the AFS, the greater the increase in initial derailment probability. For a 
given track segment, the AFS values are summed, and based on the total AFS, a level of 
initial derailment probability is assigned (Table 4.3). The effects of different factors on 
the initial derailment probability may vary. For instance, the effect of FRA track class 








Table 4.2: Summary of factors affecting the initial derailment probability and AFS 
 
Accident 




6 or above 1.00 
5 1.25 
4 1.50 
2, 3 1.75 
X, 1 2.00 
Traffic 
Density 
Freight-Train only or Freight and 
Passenger Shared Lines: 
More than 60 MGT 1.00 
40 - 60 MGT 1.33 
20 - 40 MGT 1.67 
Less than 20 MGT 2.00 
Passenger-Train only Lines: 







80% or More Passenger 
Train Traffic 1.00 
Mixed Traffic 1.50 
80% or More Freight 





The highest AFS possible 10.00  
The lowest AFS possible 5.00 
 
 
Table 4.3: Total AFS and level of initial derailment probability 
 
Total AFS Level of P(D) 
AFS ≤ 6 1 
6 < AFS ≤ 7 2 
7 < AFS ≤ 8 3 
8 < AFS ≤ 9 4 
AFS > 9 5 
 
The effects on probability from different levels of the same factor may also vary. 
Taking FRA track class as an example, the change in effect on train derailment 
probability between class 4 track and class 5 track is likely to differ from the change of 
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effect on train derailment probability between class 5 track and class 6 track. Some of 
these relationships are addressed by quantitative analyses, while others are not fully 
understood. In this research, I used a linear approach for affecting factors in which each 
has an equal effect on the initial derailment probability, and each level within a factor 
also has an equal impact on initial derailment probability. For the purpose of consistency 
and simplicity, there are some underlying assumptions for the AFS: the effect of each 
factor is weighted equally, the AFS for each factor is equally divided by the number of 
categories for the factor, and the total AFS is equally divided into 5 levels. 
 
4.2.4 Conditional Probability of Intrusion, P(I|D), and Intrusion Factors 
Several factors affect intrusion probability including distance between track 
centers, track alignment and geometry, elevation differential, adjacent structures, 
containment, train speed, and point of derailment. In order to account for these factors in 
the model, an Intrusion Factor Score (IFS) is assigned to each factor for a track segment 
similar to AFS. The effects of each factor are discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.2.4.1 Distance between Track Centers 
Research by English et al. (2007) found an inverse relationship between the 
distance between track centers and probability of intrusion. The authors developed the 
distribution of maximum lateral distance traveled by derailed rolling stock (Figure 4.2) 
and found a gamma distribution was the best fit for the data. The parameters for the fitted 
gamma distribution were later updated by Clark et al. (2013) and these are used in the 
comprehensive ATA probability assessment model presented in chapter 6. In the model 
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described in this chapter, IFS for distance between track centers is assigned based on the 
25th, 50th, 60th and 80th percentile from the probability distribution of lateral 
displacement from English et al.’s research. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Maximum lateral travel distribution (English et al., 2007) 
 
 
4.2.4.2 Track Alignment and Geometry 
Track alignment and geometry indicates whether a track segment is tangent, 
curved, level, or on a grade. A level, tangent track segment is considered the base case 
scenario. If a derailment occurs on a curved track segment, additional lateral forces may 
increase the intrusion probability. A derailment on a grade affects longitudinal forces that 
indirectly affect intrusion probability. These longitudinal, in-train forces do not directly 
cause lateral movement of equipment; however, they may affect the extent that derailed 
rolling stock collides with other equipment in the train. These impacts may cause 
equipment to be moved laterally or rotate causing an intrusion on an adjacent track. 
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When these two factors occur together I assumed that, ceteris paribus, these track 
sections will have higher intrusion probability than curved-only or gradient-only sections. 
 
4.2.4.3 Elevation Differential between Adjacent Tracks 
If there is an elevation difference between two adjacent tracks, derailments 
occurring on either track may have different intrusion rates. Specifically, derailments on 
the high track are more likely to intrude onto the lower track due to derailed equipment 
falling down the embankment (Figure 4.3a). Conversely, derailed equipment on the lower 
track is less likely to intrude onto the higher adjacent track because of the constraining 
effects of gravity and the embankment (Figure 4.3b). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Effect of elevation differential on intrusion probability 
 
4.2.4.4 Adjacent Structures 
Adjacent structures along a railroad line may have a "rebound" effect (Figure 4.4) 
that alters the direction of travel of derailed equipment. If a structure is close enough to 




from “away from adjacent tracks” to “toward adjacent tracks”, then its presence could 
affect intrusion probability. Adjacent structures, depending on their shape and density, 
are classified into three types: single, discrete, and continuous structures. A single 
structure is an independent, self-supported structure such as a bridge abutment or a pier. 
Discontinuous structures could be multiple buildings located close to each other along a 
track segment, such as a group of grain elevators or silos. Examples of a continuous 
structure are noise barriers located alongside the track or residential buildings along the 
track in an urban area. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Effect of adjacent structure on intrusion probability 
 
 
4.2.4.5 Containment  
Containment refers to structures that prevent derailed equipment from intruding 
onto adjacent tracks. Containment may also reduce the consequences by absorbing 
energy from derailed equipment (further discussed in the Consequence section of this 
chapter). Two types of containment are currently used in HSR systems in Europe and 
Asia: parapets and physical barriers (Hadden et al., 1992; Moyer et al., 1994; Ullman and 
Bing, 1995; Rulens, 2008). Parapets are reinforced railings or structures mounted 
adjacent to the track to keep the derailed trucks (bogies) of equipment in line and prevent 
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it from intruding onto adjacent tracks (Figure 4.5). Physical barriers can be earth berms or 
concrete walls (Figure 4.6) installed between adjacent tracks to absorb the impact forces 
of derailed equipment and prevent it from intruding onto adjacent tracks.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Parapet contains the wheel set of derailed equipment and prevents the 
equipment from intruding onto an adjacent track (Bae et al., 2018a) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Drawing of a physical barrier between a high-speed rail train and a 




4.2.4.6 Train Speed 
Train speed may affect intrusion probability because the higher the speed, the 
more energy involved when a train derails, resulting in more opportunity for the derailed 
equipment to move farther and foul adjacent tracks. Train speed on a track segment is 
assigned high, medium, or low, based on the average speed for the segment. The average 
train speed is affected by various factors such as type of traffic (bulk freight, inter-modal, 
passenger, etc.), traffic heterogeneity, track alignment, track class, and method of 
operation. Two speeds were selected for categorization: 23 mph for the average speed of 
freight trains on major railroads in the US, and 79 mph which is the maximum authorized 
speed of passenger trains on most US passenger and freight shared rail corridors. These 
speeds were selected to represent typical North American railroad operating conditions. 
 
4.2.4.7 Point of Derailment 
Point of derailment (POD) has been used to refer to the position of the first 
vehicle derailed in a train (Anderson, 2005; Liu et al., 2013a). This position may affect 
intrusion probability due to reaction forces at the coupler. Also, because the first and last 
vehicle are only coupled at one end, they are less restrained with regard to lateral 
movement and might have more chance to rotate and foul adjacent tracks in a derailment. 
Vehicles elsewhere in the train consist are coupled at both ends, providing greater 
restraining force. The most common situation is when a single vehicle in a train derails 
and causes other vehicles to derail, resulting in a larger derailment and intrusion. Due to 
this level of uncertainty, the effect of POD is not known and will require further research 
to better understand the effect of this mechanism. Compared with other intrusion factors, 
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POD is a post-accident factor rather than a pre-accident factor. That is, we would not 
know which car in the train consist will derail before the derailment occurs. As such, it is 
difficult to pre-assign scores to this factor in the model.  
 
Similar to AFS, IFS is assigned for each intrusion factor. The higher the IFS, the 
greater the increase in intrusion probability. Each factor has an IFS ranging from 1 to 2 
where the base value is 1. For a track segment, the IFS values from all intrusion factors 
are summed. Based on the total IFS, a level of intrusion probability (from 1 to 5) is 
assigned. The intrusion probability has the same assumption as the probability of initial 
derailment. Table 4.4 summarizes intrusion factors except POD and associated IFS and 
the relationship between total IFS and corresponding levels of P(I|D) (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.4: Summary of intrusion factors and IFS 
 
Intrusion 
Factor Criteria (Level) IFS 
Distance 
Between Track 
Centers, X, in 
feet (meters) 
X > 80 (24.4) 1.00 
55 (16.7) < X ≤ 80 (24.4) 1.25 
30 (9.1) < X ≤ 55 (16.7) 1.50 
15 (4.5) < X ≤ 30 (9.1) 1.75 
X ≤ 15 (4.5) 2.00 
Track 
Alignment 
Tangent and level 1.00 
Tangent and on gradient when 
traveling upward 
1.13 
Tangent and on gradient when 
traveling downward 
1.25 
Curved on outside track and level 1.38 
Curved on inside track and level 1.50 
Curved on inside track and on 
gradient when traveling upward 
1.63 
Curved on outside track and on 
gradient when traveling upward 
1.75 
Curved on outside track and on 
gradient when  
traveling downward 
1.88 
Curved on inside track and on 





The track where a train derail is 
10 ft. lower than adjacent track 
1.00 
The track where a train derail is 
level with adjacent track 
1.50 
The track where a train derail is 




No adjacent structure 1.00 
Single structure 1.33 
Discrete structure 1.67 
Continuous structure 2.00 
Containment 
Both containments installed 1.00 
Physical barrier installed only 1.33 
Parapet installed only 1.67 
No containment installed 2.00 
Train Speed 
Low (less than 23 mph) 1.00 
Medium (24 mph to 79 mph) 1.50 
High (more than 79 mph) 2.00 
The highest IFS possible 12.00 
The lowest IFS possible 6.00 
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Table 4.5: Total IFS and level of intrusion probability 
 
Total IFS 
Level of  
P (I|D) 
IFS ≤ 7.2 1 
7.2 < IFS ≤ 8.4 2 
8.4 < IFS ≤ 9.6 3 
9.6 < IFS ≤ 10.8 4 
IFS > 10.8 5 
 
4.2.5 Conditional Probability of Presence of Trains on Adjacent Tracks, P(T|I|D), and 
Train Presence Factors 
The third probability component of the ATA risk model is the presence of trains 
on adjacent tracks given an intrusion. There are two variants for the presence of a train. 
One is that when an intrusion occurs, there is a train adjacent to the derailing equipment, 
and the other is that the train on the adjacent track is approaching the intrusion location. 
Factors affecting this probability include intrusion detection systems, traffic density, 
method of operation, and train speed. 
 
4.2.5.1 Intrusion Detection and Warning System 
An intrusion detection and warning (IDW) system detects intruding rail 
equipment when it derails and breaks the fences installed with detectors between tracks 
(Hadden et al., 1992; Ullman and Bing, 1995; Saat and Barkan, 2013). If trains on 
adjacent tracks are a sufficient distance away from the intrusion location, the IDW system 
will allow them to stop before reaching it. If not, they may be able to slow down if not 





4.2.5.2 Traffic Density 
The higher the traffic density, the more likely it is that there will be a train at or 
near an intrusion location. The traffic density for dedicated passenger lines is assigned the 
highest level, while on a mixed-traffic corridor, the traffic density of a track segment is 
measured using freight gross tonnage. This is because on a railroad corridor with only 
passenger trains, these trains are likely to have similar operating patterns such as station 
stops and speed profiles; therefore, the capacity of the corridor increases, and more trains 
can be accommodated. On the other hand, a railroad with mixed traffic encounters 
differing schedules and patterns between passenger and freight trains, meaning that the 
traffic heterogeneity is high, resulting in more train conflicts and consequent delay and 
reduction in traffic density (Dingler et al., 2009; Shih et al., 2015; Sogin et al., 2016). 
 
4.2.5.3 Method of Operation 
Train control systems have differing levels of precision in determining train 
location. They also vary in their ability to communicate the information between 
engineers (train drivers) and dispatchers. For example, a conventional track circuit 
system identifies a train’s location by “signal block” but does not provide the exact 
position of the train, whereas more advanced train control systems are capable of 
identifying the trains’ location more precisely. Such systems include the European Rail 
Traffic Management System in European countries and Advanced Train Administration 
& Communications System in Japan. These advanced train control systems communicate 
information between dispatchers and engineers more efficiently than traditional 
communication methods. IDW can also be integrated with advanced train control systems 
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so that the intrusion warnings can be more efficiently delivered to other trains in their 
proximity (Hadden et al., 1992; Ullman and Bing, 1995). 
 
In the model described in this chapter, train control systems are divided into three 
categories: advanced train control systems, conventional train control systems that detect 
train presence using track circuits, and non-signaled (dark) territory in which there is no 
automatic means of detecting train presence.  
 
4.2.5.4 Train Speed 
If train speed is high enough, a train approaching an intrusion location may not be 
able to stop before striking the derailed equipment fouling the track. Train speed for a 
track segment is assigned high, medium, or low based on the average train speed of the 
adjacent track. 
 
Based on engineering judgment, a Train Presence Score (TPS) is developed for 
each factor (Table 4.6). Similar to the initial derailment probability and intrusion 
probability, each train presence factor has a TPS ranging from 1 to 2 where the base 
value is 1. The total TPS for a specific track segment is calculated by summing the TPS 
from all train presence factors. Total TPS is then converted to levels of train presence 
(Table 4.7). The higher the level, the more likely the probability. Although not all the 
combinations are considered, the selected factors are assumed to be representative of 












 Freight or Freight and Passenger Shared Lines: 
Traffic Density 
Less than 20 MGT 1.00 
20 - 40 MGT 1.33 
40 - 60 MGT 1.67 
More than 60 MGT 2.00 
Passenger Lines: 
Dedicated Passenger Line 2.00 
Method of 
Operation 
Advanced train control 1.00 
Typical train control system 1.50 
Dark territory 2.00 
Average Train 
Speed 
Low (less than 50 mph) 1.00 
Medium (50 mph to 79 mph) 1.50 
High (more than 79 mph) 2.00 
The highest TPS possible 8.00 
The lowest TPS possible 4.00 
 
Table 4.7: Total TPS and level of train presence probability 
Total TPS Level of P(T|I|D) 
TPS ≤ 4.8 1 
4.8 < TPS ≤ 5.6 2 
5.6 < TPS ≤ 6.4 3 
6.4 < TPS ≤ 7.2 4 
TPS > 7.2 5 
 
4.2.6 Consequence and Consequence Factors 
Consequence is the impact from an ATA. The major concern is the consequence 
resulting from a collision between derailed equipment and trains on adjacent tracks. 
Previous research showed that the average casualties for passenger train collisions is 
greater than passenger train derailments (Lin et al., 2013). The consequences of ATAs 
include multiple types of impacts as follows: 
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• Casualties (injuries and fatalities) 
• Equipment damage 
• Infrastructure damage 
• Non-railroad property damage 
• System disturbance and delay 
• Environmental impact 
• Economic loss 
 
I discuss the factors affecting the severity of ATA accidents - speed of train, 
equipment damage resistance, containment, and product being transported - in the 
following subsections. 
 
4.2.6.1 Equipment Damage Resistance 
Equipment damage resistance is a key factor for reducing on-board casualties 
from the derailment and/or collision impact. Carolan et al. (2011) conducted 
crashworthiness analyses for higher-speed passenger trains to understand how equipment 
with crash energy management (CEM) design can withstand greater collision impact 
force and result in less structural damage and fewer passenger casualties. Rolling stock is 
classified into two categories: CEM-designed equipment and conventional equipment. 
CEM-designed equipment refers to passenger cars that meet the FRA Tier I or higher 





4.2.6.2 Train Speed 
With higher train speed, there will be more energy when a derailment or collision 
occurs. Research has shown that higher derailment speed is correlated with a greater 
number of cars derailing (Barkan et al., 2003; Liu et al. 2011); therefore, more severe 
consequences are expected if the train speed is higher. 
 
4.2.6.3 Containment 
The presence of containment reduces the probability of intrusion and also the 
consequences by absorbing the impact forces from derailed equipment (Hadden et al., 
1992; Moyer et al., 1994; Ullman and Bing, 1995). 
 
4.2.6.4 Product Being Transported (Freight Train Only) 
If a collision involves freight trains carrying hazardous materials, it may cause a 
release resulting in more severe consequences.  
 
A Consequence Factor Score (CFS) is assigned to each consequence factor (Table 
4.8). The total CFS is calculated by summing the CFS from individual consequence 








Table 4.8: Consequence factors and CFS 
 
Consequence 
Factor Criteria (Level) CFS 
Equipment 
Strength 
CEM-designed equipment 1.00 
Traditional equipment 2.00 
Speed 
Low (less than 40 mph) 1.00 
Medium (40 mph to 70 mph) 1.50 
High (more than 70 mph) 2.00 
Containment 
Containment Present 1.00 
No Containment 2.00 
Product being 
transported 
No Hazardous material 1.00 
Hazardous material 2.00 
The highest CFS possible 8.00 
The lowest CFS possible 4.00 
 
Table 4.9: Total CFS and level of consequence 
Total CFS Level of Consequence 
CFS ≤ 4 1 
4 < CFS ≤ 5 2 
5 < CFS ≤ 6 3 
6 < CFS ≤ 7 4 
CFS > 7 5 
 
4.2.7 Overall Probability 
Levels of probability for initial derailment, intrusion, and train presence can be 
multiplied together to obtain the overall probability P using equation 4.2. Based on the 
values of P, a level of overall probability is assigned (Table 4.10). 
 
Table 4.10: Overall probability level definitions 
 
Multiplication of P(D), 
P(I|D), and P(T|I) 
Overall Probability 
Level, P 
1 < P ≤ 10 1 
10 < P ≤ 20 2 
20 < P ≤ 30 3 
30 < P ≤ 50 4 
P > 50 5 
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After obtaining the overall probability level, using equation 4.1, an ATA risk 
index, R, is obtained by multiplying the overall probability level, P, and the consequence 
level, C. Note that the risk index is not a quantitative measure of ATA risk. Instead, it 
indicates the relative risk of a track segment compared to other track segments. 
 
4.2.8 Model Application 
The proposed semi-quantitative model enables evaluation and comparison of 
ATA risk on different track segments. A track segment is defined as a portion of a 
railroad corridor including tracks, infrastructure, structures, and signals. A railroad 
corridor is divided into multiple track segments. Segment length varies depending on site 
characteristics and the desired resolution of the analysis. Using the semi-quantitative risk 
model, the ATA risk index is calculated for each track segment based on its 
infrastructure, rolling stock, and operational characteristics. 
 
Evaluation of ATA risk index is based on the number of track pairs. For example, 
if there are two tracks, A and B, adjacent to each other on a segment (Figure 4.7a), the 
ATA risk index for the segment is: 
 
RAB+RBA                                                                                    (4.3) 
 
where: 
RAB: the risk of having an ATA where a train on track A derails and intrudes onto 
track B and strike or is struck by another train on track B 
RBA: the risk of having an ATA where a train on track B derails and intrudes onto 





Figure 4.7: ATA risk relevance among different adjacent tracks 
 
One of the complexities of evaluating ATA risk index is multiple risks being 
calculated on one track segment. If three tracks are adjacent to each other in a segment 
(Figure 4.7b), the ATA risk is calculated for each pair of tracks, and the risk index for 
this track segment is the sum of the risk indices from each pair of tracks: 
 
RAB+RBA+RAC+RCA+RBC+RCA                                                (4.4) 
 
If there are n tracks adjacent to each other in a segment (Figure 4.7c), the ATA 
risk index for this segment is evaluated as follows: 
 




i                                                                      (4.5) 
 
where: 
𝑖 < 𝑗                      ∀𝑖, 𝑗 
 
The aforementioned calculations consider train interactions on adjacent main 
tracks. If there is a railroad yard or terminal in the track segment (Figure 4.7d), the ATA 
…
(a) (b) (c) (d)
A B A B C A B C n A YD
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risk between mainline tracks and tracks in a railroad yard or terminal is evaluated 
separately. Since there are usually multiple tracks in a yard, numerous calculations need 
to be done when a train passes by. Accident rates on yard and terminal tracks are higher 
than on mainline tracks (Anderson and Barkan, 2004). In a busy yard or terminal there 
are many switching operations and thus trains going back and forth in the yard, which 
increases the train presence rate. Most of the train operations in yards and terminals are at 
low speed, which results in lower intrusion rate and consequence. For simplicity, the yard 
or terminal track that is the closest to the mainline represents the whole yard or terminal 
and the ATA risk index between a mainline and a yard or terminal is: 
 
RAY+RYA                                (4.6) 
 
where: 
RAY: the risk of having an ATA where a train on track A derails and intrudes onto 
the closest yard track and strike or is struck by another train on the yard track  
RYA: the risk of having an ATA where a train on the yard track closest to track A 
derails and intrudes onto track A and strike or is struck by another train on 
track A 
 
The total ATA risk index on the railroad corridor is the summation of risk indices 
on all segments, which can be written as: 
 













n: total number of tracks in a segment 
i, j: tracks in the segment m 
𝑖 < 𝑗                                    ∀𝑖, 𝑗 
m: track segment 
p: total number of track segments in the railroad corridor 
 
4.3 Model Limitations and Future Opportunities 
There are some limitations in the proposed semi-quantitative risk assessment 
model. First, the effects of each factor on the probability or the consequence of an ATA 
are weighted equally, but this assumption will generally not be the case. For example, 
distance between track centers may have more effect on the intrusion probability than 
other intrusion factors such as elevation differential and adjacent structure. Second, I 
assume a linear relationship between the change of a factor and its corresponding effect 
on the probability or the consequence of an ATA. This assumption will also not actually 
be the case. For instance, changes in the distance between track centers and the 
corresponding changes in intrusion probability may not result in a linear relationship. 
Addressing the differences in the influence of each factor on P(D), P(I|D), P(T|I|D), and 
C requires quantitative data analyses, but at present, insufficient data are available to 
quantify these relationships; hence the use of a semi-quantitative approach. Development 
of quantitative answers to these questions should be the subject of future research.  
 
Another limitation of the model is that identification of factors and categorization 
of levels of probability and consequence rely on engineering judgment. This is because 
there has not been a general model to encompass all risk components (P(D), P(I|D), 
P(T|I|D), and C) and factors affecting these risk components. A contribution of this 
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research developing a semi-quantitative risk assessment model is identification of factors 
affecting all ATA risk components. 
 
Despite the aforementioned model limitations, the proposed semi-quantitative risk 
assessment model provides a foundation for addressing ATA risk. Once quantitative data 
for each factor are collected, further quantitative analyses can be performed based on the 
proposed, semi-quantitative risk assessment. This model is also dynamic because 
additional factors can be incorporated once they are identified and the model can be 
modified accordingly.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
The research described in this chapter presents the first comprehensive assessment 
of the factors affecting ATA risk, and the likelihood and consequence of ATAs. A semi-
quantitative risk analysis was developed to fulfill this objective. I also defined levels of 
probability and consequence, and various factors affecting the initial derailment, the 
intrusion, the presence of trains on adjacent tracks, and the consequences. The model 
enables comparisons of the relative ATA risks among different track segments. It can 
also be used to locate high-risk locations (risk hotspots) on a railroad corridor where the 
ATA risk is high, and therefore more in-depth analyses and risk mitigation measures may 
be appropriate.  
 
The semi-quantitative model derived in this chapter serves as a key interim step 
towards the development of a comprehensive ATA risk model. Factors affecting intrusion 
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probability that are not quantified will be incorporated in semi-quantitative form in the 
final model. The model structure, combined with engineering judgement, provides a 
useful tool to conduct sensitivity analyses that can be used to refine the understanding of 
which factors are the most important to further investigate. In this way it can provide 






TRAIN PRESENCE AND ADJACENT TRACK COLLISION 
PROBABILITY ANALYSIS IN INTRUSION SCENARIOS 
 
5.1 Introduction  
When an intrusion occurs, the most undesired consequence is that the derailed 
equipment intruding onto an adjacent track strikes or is struck by another train traveling 
on that track. There are several factors affecting the probability of such a collision, 
referred to as an adjacent track collision. The first is the frequency of train meets and 
passes on adjacent tracks. The more train meets and passes, the more likely it is that when 
an intrusion occurs, another train will be next to, or approaching, the intrusion location on 
the adjacent track. The second factor is the distance between the intruding rail vehicle 
and the train on the adjacent track. When an intrusion occurs, trains on the adjacent track 
may be far enough away from the intrusion location that there is little chance of an 
adjacent track collision. Alternatively, they may be close enough to the intrusion location 
that there is a very high likelihood of collision, and in the most extreme situation, a train 
derails and intrudes onto a track while another train is adjacent to it, resulting in an 
immediate collision. Between these two extremes the probability of adjacent track 
collision is affected by two other factors: point of derailment of the intruding equipment 
and the braking capability of trains on the adjacent track.  
 
In railroad train accident investigations, the point of derailment (POD) generally 
refers to the location on the tracks where the first derailed locomotive or railcar leaves the 
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rails. In statistical and risk analysis research on train safety the term POD has also been 
used to refer to the first car or locomotive to derail in a train (Anderson and Barkan, 
2005; Liu et al., 2014) and this is the definition I use in my research. This distribution of 
POD has been shown to vary depending on the cause of the derailment (Liu et al., 2014). 
Train speed, resistance, type and consist, track grade, curvature, friction, and the type of 
braking system all can affect the stopping capability of trains.  
 
In this chapter, I develop probability distributions for adjacent track collisions in 
train meet and train pass scenarios. I also derive a generalized model to quantitatively 
evaluate the probability of train presence on an adjacent track when an intrusion occurs. 
The probability models developed in this chapter are key elements of the comprehensive 
adjacent track accident (ATA) probability assessment model presented in chapter 6. For 
clarity, the probability of an adjacent track collision referred to in this chapter is the 
conditional probability of train collision given an intrusion occurs, and the probability of 
an ATA refers to the probability of the whole event sequence introduced in the ATA 
event tree (Figure 2.2). Therefore, an adjacent track collision can be considered as the 
end state of an ATA. 
 
5.2 Methodology  
I divide train presence and adjacent track collision probability model development 
into the following steps: 
1) Calculate the frequency of train meet and pass events 
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2) Calculate the critical distance where two trains on adjacent tracks pose 
collision risk to one another 
3) For each train meet or pass event, develop probability distributions for 
collisions between derailed rail vehicles and another train on an adjacent track 
4) Derive train presence probability for a track segment in an intrusion scenario 
considering multiple train meets and passes 
 
I describe the methodology and techniques used to carry out each step of the 
model development in the following subsections. The focus of this chapter is to develop a 
collision probability model for train meet and pass activities and identify the factors that 
affect this probability. Another important output is the segment-level train presence 
probability, which serves as part of the ATA probability assessment model. 
 
5.2.1 Frequency of Trains Passing and Meeting Each Other 
To evaluate collision probability between trains on adjacent tracks, we need to 
define the terms train “meet” and “pass”. A train meet (TM) occurs when two trains 
traveling on adjacent tracks in opposite directions go past one another (Figure 5.1a), and 
a train pass (TP) occurs when one train overtakes another train on an adjacent track 





Figure 5.1: Typical (a) train meet (TM) and (b) train pass (TP) scenarios 
 
The more TM and TP activities occurring on a track segment, the higher the 
probability of having an adjacent track collision. For instance, when there is only one 
train running on one track on a multiple track railroad corridor (Figure 5.2a), there is no 
chance of having an adjacent track collision because there are no TM or TP opportunities. 
When there is another train on an adjacent track that will meet the first train (Figure 
5.2b), that event represents the only opportunity for an adjacent track collision if either 
train derails and intrudes onto the adjacent track. If there are two trains (B1 and B2) 
running on the adjacent track (Figure 5.2c), all else being equal, the frequency of TMs on 
the corridor doubles and so does the probability of adjacent track collisions. There is also 
a possible TP opportunity between trains B1 and B2 if train B2 is running at higher speed 
than B1 or if the train dispatcher decides to let train B2 pass B1 at some point on this track 





multiple trains on both tracks (Figure 5.2d), the probability of an adjacent track collision 
increases accordingly based on the total number of TM and TP events.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Train meets on adjacent tracks 
 
If all trains have a fixed schedule and there is no delay on a railroad corridor, the 
number of TM and TP events can be calculated directly by identifying all those events on 
the operating schedule; however, in North America, most freight trains run on flexible 
schedules (Dick et al., 2018), meaning that they do not have a precise departure or arrival 
time on a given day, nor do they have exact locations to perform TMs and TPs during 























trains (e.g. some intermodal trains) run on a more structured schedule (Furtado, 2013; 
Pouryousef et al., 2013) where trains have pre-determined departure time, arrival time, 
and TM and TP locations (Martland, 2008), their operations are not planned in detail nor 
are their schedules as strict as many European or Asian railroad operations (Furtado, 
2013). Therefore, TM and TP locations may still change in these semi-structured 
operations. Train delay may also change the number and location of TM and TP events. 
If a train is delayed, it may not be able to meet or pass other trains where and when it is 
scheduled to.   
 
TM and TP event identification has been analyzed using econometrics (Oh et al., 
2004; Gorman, 2009; Şahin, 2017; Sørensen et al., 2017) and simulation methods (White, 
2005; D’Ariano et al., 2007; Shih et al., 2017). In my research, I use the train conflict 
screening tool developed by Shih et al. (2017) to identify the number of TM and TP 
events. This model calculates TM and TP events using a Monte Carlo process to address 
the uncertainty caused by flexible train scheduling and potential train delays (Figure 5.3). 
The output of this model is the average number of TM and TP events on different track 
segments along a railroad corridor, given track, train and operational characteristics. 
Other methods of identifying TM and TP events may be used if they are more suitable for 





Figure 5.3: Monte-Carlo-process-based train conflict identification model  
(Shih et al., 2017) 
 
In the following subsections, I present the collision probability assessment for TM 
and TP events in two steps. First I calculate the maximum distance between two trains on 
adjacent tracks that may result in a collision at the time an intrusion occurs (Subsection 
5.2.2), while accounting for the point of derailment of intruding rail equipment 
(Subsection 5.2.3). Then, I develop a generalized model to evaluate the probability of 
train collision between two trains within the calculated distance for TM and TP scenarios, 
as well as segment-level train presence probability (Subsection 5.2.4). 
 
5.2.2 Critical Distance (CD) 
When two trains on adjacent tracks meet or pass and are within a certain distance 
of each other when an intrusion occurs, a collision may result. I define the maximum 
distance between two trains on adjacent tracks posing potential collision risk to each 
other as “Critical Distance (CD)”. In other words, any distance greater than CD will not 
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result in an adjacent track collision even if the front of the intruding train derails and 
fouls the adjacent track, given everything else functioning normally. CD is crucial in train 
presence probability calculation because it bounds the collision probability distribution. 
 
 CD is calculated using minimum train braking distance. Two main factors affect 
braking distance: initial train speed and train deceleration rate (IEEE, 2009). Previous 
research developed methodologies to calculate train braking distances based on train and 
track characteristics (Hay, 1982; IEEE, 2009; Thurston, 2011; ERA, 2014). The 
minimum braking distance is calculated as:  
 
 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒  0.7333 ×
𝑉2
𝑏 + 0.008 × 𝑅 + 0. × 𝐺
             (5. ) 
 
where: 
 Dbrake = train braking distance (feet) 
 V = initial speed of the train (miles per hour) 
 b = train deceleration rate (miles per hour per second) 
 R = curvature (degree) 
 G = grade (percent; positive value indicates ascending grades and negative value 
indicates descending grades) 
 
The initial speed refers to the train speed when the train engineer applies brakes. 
The grade and curvature are obtained directly from the infrastructure characteristics of 
the track segment of interest. The train deceleration rate is affected by the total weight of 
the train and train resistance, which is further affected by train speed, air drag factor, 




Two types of deceleration rate are considered in the model: full-service brake 
deceleration rate and emergency brake deceleration rate. The former is the rate used when 
a normal, maximum full service brake application is made. The latter is the deceleration 
rate used when an emergency brake application is made. In this case, all of the possible 
braking power is applied to stop the train. In an air brake system, this means using all of 
the air pressure stored in both the auxiliary and emergency reservoirs on each car in a 
train to achieve the maximum possible braking force and deceleration rate. 
 
The selection of deceleration rate depends on different TM and TP scenarios. 
Train engineers avoid use of emergency brakes unless it is truly an emergency because it 
may cause discomfort or injuries to passengers, is potentially harmful to rolling stock and 
infrastructure, causes excessive delay while recharging the air brake system, and has the 
potential to cause a derailment. If an intrusion is identified by the engineer of the train on 
the adjacent track when the train is far enough away from the intrusion location, a full-
service brake application will be sufficient to stop the train; therefore, under these 
circumstances I assume the deceleration rate for a full-service brake. Alternatively, if the 
intrusion occurs while the oncoming train is in the adjacent signal block, then I assume an 
emergency brake application will be made because the engineer on that train will observe 
a signal displaying a stop indication without having prior warning. If the train is already 
in the signal block then only direct communication or visual detection will inform the 




For TM scenarios, CD will be the sum of Dbrake for the train intruding onto an 
adjacent track and the train on that track. Even when a train derails, the train may 
continue moving forward until it comes to a complete stop. Although the deceleration 
rate in derailments is most likely greater than the deceleration rates in regular full-service 
brake and emergency brake application, the resulting deceleration distance still 
contributes to the overall CD.  
 
For a TP scenario, I only consider Dbrake for the train running on the adjacent track 
trying to stop and avoid the collision, but I do not consider Dbrake for the train that derails 
and intrudes onto the adjacent track. The reason is that, in the TP scenario, the intruding 
train and the train on the adjacent track are running in the same direction. Therefore, 
when the intruding train derails and continues moving forward before it stops, this 
movement increases the distance available for the train on the adjacent track to brake and 
stop. Although as mentioned above, trains do continue to move forward after they derail, 
the distance can vary considerably. For example, if a derailment results in a pile-up of 
equipment, or if derailed equipment collides with other objects while intruding onto an 
adjacent track, it will not travel as far from the initial derailment location. To avoid 
underestimating the risk of adjacent track collision, Dbrake for the intruding train is not 
included in the CD calculation in TP scenarios. 
 
5.2.3 Point of Derailment 
CD defines the maximum distance where two trains pose adjacent track collision 
risk to one another. If we assume that the front of the intruding train derails and intrudes 
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onto the adjacent track, and the two trains on adjacent tracks are within their CD when 
the intrusion occurs, a collision is inevitable. However, the first rail vehicle derailed may 
not be the first piece of equipment in the train consist. If the first derailed equipment is 
further back in the train, there will be additional distance for the adjacent train to apply 
brakes and avoid a collision within the CD. The POD thus plays a key role in train 
presence probability assessment and understanding the probability distribution of POD 
enables more accurate estimation of the probability of an adjacent track collision.  
 
Trains vary in the number of pieces of equipment in the consist and consequent 
train length.  The normalized point of derailment (NPOD) was developed to account for 
this variation (Saccomanno and El-Hage, 1989; 1991). Previous research found that 
NPOD is affected by accident causes (Liu et al., 2014). Different derailment causes result 
in different probability distributions for NPOD. Liu et al. (2014) found that a beta 
distribution provided the best fit for the POD and NPOD probability distributions for 
most derailment causes (Figure 5.4). In my research, I adopt a beta distribution 
 (α = 0.6793, β = 0.8999) for the probability distribution of NPOD based on Liu et al.’s 
(2014) work. Given train length L, the probability that the POD is at the nth position in a 
train, P(n), can be estimated using the following equation: 
 
𝑃(𝑛)   (
𝑛
𝐿
) −  (
𝑛 −  
𝐿
)             (5. ) 
 where: 
 P(n): probability of POD being at the nth car of a train  





Figure 5.4: Distribution of the point-of-derailment for Class I railroad, 
mainline, freight-train derailments due to all causes, 2002–2011 (Liu et al., 2014) 
 
5.2.4 Adjacent Track Collision and Train Presence Model 
5.2.4.1 Adjacent Track Collision Probability in TM Scenario 
Consider two trains B and A running at speed VB and VA in opposite directions 
towards each other on Main Track (track M) and Adjacent Track (track J), respectively 
(Figure 5.5a). When the distance between the front of the two trains, the Available 
Distance, or Davail, is greater than their CD, there is no risk of an adjacent track collision. 
When Davail = CD (Figure 5.5b), they will just make contact if train B derails and intrudes 
its front end onto track J, and the engineer of train A makes an immediate brake. The 
collision probability where Davail being CD is set to zero. When Davail is less than CD 









 P(n): probability of POD being at the nth car of train B’s consist 
 K: the Kth car in train B’s consist so that: 
 
 
∑𝑙𝑘 > ( 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 −  𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙)
𝐾
𝑘=1
           (5.4) 
  
 
where lk is the length of the kth rail equipment in train B’s consist.  
 
As two trains approach each other, the distance between them diminishes, 
resulting in increasing collision probability (Figure 5.5d). After the rear end of train A 
passes the front end of train B (Figure 5.5e), I assume that the portion of train B passed 
by train A will not pose any threat to train A if it derails. For example, if the end of train 
A has passed the 14th car of train B (counting from the front) while the POD of train B is 
at the 8th car, this situation will not lead to an adjacent track collision Therefore, the 
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The collision probability exists until the two trains completely pass each other 
(Figure 5.5f). At this point, the probability of collision returns to zero. I call the sum of 
CD and the total length of two trains the “Collision Zone (CZ)”, because the risk of an 
adjacent track collision is greater than zero when the two trains on adjacent tracks are 
within this distance.  
 
5.2.4.2 Adjacent Track Collision Probability in TP Scenario 
Train collision probability calculation for the TP scenario is similar to the 
calculation in the TM scenario, except that now the two trains are running in the same 
direction. Consider trains B and A running at speed VB and VA in the same direction on 
Main Track (track M) and Adjacent Track (track J), respectively (Figure 5.6a). When the 
distance between the front end of train A and the rear end of train B, the Available 
Distance, or Davail, is greater than their CD, there is no risk of adjacent track collision. 
When Davail is their CD (Figure 5.6b), they will just make contact if train B derails and 
intrudes its rear end onto track J, and the engineer of train A applies the  







































































































The collision probability where Davail = CD is set to zero. When Davail is less than 
CD (Figure 5.6c), the probability of collision can be expressed as: 
 






          (5.6) 
 
where: 
P(n): probability of POD being at the nth car of train consist 
K: the Kth car in train B’s consist so that: 
 
 
∑𝑙(𝐸−𝑘) > ( 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 −  𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙)
𝐾
𝑘=1
         (5.7) 
 
 
where lk is the length of the kth rail equipment in the train consist. 
E: the last car in train B’s consist 
S: the Sth car in train B’s consist (counting from the rear) that is passed by the 
end of train A 
 
As train A approaches train B, the distance between them diminishes, resulting in 
increasing collision probability (Figure 5.6d). After the rear end of train A passes the rear 
end of train B (Figure 5.6e), if train A has completely passed the POD of train B when it 
derails, I assume that this will not result in an adjacent track collision. The collision 
probability exists until the rear end of train A passes the front end of train B (Figure 5.6f). 
In this case, the probability of collision becomes zero again. The definition of CZ is the 




The major difference in probability calculation for the TP scenario compared to 
the TM scenario is that the NPOD reference for the derailing train is reversed because the 
train is running in the same direction as the train on the adjacent track, so the adjacent 
train is approaching the rear of the potential derailing and intruding train instead of  
its front. 
 
5.2.4.3 Segment-level Adjacent Track Collision Probability 
To obtain the adjacent track collision probability given an intrusion in a track 
segment, I investigated how frequently TM and TP events will occur on a track segment. 
If there are relatively few such events on this segment, then the probability of an intrusion 
occurring in proximity to another train is low. On the other hand, if TMs and TPs are 
sufficiently frequent, then it is likely that if an intrusion takes place, another train will be 
at, or approaching, the intrusion location, and thus the collision risk is high. I use the 
concept of average spacing to obtain adjacent track collision probability on a track 
segment. Average spacing means the average distance between trains. I develop two 
types of average spacing: average spacing for TM events and average spacing for TP 
events. Average spacing for TM events, denoted as SM, is the average distance between 
trains that will meet each other in the track section, and average spacing for TP events, 
denoted as SP, is the average distance between trains that will pass one another on the 
track segment. 
 
There is also a minimum spacing between trains traveling at normal speed on the 
same track in the same direction. This spacing should consider the longest safe braking 
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distance among the trains on the track segment and the length of signal blocks, depending 
on the train control systems used, so that trains are safely separated. The average spacing 
of trains on the same track on the track segment should be equal or greater than the 
minimum train spacing of the track segment. 
 
When an intrusion occurs, two trains on adjacent tracks can be any distance away 
within average spacing. If this distance is also within CZ, then the risk of adjacent track 
collisions exists. Therefore, I consider CZ as a proportion of the average train spacing to 
calculate the probability that the distance between two trains on adjacent tracks is within 
CZ (Figure 5.7a). When the distance between two trains on adjacent tracks is within CZ, 
the average collision probability from the derived distribution is used to calculate the 
adjacent track collision probability for the track segment, assuming the probability of the 
distance between two trains on adjacent tracks is uniformly distributed within the average 
spacing (Figure 5.7b). 
 
For each TM and TP event, the probability of an adjacent track collision given an 





× 𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)         (5.8) 
 
where: 
PT: the probability of train presence given an intrusion on a track segment 
CZ: collision zone in feet 
S: average spacing (SM or SP) based on TM or TP scenarios in feet 




Figure 5.7: Illustration of (a) the proportion of CZ to the average spacing and (b) 
distance between trains on adjacent tracks at any given point. 
 
Hence, for a track segment, given the average spacing of trains on adjacent tracks 
and the number of TM and TP events, the overall adjacent track collision probability is 
calculated by: 




          (5.9) 
 
 where: 
 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑀𝑖: adjacent track collision probability for the ith TM event  
 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑃𝑗: adjacent track collision probability for the jth TP event  
 i: total number of TM events in the track segment 
 j: total number of TP events in the track segment  
 
 If we want to calculate the probability of adjacent track collisions on the track 










 −∏( − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑀𝑖( ))
𝑖
×∏( − 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑃𝑗( ))
𝑗
          (5. 0) 
 
 where: 
𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑀𝑖( ): the probability of an adjacent track collision in TM scenario  
    given spacing S 
 𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑃𝑗( ): the probability of an adjacent track collision in TP scenario given   
    spacing S 
 S: spacing between trains in feet 
i: total number of TM events in the track segment 
 j: total number of TP events in the track segment  
 
5.2.4.4 Exposure Time and Exposure Distance 
In addition to collision probability calculation, it may also be important to 
understand the area or distance along a corridor, and the length of time that two trains on 
adjacent tracks are exposed to the risk of an adjacent track collision. Exposure Time is 
defined as the time required for two trains on adjacent tracks to complete a TM or TP, 
and Exposure Distance is the distance required to do so. The Exposure Time and 
Exposure Distance for TM scenarios are: 
 
                            𝐸 𝑇𝑀   
𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑀
(𝑉𝐴 + 𝑉𝐷)
                       (5.  ) 
                           𝐸 𝑇𝑀  𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑀                               (5.  ) 
  
where: 
 ETTM: Exposure Time for TM scenarios (seconds) 
 EDTM: Exposure Distance for TM scenario (feet) 
 CZ: Critical Zone (feet) 
 VA: speed of the approaching train (feet per second) 
 VD: speed of the derailing train (feet per second) 
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The Exposure Time and Exposure Distance for TP scenarios are: 
 
                        𝐸 𝑇𝑃   
𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑃
(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐷)
                         (5. 3) 
                        𝐸 𝑇𝑃  
𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑃
(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐷)
× 𝑉𝐷                (5. 4) 
  
where: 
 ETTP: Exposure Time for TP scenarios (seconds) 
 EDTP: Exposure Distance for TP scenario (feet) 
 
Exposure Time and Exposure Distance provide additional information regarding 
the adjacent track collision risk. An important aspect is the relative speed of the derailing 
and approaching trains. The greater the relative speed between the derailing train and 
approaching train, the more quickly the two trains will travel through the CZ, and the 
shorter the time that the trains are exposed to adjacent track collision risk. This is true for 
both TM and TP scenarios. The Exposure Distance for TM scenarios is CZ, regardless of 
the relative speed of the two trains. For TP scenarios, the Exposure Distance depends on 
the relative speed of the two trains. If the approaching train is traveling at a much higher 
speed than the derailing train, it will overtake the train quickly and therefore the distance 
traveled while the two trains are exposed to an adjacent track collision is short; in some 
scenarios as short as two thousand feet. Conversely, if the approaching train is traveling 
just slightly faster than the derailing train resulting in a small relative speed difference 
between two trains, it may take several miles or more to complete the TP, meaning that 




From a risk management perspective, this means that if a TM or TP takes place in 
a short time and distance, then it may be possible to implement risk mitigation measures 
at specific locations or track segments where TMs or TPs are most likely to occur; 
however, if most of the TMs or TPs take place with long Exposure Distance and 
Exposure Time, these risk mitigation measures would need to be implemented on more 
extensive sections of track. Understanding Exposure Distance and Exposure Time assists 
model users in interpreting the results of the collision probability assessment and decision 
making regarding the implementation of risk mitigation measures. 
 
5.3 Model Demonstration 
5.3.1 Case Study 
In this section, I provide an example of an adjacent-track collision probability 
calculation on a two-track segment with pre-defined train and traffic information (Table 
5.1). This is accomplished by calculating the collision probability of the freight train 
derailing and intruding onto the adjacent track where a passenger train is running. 
 
Table 5.1: Input for a sample adjacent track collision probability calculation 
 
 
Passenger Train Freight Train
Speed (mph) 79 59
Deceleration Rate (mphps) 2.00 1.48
Number of Locomotives and Rail Cars 15 80
Average Length of Rail Equipment (ft.) 85 60
Train Length (ft.) 1,275 4,800
Average Spacing of TM (ft.)
Average Spacing of TP (ft.)
Total Number of TM on the Track Segment








Using equation 5.1, I calculate the minimum braking distance for the passenger 
train and the freight train: 
 
 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒(𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠.)  0.7333 ×
792
 + 0.008 × 0 + 0. × 0
  , 83.3 𝑓𝑡. 
 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑖.)  0.7333 ×
592
 + 0.008 × 0 + 0. × 0
  ,7 4.7 𝑓𝑡. 
 
Since this is a TM scenario, the CD will be the sum of the two braking distances: 
 
𝐶 𝑇𝑀    𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒(𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠.) +  𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑖.)   , 83.3 +  ,7 4.7  4,0 3.0 𝑓𝑡. 
 
 The total lengths of the two trains are:  
 
𝐿𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡  80 × 60  4,800 𝑓𝑡. 
𝐿𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟   5 × 85   , 75 𝑓𝑡. 
  
Using equations 5.2 through 5.5, the collision probability is derived (Figure 5.8). 
On the vertical axis is the probability of an adjacent track collision and on the horizontal 
axis is the distance between the trains. The reference point (distance = 0) is when the 





Figure 5.8: Collision probability distribution for TM scenario 
 
 The collision probability increases as the two trains approach each other and 
eventually reaches one. Then the probability begins to decrease as the rear end of the 
passenger train passes the front end of the freight train because the portion of freight train 
passed by the passenger train no longer pose collision risk to the passenger train. An 
asymmetric probability distribution is observed because the distribution of POD is also 
asymmetric in a train consist. 
 
 If the two trains are running in the same direction, and the passenger train is 
passing the freight train on the adjacent track, then using equation 5.6 and equation 5.7, I 
derive the adjacent track collision distribution accordingly (Figure 5.9). A similar pattern 
is shown except that the increasing and decreasing curve of collision probability is 


























Distance Between Trains (ft.)
The fronts of two trains meet




scenario. The CD for the TP scenario is just the minimum braking distance of the 
passenger train, which is less than the CD in the TM scenario. This is because the braking 
distance for the freight train (the train that derails and intrudes onto an adjacent track) is 
not counted towards the total CD for the reason stated in subsection 5.2.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: Collision probability distribution for TP scenario 
 
The CZs for TM and TP are calculated respectively: 
 
𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑀  4,800 +  ,7 4.7 +  , 75 +  , 88.3    0,088 
𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑃  4,800 + 3,356 +  , 88.3   8,363.3 
 
 Given the average spacing of five miles (26,400 feet), the proportion of CZ to the 
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 0.3 68 
 
 Using equation 5.8, the probabilities of an adjacent track collision in a TM and TP 









× 𝐸(𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑃)  0.3 68 × 0.4347  0. 377 
 
 Since there are two TM events and one TP event on this track segment, the 
average adjacent track collision probability can be calculated using equation 5.9: 
 





  − (( − 0. 040) × ( − 0. 040) × ( − 0. 377))  0.4537 
 
 Using equation 5.10, the adjacent track collision probability when two trains are 




𝑃(𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,    ,000)   −∏ ( − 𝑃𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑀𝑖( ,000))𝑖 ×
∏ ( − 𝑃𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑃𝑗( ,000))𝑗   − ( − 𝑃𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑀1( ,000)) ×
( − 𝑃𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑀2( ,000)) × ( − 𝑃𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑇𝑃1( ,000))  0.5789  
 
 Using equations 5.11 through 5.14, the Exposure Time and Exposure Distance for 
TM and TP scenarios can be calculated as follows: 
 





(  5.9 + 86.5)
 50 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠                       
                           𝐸 𝑇𝑀  𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑀   0,088 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡   .9  𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠                                   





(  5.9 − 86.5)
  85 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠              
          𝐸 𝑇𝑃  
𝐶𝑍𝑇𝑃
(𝑉𝐴 − 𝑉𝐷)
× 𝑉𝐷   85 × 86.5   4,65 .5 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡  4.67 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠                 
 
 The speeds of the passenger and freight train are converted from mph to feet per 
second for the calculations. Given the same input, the Exposure Time and Exposure 
Distance for the TP scenario are both greater than those in an otherwise similar TM 
scenario due to the smaller relative speed between the approaching and derailing trains.  
  
5.3.2 Analysis of the Effects of Train Length and Train Speed  
 In this subsection, I describe analyses to understand the effects of train length and 
train speed on the probability of adjacent track collisions. To analyze the effect of train 
length, a set of input variables were chosen to perform the analyses (Table 5.2). Four 
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combinations of train length were compared: long derailing train and long approaching 
train, long derailing train and short approaching train, short derailing train and long 
approaching train, and short derailing train and short approaching train. All other input 
variables remain the same in all scenarios. The analysis was conducted for both TM and  
TP situations. 
 




 In the TM scenario, a long derailing train and long approaching train have the 
longest CZ (Figure 5.10) because the total train length is the longest of the four scenarios. 
When the derailing train is long, the slope of the increasing and decreasing portions of the 
collision probability distribution are shallower. This is because the longer the derailing 
train, the more distance is required for the combined braking distances of both trains to 
reach the later part of the derailing train. More distance is also required for the 
approaching train to fully pass the derailing train. By contrast, if the length of the 
Derailing Train Approaching Train Derailing Train Approaching Train
Speed (mph*) 49 79 49 79
Deceleration Rate (mphps**) 1.48 2.00 1.48 2.00
Train Length (feet) 6,000 8,500 1,200 8,500
Track Grade (%) 0 0 0 0
Track Curvature (degree) 0 0 0 0
Derailing Train Approaching Train Derailing Train Approaching Train
Speed (mph*) 49 79 49 79
Deceleration Rate (mphps**) 1.48 2.00 1.48 2.00
Train Length (feet) 1,200 1,275 6,000 1,275
Track Grade (%) 0 0 0 0











derailing train is short, there is a steep increase and then decrease in the collision 
probability distribution. This is because the combined braking distance of the two trains 
can reach the end of the derailing train quickly, therefore resulting in a collision 
probability of one. After the front of the approaching train passes the end of the derailing 
train, the collision probability decreases quickly because it takes less distance for the 
approaching train to fully pass the derailing train. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Collision probability distribution of the four combinations 
of train length for TM scenario  
 
In the long derailing train and short approaching train scenario, there are 
discontinuities at certain distances. These occur when the rear end of the approaching 





















































































































































two trains reaches the end of the approaching train. The long derailing train and short 
approaching train scenario also demonstrates a lower average collision probability. 
 
The same analysis and comparisons were performed for the TP scenarios (Figure 
5.11) and the results are similar to the TM scenarios. The CDs are less than those in the 
TM scenarios because by definition the TM CDs are longer than those in the TP 
scenarios. The shape of each TP scenario tends to mirror to the corresponding TM 
scenario. This is due to the reverse use of the POD distribution in the probability 
calculation, as the approaching trains in TP scenarios are catching up and overtaking the 
derailing trains from their rear end instead of their front end. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Collision probability distribution of the four combinations 





















































































































































 I conducted another set of analyses to understand the effect of the relative speed 
of derailing (Figure 5.12) and approaching trains (Figure 5.13). In each set of scenarios, I 
held the speed of the approaching or derailing train constant (79 mph and 49 mph, 
respectively) and varied the speed of the corresponding derailing or approaching trains. 
As expected, the higher the relative speed, the greater the CD. 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Collision probability distribution due to different speeds 
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Speed of Derailing Train = 59 mph
Speed of Derailing Train = 49 mph Speed of Derailing Train = 39 mph




Figure 5.13: Collision probability distribution due to different speeds 
 of the approaching train 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I developed a quantitative model to evaluate the probability of 
train presence on an adjacent track when an intrusion occurs. The critical distance where 
two trains on adjacent tracks pose potential risk to each other and the factors affecting 
this distance were investigated. I developed a probability distribution for a single adjacent 
track collision in train meet and train pass scenarios based on train and derailment 
characteristics. I also investigated the effects of relative train length and relative train 
speed on collision probability. Segment-level train-presence probability was derived 
based on the frequency and average headway of train meet and pass events. I calculated 
the Exposure Time and Exposure Distance for adjacent track collisions to understand the 
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Speed of Approaching Train = 79 mph
Speed of Approaching Train = 69 mph Speed of Approaching Train = 59 mph
Vderailing = 49 mph
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also provided sample calculations to demonstrate the model’s behavior.  This model also 
serves as an important part of the comprehensive adjacent track accident model that I 








DEVELOPMENT OF ADJACENT TRACK ACCIDENT 
PROBABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Development of an adjacent track accident (ATA) probability assessment model 
requires comprehensive understanding of the event sequence of an ATA (Figure 2.2) and 
factors affecting the probability of each event stage of an ATA event (Figure 2.5). In 
previous chapters, I investigated factors affecting the probability of: initial train 
derailments (Chapter 3), intrusion (Chapter 4), and train presence (Chapter 5) and 
developed models for each probability components. In this chapter, I introduce the 
Adjacent Track Accident Probability Assessment Model (ATAPAM) combining the risk 
analysis results and models developed in previous chapters to provide a comprehensive 
risk assessment tool to evaluate the probability of an ATA. The factors affecting 
probability components identified previously are incorporated in the model. The 
ATAPAM presents ATA probability in two forms: a quantitative probability value and a 
qualitative risk indicator showing additional intrusion risk. I demonstrate the ATAPAM 
with a case study showing how the model works and can be used to evaluate ATA 
probability. Finally, I develop an ATA probability assessment procedure and guidance 




6.2 Adjacent Track Accident Probability Assessment Model (ATAPAM) 
The ATAPAM consists of three probability models for initial train derailment, 
conditional probability of intrusion, and conditional probability of train presence. The 
model evaluates the probability of an ATA as defined in the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) in 
chapter 2, and the probabilities of basic events in the fault tree are calculated in the 
ATAPAM. Each probability model is affected by different infrastructure, rolling stock, 
and operational factors (Figure 6.1). These factors are divided into two groups: 
quantitative factors affecting the probability values of ATA, and qualitative factors that 
affect ATA probability, but whose degree of influence is not quantified.  
 
Some factors affect more than one probability model. For instance, track 
alignment, point of derailment, and train speed affect both intrusion probability and train 
presence probability. They affect one probability model in a quantitative manner and 
qualitatively affect another model. Track alignment qualitatively affects intrusion 
probability but quantitatively affects train presence probability. This is because track 
alignment characteristics such as curvature and grade, are believed to contribute to 
intrusion probability, but their effect is not presently quantifiable. In train presence 
probability assessment, these track characteristics affect train resistance and braking 
performance, and these effects are quantified in the model. A qualitative factor can 
become a quantitative factor when sufficient information is available and proper 
quantification analyses are conducted. The ATAPAM can incorporate and adapt the 
quantification of these qualitative factors by modifying and extending the model using 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The ATAPAM produces two outputs: a quantitative probability value for an ATA, 
and a qualitative risk indicator representing additional ATA risk. The quantitative 
probability value, denoted as PATA, is the multiplication of initial train derailment 
probability, intrusion probability, and train presence probability. The qualitative risk 
indicator, denoted as RATA, is a numerical value acknowledging the presence of factors 
that can increase or reduce overall ATA probability. Although their actual quantitative 
effect is not known, they provide useful information for model users in risk assessment 
and decision-making processes when managing ATA risk. 
 
The ATA probability is evaluated by track segment. A railroad corridor is divided 
into segments based on different infrastructure, rolling stock, and operational 
characteristics. ATA probabilities and risk indicators for each track segment are 
evaluated by the ATAPAM. In the following subsections, I describe each probability 
model and discuss how the risk indicator is evaluated by qualitative factors. 
 
6.2.1 Initial Train Derailment Probability, P(D) 
The initial train derailment probability is expressed as number of train derailments 
divided by traffic exposure (Nayak et al., 1983; Anderson and Barkan, 2004; Liu et al., 
2011; 2017). In the ATA fault tree, the initial derailment event is divided into different 
accident causes as basic events (Figure 2.5), because these causes explain which part of 
the railroad system failed resulting in a derailment. In terms of probability measurement, 
there are multiple approaches depending on data and methods available. In the following 
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paragraph, I describe how I evaluate the probability of initial derailment for different 
types of trains. 
 
The two general types of trains considered are freight trains and passenger trains. 
Previous studies found that freight train derailment rates are affected by the track class 
defined by the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA), method of operation, and traffic density (Liu et al., 2017). The 
authors developed a derailment rate matrix based on those factors using USDOT FRA 
train accident data. That matrix has been updated by Wang et al. (2019) (Table 6.1). The 
derailment rate matrix does not explicitly show derailment rates by accident causes; 
however, the differences in the rates in different infrastructure, traffic, and method of 
operation categories implicitly account for the probability of derailments caused by 
different accident causes. For example, a track with higher FRA track class has a lower 
derailment rate. This is probably because there are fewer derailments caused by 
infrastructure defects due to more frequent track maintenance and more stringent track 
standards. Accident-cause-specific freight train derailment rate analysis and estimation 
has also been conducted (Barkan et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2011; 2012; Liu, 2017a; b). The 
derailment matrix used in the ATAPAM provides an aggregated, more general 
probability that applies to most freight railroad corridors in the United States. That said, 
the ATAPAM can adapt to the results generated from these causal analyses and specific 




With regard to passenger train derailment rate, in chapter 3, I presented a general 
statistical and causal analysis for passenger train accidents and evaluated passenger train 
derailment rate using the USDOT FRA train accident data (Table 3.2). The aggregated 
derailment rate provides a national average for general risk assessment use, while cause-
specific derailment rates are also available if we need to obtain the probability of ATA 
caused by a specific accident cause. (Table 3.5). 
 
Table 6.1: Estimated Mainline Derailment (per billion ton-miles) for the Time 








FRA Track Class 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
<20 
Non-Signaled 1.399 0.552 0.292 0.167 n/a 0.316 
Signaled 2.083 0.557 0.230 0.119 0.208 0.199 
 ≥20 
Non-Signaled 0.238 0.169 0.061 0.082 0.000 0.089 
Signaled 0.326 0.187 0.074 0.041 0.022 0.043 
    4.047 1.466 0.657 0.408 0.230 0.647 
* There was no traffic for <20 MGT, non-signaled, class 5 track 
 
Derailment rate varies with different types of train operations due to differing 
types of rolling stock, infrastructure, and operational protocols implemented for the 
specific type of train operation. To account for different types of train operation on the 
same track, I developed a weighted derailment rate based on the proportion of traffic 
from different types of railroad operation. On a shared-use rail corridor (SRC), for 
example, train derailment rate is the weighted average of freight train derailment rate and 





𝑃( )  
∑𝑅𝑖 ×  𝑖
∑ 𝑖
              (6. ) 
 
where: 
P(D): the probability of initial train derailment 
Ri: probability of train derailment for the ith type of rail operation  
Ti: the traffic of the ith type of rail operation 
 
 The reason I use the weighted average for train derailments is because accident 
characteristics change with traffic composition. For example, on a freight-dominant 
railroad corridor, broken rail and weld is the most frequent accident cause (Liu, 2017b), 
while on a passenger-dominant corridor, turnout defects and failure to obey or display 
signal are the most frequent (Table 3.5). More sophisticated methods such as multivariate 
analysis can be performed to obtain more accurate relationships between traffic 
composition and derailment rate, accounting for other variables that also affect train 
derailment rate. If sufficient accident data are collected for the railroad corridor of 
interest, use of the weighted average derailment is unnecessary because the probability of 
derailment rate can be directly calculated. 
 
6.2.2 Intrusion Probability, P(I|D) 
 The conditional probability of intrusion given a train derailment is determined by 
the likelihood of excessive lateral displacement of derailed rail vehicle and the presence 
and reliability of intrusion barriers or containment as illustrated in the ATA fault tree 





6.2.2.1 Lateral Displacement of Derailed Equipment 
As discussed in chapter 4, a gamma distribution was found to provide the best fit 
for the data on lateral displacement of derailed rail vehicle. The probability distribution of 
lateral displacement of derailed equipment can be expressed as: 
 
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝑋; 𝛼, 𝛽)  
 
𝛽𝛼Γ(α)
× 𝑋∝−1 × 𝑒
−𝑋
𝛽             (6. ) 
 
where: 
Gamma (X; α, β): the probability where the maximum lateral displacement of 
derailed equipment is X feet 
X: maximum lateral displacement of derailed equipment 
Γ(α): the gamma function  
α: the shape parameter 
β: the scale parameter 
 
The values of α = 1.2 and β = 33.0 were selected as the fitted parameters for the 
gamma distribution based on NTSB data (Clark et al., 2013). The probability of intrusion 
for a track segment can be calculated by obtaining the cumulative probability function 
where x ≥ X, given that no intrusion barrier is present (Figure 6.2): 
 
𝑃(x ≥  X)   −  (𝑋;  𝛼, 𝛽)                 (6.3) 
 
where: 
P(x ≥ X): the probability of intrusion for a track segment 







Figure 6.2: Probability function for the lateral displacement of derailed equipment 
exceeding distance x (Clark et al., 2013) 
 
  
6.2.2.2 Crash Wall and Containment Failure  
 A crash wall, containment, or intrusion barrier are structures installed between 
adjacent tracks to contain derailing trains and prevent derailed equipment from intruding 
onto adjacent tracks. The design of these structures has been studied using computer 
simulations (Moyer et al., 1994; Layden, 2014; Bae et al., 2018a; b) and implemented in 
the California High-Speed Rail project (Abtahi, 2013). Previous studies focused on the 
design of intrusion barriers so that their strength will meet the maximum possible impact 
forces. I am unaware of any empirical studies of the efficacy of these intrusion barriers, 





















































X - Lateral Distance from Track Center (feet)
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intrusion barrier in a track segment is 100% effective, i.e., that it would always contain 
derailed equipment and prevent it from intruding onto an adjacent track. The ATAPAM 
can account for lower effectiveness of intrusion barriers if proper data are available. The 
probability of crash wall failure is defined in the following way: 
 
 PCF = 1 if no intrusion barrier is installed  
 and 
 PCF = λ if an intrusion barrier is installed 
 where λ is the failure rate of the intrusion barrier  
 
 Although there is currently no reliable value for λ, its inclusion in the ATAPAM 
enables sensitivity analysis of its effect on intrusion probability and ATA risk. This in 
turn may provide guidance for target levels of effectiveness and consequent design 
parameters for intrusion barriers. The notation PCF corresponds to the event notation in 
the ATA fault tree (Figure 2.5). Combining this probability with the probability of lateral 
displacement of derailed equipment exceeding track center spacing (equation 6.3), the 
conditional probability of intrusion given a train derailment can be expressed as follows: 
 







6.2.3 Train Presence Probability, P(T|I|D) 
The conditional probability of train presence given an intrusion consists of two 
parts: base train presence probability and failure to apply train brakes due to equipment 
failure or human errors (Figure 2.5). 
 
6.2.3.1 Base Train Presence Probability 
Train presence probability on a track segment is derived in chapter 5 as follows: 
 




          (6.5) 
  
where: 
 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑀𝑖: adjacent track collision probability for the ith TM activities  
 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑃𝑗: adjacent track collision probability for the jth TP activities  
 i: total number of TM in the track segment 
 j: total number of TP in the track segment  
  
Details regarding derivations of adjacent track collision probability are described 
in subsection 5.2. This model considers track alignment, point of derailment, train speed, 
traffic density, and braking capability as quantitative factors.  
 
6.2.3.2 Failure to Apply Train Brakes 
 The base train presence probability assumes the train’s brakes are applied and 
function properly. This may not always be the case because brake components may 
malfunction, or the engineer might not operate the brakes properly. There are only a few 
studies regarding the reliability of certain train brake system and components (Yang et 
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al., 2016; Cai et al., 2018). They focus on specific brake systems or particular braking 
components. Consequently, the analysis results are not general enough to be implemented 
in the ATAPAM. The methods introduced in these studies can be applied when 
appropriate data are available.  
 
There has been considerable research on human error in railroad operations 
(Wilson and Norris, 2005; Reinach and Viale, 2006; Wilson et al., 2007; Baysari et al., 
2008; Wilson, 2014; Madigan et al., 2016; Zhan et al., 2017; Kyriakidis et al., 2018; 
Zhou and Lei 2018); however, no previous study has focused on human error in train 
brake operations.  
 
The probability of braking system failure is defined as follows: 
 
 PFB = 1 – (1 – λEB) × (1 – λHB) 
where λEB is the failure rate of the train braking system, and λHB is the failure rate 
of brake application due to human error.  
 
Although there is currently no reliable value for λEB and λHB, its inclusion in the 
ATAPAM enables sensitivity analysis of its effect on train presence probability and ATA 




Combining this probability with the probability of train presence on adjacent 
tracks (equation 6.5), the conditional probability of train presence given an intrusion can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
 −∏(( − 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑀𝑖) × ( − 𝑃𝐹𝐵,𝑇𝑀𝑖)
𝑖
) ×∏(( − 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑃𝑗) × ( − 𝑃𝐹𝐵,𝑇𝑃𝑗))
𝑗
        (6.6) 
 
6.2.4 Qualitative Factors 
Factors that are not quantified in the models but affect ATA probability are 
considered qualitatively as risk indicators (Table 6.2). The presence of each factor adds 
one point to the risk indicator if it increases the ATA probability and subtracts one point 
from the risk indicator if it reduces the ATA probability. The higher the risk indicator 
points the greater the likelihood of an ATA. Given the same quantitative value of ATA 
probability, track segments with positive points in the risk indicator have a higher chance 
of having an ATA; if the risk indicator points are negative for a track segment, it means 















6.3 Case Study 
6.3.1 Hypothetical Corridor 
The hypothetical rail corridor consists of a 200-mile SRC with four tracks: S1, S2, 
P1 and P2 (Figure 6.3). Tracks S1 and S2 are two main tracks with 90% freight train 
traffic and 10% passenger traffic; Tracks P1 and P2 are two main tracks with pure 
passenger traffic. Assume that there is a concern for potential ATA risk between track S2 
and P1, and the railroad operators on both tracks want to understand where along the 
corridor has high ATA risk, especially the probability of ATA where trains on Track S2 
derail and intrude onto Track P1, and either strike, or are struck, by trains on Track P1. 
There is also ATA risk between track pair S1/S2, P1/P2, S1/P1, S2/P2, and S1/P2, but for 
the purpose of model demonstration, I specifically evaluate the ATA probability between 
tracks S2 and P1. 
 
Factor Risk Indicator Point Description
Curvature Add 1 point if the track segment is in a curve
Grade Add 1 point if the track segment is on a grade
Adjacent 
Structure
Add 1 point if there are adjacent structures along the track segment
Elevation 
Differential
Add 1 point if the track where the intruding train is running on is higher in 
altitude than the adjacent track; subtract 1 point if the track where the 
intruding train is running on is lower in altitude than the adjacent track
Train           
Speed
Add 1 point if the maximum speed of trains on the adjacent track is 
greater than 60 mph; subtract 1 point if the maximum speed of trains on 
the adjacent track is less than 30 mph.
Intrusion 
Detection




Figure 6.3: Hypothetical SRC layout 
 
The average TM frequency between freight trains on Track S2 and passenger 
trains on Track P1 is four; the average TM frequency between passenger trains on Track 
S2 and passenger trains on Track P1 is one. The average TM spacing is five miles 
(26,400 feet). Assume tracks S2 and P1 are not connected so there is no TP event 
possible between these two tracks. The maximum track separation between tracks S2 and 
P1 is 25 feet, making this a shared-ROW corridor.  
 
The corridor is divided into 20 segments based on infrastructure, rolling stock, 
and operational characteristics (Table 6.3). At the end of segment 16, two thirds of the 
freight train traffic from track S2 is diverted to another route. Therefore, from segment 17 
to segment 20, Track S2 has 75% freight train traffic and 25% passenger train traffic. The 








Intrusion Detection Device Installation
Intrusion Barrier Installation
Track Grade (arrows indicate downhill grades if pointing toward the direction of travel)
Elevation Differential (arrows point toward the low track)
FRA Track Class 2 (Track S)
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FRA Track Class 5 (Track P)
Non-signaled Territory
Maximum Track Center 
Spacing = 25’
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I selected track segment 11 to perform an example calculation using  
following steps: 
 
1. The freight train derailment rate is 0.074 per billion gross-ton-miles, which is 
converted to 0.264 derailments per million freight-train-miles using the 
average gross tons per train load (AAR, 2016). The passenger train derailment 
rate is 0.126 per million passenger-train-mile (Table 3.2). The initial 
derailment on track S2 for this segment is calculated using equation 6.1: 
 
Segment TC G C S AS MSF MSP TC G C S AS MS TS ED
1 3 0 0 1 1 20 40 5 0 0 1 1 50 25 0
2 3 0 0 1 0 25 45 5 0 0 1 0 55 25 0
3 3 0 1 1 0 25 45 5 0 1 1 0 55 22 0
4 3 0 0 1 0 39 59 5 0 0 1 0 79 20 0
5 3 0 0 1 0 39 59 5 0 0 1 0 79 17 0
6 3 +1 0 1 0 39 59 5 0 0 1 0 79 15 +1
7 3 0 0 1 0 30 55 5 0 0 1 0 79 15 +1
8 3 0 0 1 0 39 59 5 +1 0 1 0 79 15 +1
9 3 0 1 1 0 39 59 5 0 1 1 0 79 15 0
10 3 -1 1 1 0 39 59 5 -1 1 1 0 79 15 0
11 3 0 1 1 0 39 59 5 0 1 1 0 79 15 0
12 3 0 0 1 0 39 59 5 0 0 1 0 79 15 0
13 3 0 0 1 0 30 45 5 0 0 1 0 79 18 0
14 2 0 0 0 0 20 29 5 0 0 1 0 79 20 0
15 3 0 0 1 0 30 45 5 0 0 1 0 79 20 0
16 3 0 0 1 0 39 59 5 0 0 1 0 79 20 0
17 3 0 0 1 0 30 59 5 0 0 1 0 79 20 0
18 3 0 0 1 0 25 50 5 0 0 1 0 75 17 0
19 3 0 0 1 0 20 40 5 0 0 1 0 60 14 0
20 2 0 0 0 0 15 25 5 0 0 1 0 40 14 0
TC: FRA track class AS: presence of adjacent structure
G: track grade TS: track spacing
C: presence of curve ED: elevation differential
S: presence of signaling system
MSF: maximum operating speed for freight train (track S2)
MS: maximum operating speed for passenger train (track S2)
MS: maximum operating speed for passenger train (track P1)
Track S2 Track P1
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𝑃( )  
∑𝑅𝑖 ×  𝑖
∑ 𝑖
 
0. 64 × 0.9 + 0.  6 × 0. 
0.9 + 0. 
 0. 498 
 
2. The intrusion rate is calculated using equation 6.3: 
 
𝑃( | )  P𝐶𝐹 ×  𝑃(x ≥  X)   × ( −  (𝑋;  𝛼, 𝛽))   × ( −  ( 5;   . , 33.0))
 0.7  8 
 
 The failure rate of the intrusion barrier, PCF, is assumed to be one because there 
is no intrusion barrier or containment installed on this track segment. 
 
3. The train presence rate for a TM between a freight train on Track S2 and a 
passenger train on Track P1 is 0.3584; the train presence rate for a TM 
between a passenger train on Track S2 and a passenger train on Track P1 is 
0.3831. The train presence probability for this segment is calculated using 
equation 6.6, assuming there is no braking failure due to human errors or 
mechanical failure (PFB = 0): 
 
𝑃( )   −∏(( − 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑀𝑖) × ( − 𝑃𝐹𝐵,𝑇𝑀𝑖))
𝑖
×∏(( − 𝑃𝑇,𝑇𝑃𝑗) × ( − 𝑃𝐹𝐵,𝑇𝑃𝑗))
𝑗
  − (( − 0.  03) × ( − 0))
4
× (( − 0. 5  ) × ( − 0))




4. The quantitative probability value of ATA (number of ATAs per million train 
mile) for this segment is: 
 
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐴,   𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 11  𝑃( ) × 𝑃( | ) × 𝑃( | | )  0. 498 × 0.7  8 × 0.7 33  0. 306 
  
5. There is only one qualitative factor in this segment, curvature, which is 
expected to increase intrusion rate. Therefore, the risk indicator for this 
segment, RATA,11, is +1. 
 
6. The ATA probability for track segment 11, P11, is: 
 
(PATA, RATA) = (0.1306, +1) 
 
 The probability of an ATA is calculated for all segments on the SRC (Table 6.4). 
Segment 14 has the highest ATA probability mainly due to high initial derailment rate. 
There is already an intrusion barrier installed in the segment, so the overall ATA 
probability can be reduced based on how the intrusion barrier can absorb the impact from 
derailed equipment and prevent it from intruding onto the adjacent track. Segment 20 also 
has high ATA risk due to the high initial derailment rate. The suggested risk mitigation 
measure is to upgrade the track to higher track class or install a signaling system for the 
segment. Segments 6 through 12 all have the same initial derailment and intrusion 
probability due to similar infrastructure characteristics and track spacing, but their ATA 
probabilities differ because of different track alignment resulting in different train 
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presence probabilities. Segments with high train presence probability are usually 
associated with high maximum operating speed. The effect of grade and curve on train 
presence probability is relatively less. Intrusion probability is a direct function of track 
spacing, but as mentioned in chapter 6, this could change once the reliability data for 
intrusion barriers are available. 
 
Table 6.4: ATA risk calculation output for the hypothetical SRC 
 
 
6.4 ATA Probability Assessment Procedure and Guidance 
The ATAPAM provides a generic ATA probability assessment framework. There 
are several assumptions and simplifications for the model configuration, input parameters 
and probability calculations due to the lack of certain quantitative data. These 
Segment P(D) P(I|D) P(T|I|D) P(ATA) R(ATA)
1 0.2498 0.5600 0.4665 0.0653 1
2 0.2498 0.5600 0.5164 0.0722 0
3 0.2498 0.6054 0.5155 0.0780 1
4 0.2498 0.6373 0.7251 0.1154 0
5 0.2498 0.6876 0.7251 0.1246 0
6 0.2498 0.7228 0.7152 0.1291 2
7 0.2498 0.7228 0.7000 0.1264 1
8 0.2498 0.7228 0.7494 0.1353 1
9 0.2498 0.7228 0.7233 0.1306 0
10 0.2498 0.7228 0.7155 0.1292 1
11 0.2498 0.7228 0.7233 0.1306 0
12 0.2498 0.7228 0.7251 0.1309 -1
13 0.2498 0.6705 0.6881 0.1153 -1
14 0.5544 0.6373 0.6551 0.2315 -1
15 0.2498 0.6373 0.6881 0.1095 0
16 0.2498 0.6373 0.7251 0.1154 0
17 0.6459 0.6373 0.4046 0.1666 0
18 0.6459 0.6876 0.3627 0.1611 0
19 0.6459 0.7408 0.2738 0.1310 0
20 1.5062 0.7408 0.1801 0.2009 -1
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assumptions can be removed or modified to improve the accuracy of ATAPAM if proper 
quantitative data are available. Models in the ATAPAM can also be modified or 
customized to best suit the needs of the users. The following paragraphs provide guidance 
for use of the ATAPAM. 
  
6.4.1 Initial Derailment Rate 
The calculation of initial derailment rate can vary due to available data and the 
resolution of the analysis. Proper selection of accident and traffic data is important, and 
the following paragraphs provide guidance on choosing and use of these data. 
 
Train derailment data: The default initial train derailment rate in the ATAPAM is 
calculated using historical national train accident data developed by the United States 
Department of Transportation (USDOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). If train 
derailment data specific to the railroad corridor of interest, or for corridors with similar 
characteristics to the corridor of interest are available, a more representative set of train 
derailments can be used to calculate the initial derailment rate.  
 
 Traffic data: The default traffic data used to calculate the initial derailment rate 
are the national traffic from the Class I railroads and Amtrak in the US. If specific traffic 
data for the corridor of interest, or corridors that have similar train, track, and operational 
characteristics to the corridor of interest are available, these can be used instead. The 
default unit of traffic data is train-mile because it is applicable to both passenger and 
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freight train traffic. The use of different units for traffic data is possible, but the selected 
units should make sense and be consistent for all types of trains operating on the corridor. 
 
 Initial derailment rate evaluation: The ATAPAM provides a weighted average for 
initial derailment rate on a SRC using nation-wide average passenger and freight train 
derailment rates. This is based on the assumption that derailment rate is proportional to 
the different types of traffic. If train derailment and traffic data are available for a 
particular corridor, a more accurate initial derailment rate can be developed without using 
the weighted average equation. 
 
6.4.2 Conditional Probability of Intrusion 
 Track center spacing: The current intrusion probability model uses track center 
spacing as the only quantitative factor to evaluate the probability. If empirical or 
simulation data are available to account for the effect of other factors, such as curvature, 
grade, or the presence of an intrusion barrier, then the model can be modified to obtain a 
more accurate intrusion probability. 
 
 Reliability of intrusion barriers and containment systems: Currently the 
ATAPAM does not specify a default value for the failure rate of intrusion barriers and 
containment. If a track segment lacks these, or they are only installed on a portion of the 
corridor, the failure rate of intrusion barriers or containment of segments without them 
should be set to one. For segments that have intrusion barriers completely installed, an 
155 
 
estimated failure rate for the intrusion probability calculation should be based on expert 
judgement for the particular design and location. 
 
 Other qualitative factors: While dividing a railroad corridor of interest into 
segments, model users should document the factors that would qualitatively affect the 
intrusion probability in each segment, including track alignment (grade and curvature), 
train speed, elevation differential, and the presence of adjacent structures. These factors 
are evaluated qualitatively for now, but will be incorporated into the quantitative 
probability assessment when proper data are available. 
 
6.4.3 Conditional Probability of Train Presence Given an Intrusion 
 When using the train presence model, users should define the resolution of the 
adjacent track collision analysis they want to conduct. For example, will each train be 
considered as an individual input, or will an average set of values be used for a group or 
type of train operation as presented in the case study.  
 
 Train meet and pass activities: If trains on the corridor of interest follow 
scheduled operation, direct calculation of the number and average spacing of TM and TP 
activities is preferable. If trains are running with unscheduled operation or there are 
multiple types of trains on the corridor with a more complicated operating schedule, the 




 Braking capability: Braking capability is an important input as it determines the 
critical distance (CD) in an adjacent track collision scenario (see subsection 5.2.2). Model 
users may want to group trains with similar braking characteristics and develop a 
representative braking distance to be used for trains in each group. This will simplify the 
process of calculating the CDs and adjacent track collision probabilities for interactions 
between different types of trains operating on the corridor. The braking capability should 
also account for infrastructure characteristics such as track curvature and grade.  
 
 Train deceleration rate: The train deceleration rate, b, used in the braking 
distance calculation can be customized for different types of trains (see subsection 5.2.2). 
Depending on the resolution of the analysis, a general deceleration rate for the various 
different types of passenger and freight trains can be used, or model users can calculate 
customized deceleration rates for each specific type of train on the corridor. 
 
 Reliability of braking system and human brake operations: Currently the 
ATAPAM does not specify default values for the failure rate of braking systems due to 
either human error or mechanical failures. Depending on the resolution of the analysis 
desired, model users can specify the failure rates for braking systems due to these factors 
based on their best knowledge. 
 
 Other qualitative factors: A qualitative factor that could affect train presence 
probability, but is not quantified is the presence of an intrusion detection system. Model 
users should document the presence and type of detection system in place at locations 
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along the corridor. When quantitative data about the reliability and effectiveness of these 
detection systems are available, their effects can be quantitatively evaluated using a 
revised and updated ATAPAM. 
 
6.5 The Semi-Quantitative ATA Risk Assessment Model and ATAPAM 
 In chapter 4, I introduced a semi-quantitative risk assessment model for ATAs 
that provides a screening-level risk assessment tool using a risk index system to rank and 
identify track segments on a railroad corridor that has high ATA risk and may require a 
more detailed quantitative risk assessment. Use of ATAPAM can provide this sort of 
analysis by incorporating more detailed track, train, and operational inputs. 
 
 Deciding whether to use the semi-quantitative ATA risk assessment model or 
ATAPAM will depend on the scope and resolution of the risk analysis needed. The semi-
quantitative risk model can be used for preliminary risk assessment to identify the 
portions of a rail corridor that appear to have relatively high ATA risk. These locations 
may in turn require more detailed risk assessment and possible mitigation. For these 
segments, ATAPAM can be used to conduct quantitative assessments to evaluate the 
probability of an ATA, identify the factors or characteristics contributing most to the 






In this chapter, I described a generic ATA probability assessment model, 
ATAPAM. The model consists of three probability models to address derailment, 
intrusion, and train presence probability. I evaluate segment-level ATA probability using 
a combination of quantitative probability values and qualitative risk indicators. A case 
study is presented to demonstrate the use of the ATAPAM with a step-by-step procedure. 
Additional guidance is provided for users to customize the model to best suit their 
particular circumstances and requirements. ATAPAM provides the first comprehensive 
attempt at a ATA risk assessment framework. With appropriate quantitative data and 
statistics, the ATAPAM has the flexibility to be extended or modified to improve the 





CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this dissertation, I describe the development and application of a probabilistic 
model to address the probability of adjacent track accidents (ATAs). Using probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) methodology, I construct an ATA risk assessment framework 
consisting of three probability models and identify factors influencing these models and 
their effects. I develop a step-by-step procedure and guidance for evaluating the ATA 
probability and present a case study as an example demonstration and usage of the 
comprehensive risk assessment model. My work has led to a number of conclusions and 
contributions that I summarize below. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
7.2.1 Event Tree and Fault Tree Analysis for Adjacent Track Accidents 
Event tree analysis and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are used to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of ATAs and a novel approach to address its probability. 
Basic events leading to the occurrence of an ATA are identified and their logical 
relationship is investigated. The overall probability of an ATA can be evaluated using the 
fault tree. Using this PRA process I developed a risk assessment framework to conduct 
more detailed risk analyses to address each probability component of an ATA, which 




7.2.2 Passenger Train Accident Analysis 
I investigated passenger train accidents in the United States using statistical and 
causal analysis, to understand the general trend in rates of different types of passenger 
train accidents. Derailments and collisions have higher consequences than other accident 
types and are also more relevant to ATAs. I conducted a causal analysis for those 
derailments and collisions and identify the most important accident causes leading to 
more frequent or more severe train derailments and collisions. The results I obtained 
provide passenger derailment rates needed for the initial train derailment probability 
calculation in the ATA risk assessment model. 
 
7.2.3 Train Intrusion Analysis 
I identified the factors affecting the intrusion probability of rail equipment in 
derailments and investigated their effects. Track center spacing is quantified to evaluate 
intrusion probability while track alignment, adjacent structures, speed, elevation 
differential and intrusion barrier are identified as qualitative factors. Their effects can be 
quantified when proper data are available and analyzed or simulations performed. I 
develop a semi-quantitative risk assessment model to provide a risk assessment tool to 
evaluate ATA probability as an intermediate step towards developing a more 







7.2.4 Train Presence Analysis  
I develop a novel approach to quantify the probability of collision between a train 
intruding onto an adjacent track while another train operates on that track. I investigate 
common practices of train meet and pass activities on railroad corridors and calculate the 
frequency of these events. Factors affecting the train presence probability are identified, 
including train spacing, track alignment, point of derailment, speed and braking 
capability. I then develop a probabilistic model to calculate the train presence probability 
accounting for those factors and traffic density.  
 
7.2.5 ATA Probability Assessment Model 
 I develop the Adjacent Track Accident Probability Assessment Model 
(ATAPAM) combining the three probability models I previously developed. The 
ATAPAM calculates ATA probability by dividing a railroad corridor into different 
segments and evaluating the ATA probability for each segment by its infrastructure, 
rolling stock, and operational characteristics. This model evaluates the ATA probability 
by providing a quantitative ATA probability and a risk indicator showing additional or 
potentially reduced ATA probability. The main contribution of this model is to provide a 
standard procedure and guidance for evaluating the ATA probability on an existing or 
newly planned railroad corridor and to manage ATA risk more effectively and efficiently. 
 
7.3 Future Work 
The research I present in this dissertation improves our understanding of ATAs 
and allows the evaluation and comparison of ATA probability based on infrastructure, 
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rolling stock and operation characteristics. With the comprehensive risk assessment 
framework developed and described in this dissertation, I summarize future research 
opportunities that can improve the accuracy of the ATAPAM or extend the range and 
utility of the model. 
 
7.3.1 Common Cause Failure Analysis of ATA 
 In the ATA fault tree, I assumed that all of the basic events are independent of 
each other. In other words, the probability of one basic event does not affect the 
probability of other basic events. This assumption can change because some basic events 
may have dependencies that are not within the original design of the system, such as 
common environmental factors or human interactions. Common cause failures (CCFs) 
are dependencies among basic events that are not explicitly modeled by PRA logic such 
as FTA (Mosleh et al., 1988; 1998; Sakurahara et al., 2019). For example, initial 
derailment is deducted into train accident causes as basic events in the ATA fault tree 
(Figure 2.5). I assumed that each train derailment is assigned a unique accident cause 
based on the way the train accident data I use are structured, and thus all accident causes 
are treated as basic events independent of each other. However, some accident causes 
may contribute to the occurrence of other accident causes, and train accidents can be 
caused by a combination of multiple accident causes. CCFs are important in system 






7.3.2 Human Factor Analysis  
 Many of the elements in the ATA probability directly or indirectly involve human 
factors. For example, some initial derailments are caused by human factors, and there 
might be human errors associated with the reliability of train brake systems and 
applications. Hence, it is an important future research direction to incorporate more 
extensive human factors analysis into the ATA risk assessment. 
 
7.3.3 Full Quantification of Intrusion Probability 
 Current constraints in data availability prevent me from developing a fully 
quantitative intrusion probability model. There are two methods to collect more data for 
the quantification of this probability. The first is investigating more recent train 
derailments that resulted in an intrusion and obtaining the lateral displacement of derailed 
equipment. By so doing one could update the intrusion probability distribution and 
account for more factors if a sufficient amount of data is collected to perform statistical 
analysis. The second method is using train derailment simulation software to estimate rail 
equipment motion in derailment scenarios (Simon and Kirkpatrick, 1999; Kirkpatrick et 
al., 2001). Using derailment simulation, one could produce data on the distribution of the 
amount of lateral displacement of derailed equipment under different circumstances 
(different track curvature and grade, for example) and the interactions between intrusion 
barriers and derailed equipment. These data will help to develop the fully quantitative 





7.3.4 Component Reliability Analysis  
 One of the assumptions in the ATAPAM is that components or devices in the 
systems will all function if present. For example, when evaluating the train presence 
probability, I assumed that the train brakes always function properly without considering 
the possible range in braking performance that might occur. Another example is that in 
the intrusion probability evaluation, I assume that when a barrier is present it will always 
function properly and reduce intrusion probability. This may not always be true because 
intrusion barriers can fail for a number of reasons. When data are available, consideration 
of those and other components that play a role in the ATAPAM would further improve 
the utility and accuracy of the model. 
 
7.3.5 Consequence for ATA 
 Risk consists of probability and consequence. In my dissertation research I 
develop the probability estimation for ATAs, but the consequence of ATAs is equally 
important to address total risk. Casualties, infrastructure damage, rolling stock damage, 
environmental damage, and other impacts of ATAs are important in the risk assessment 
process and should be the subject of further research. 
 
7.3.6 Evaluations of ATA Risk Mitigation Measures 
 The ATAPAM developed in my dissertation research can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Model users can then determine the most 
effective and efficient risk mitigation measures for specific track segments by combining 
the results with a decision analysis framework that includes cost-benefit analysis. The 
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effectiveness of these risk mitigation measures can be compared to their implementation 
and maintenance costs to determine the most cost-effective options and allocations of risk 
reduction resources. If suitable data are available, an optimization framework using 







Aas, A.L., M. Baysari, C. Caponecchia, and T. Skramstad. 2008. The impact of the ON-
S1 standard on railway risk levels in Australia. In: Proceedings of the 2008 3rd 
IET International Conference on System Safety, Birmingham, United Kingdom. 
 
Abtahi, A. 2013. Rolling Stock and Vehicle Intrusion Protection for High-Speed Rail and 
Adjacent Transportation Systems. Parsons Brinckerhoff Report TM 2.1.7. San 
Francisco, CA, USA. 
 




American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-way Association (AREMA). 2016a. 
Manual for Railway Engineering, Chapter 28: Clearances. The American Railway 
Engineering and Maintenance-of-way Association, Lanham, MD, USA. 
 
American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-way Association (AREMA). 2016b. 
Manual for Railway Engineering, Chapter 33: Electrical Energy Utilization. The 
American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-way Association,  
Lanham, MD, USA. 
 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 2009. Public Law No. 111-5.  
URL https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ5/PLAW-111publ5.pdf.  
Accessed 2019-01-31. 
 
Anderson, R.T. 2005. Quantitative Analysis of Factors Affecting Railroad Accident 
Probability and Severity. Master’s Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering.  
Urbana, IL, USA. 
 
Anderson, R.T. and C.P.L. Barkan. 2004. Railroad accident rates for use in transportation 
risk analysis. Transportation Research Record: Journal of Transportation 
Research Board, 1863: 88 – 98. 
 
Anderson, R.T. and C.P.L. Barkan. 2005. Derailment probability analysis and modeling 
of mainline freight trains. In: Proceedings of the 8th International Heavy Haul 
Railway Conference, International Heavy Haul Association,  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
 
Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL). 1996. Risk Assessment for the Transportation of Hazardous 
Materials by Rail, Supplementary Report: Railroad Accident Rate and Risk 





Association of American Railroads (AAR). 2016. Railroad Facts. Association of 
American Railroads, Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Austin, R.D. and J.L. Carson. 2002. An alternative accident prediction model for 
highway-rail interfaces. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 34(1): 31 – 42. 
 
Bae, H-U, K-M. Yun, J. Moon, and N-H. Lim. 2018a. Impact force evaluation of the 
derailment containment wall for high-speed train through a collision simulation. 
Advances in Civil Engineering. DOI: 10.1155/2018/2626905. 
 
Bae, H-U, K-M. Yun, and N-H Lim. 2018b. Containment capacity and estimation of 
crashworthiness of derailment containment walls against high-speed trains. 
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail 
and Rapid Transit, 232(3): 680 – 696. 
 
Bagheri, M., F.F. Saccomanno, S. Chenouri, and L. Fu. 2011. Reducing the threat of in-
transit derailments involving dangerous goods through effective placement along 
the train consist. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 43(3): 613 – 620. 
 
Barkan, C.P.L. 1990. Distance from Track Center of Railroad Equipment in Accidents. 
Memorandum. Association of American Railroads, Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Barkan, C.P.L., C.T. Dick, and R.T. Anderson. 2003. Analysis of railroad derailment 
factors affecting hazardous materials transportation risk. Transportation Research 
Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 1825: 64 – 74. 
 
Baysari, M.T., A.S. Mclntosh, and J.R. Wilson. 2008. Understanding the human factors 
contribution to railway accidents and incidents in Australia. Accident Analysis 
and Prevention, 40: 1750 – 1757.  
 
Bearfield G., A. Holloway, and W. March. 2013. Change and safety: decision-making 
from data. Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid 
Transit, 227(6): 704 – 714. 
 
Benekohal, R.F. and Y.M. Elzohairy. 2001. A new formula for prioritizing railroad 
crossings for safety improvement. In: Proceedings of the Institution of 
Transportation Engineers Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, USA. 
 
Bepperling, S. 2008. Validation of a semi-quantitative approach for risk assessment on 
railways (in German). Doctoral Thesis, Technical University of Braunschweig, 
Braunschweig, Germany. 
 
Bing, A.J., E.W. Beshers, M. Chavez, D.P. Simpson, E.S. Horowitz, and W.E. Zullig Jr. 
2010. Guidebook for Implementing Passenger Rail Service on Shared Passenger 
and Freight Corridors. Transportation Research Board Report NCHRP 657. 




Birk, A.M., R.J. Anderson, and A.J. Coppens. 1990. A computer simulation of a 
derailment accident: parts I & II. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 25: 121-147 & 
149 – 165. 
 
Booz Allen & Hamilton. 1989. WMATA Common Corridor Study. Washington,  
DC, USA. 
 
Britton, M.A., S. Asnaashari, and G.J.M. Read. 2017. Analysis of train derailment cause 
and outcome in Victoria, Australia, between 2007 and 2013: implications for 
regulation. Journal of Transportation Safety & Security, 9(1): 45 – 63. 
 
Cai, G., Y. Wang, Q. Song, and C. Yang. 2018. RAMS analysis of train air braking 
system based on GO-Bayes method and big data platform. Complexity.  
DOI: 10.1155/2018/5851491. 
 




California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA). 2018. California High-Speed Rail 
Program Highlights: Major Accomplishments of 2018. URL 
http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/newsroom/2018_HSRProgramHighlights_Release_12
1218.pdf. Accessed 2019-01-20. 
 
Carolan, M., K. Jacobsen, P. Llana, K. Severson, B. Perlman, and D. Tyrell. 2011. 
Technical Criteria and Procedure for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and 
Occupant Protection Performance of Alternatively Designed Passenger Rail 
Equipment for Use in Tier I Service. U.S. Department of Transportation Report 
DOT/FRA/ORD-11/22. Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority. 2018. Transit Development Plan 2018-
2023 and 2017 Annual Report.  
URL https://www.soundtransit.org/sites/default/files/transit-development-plan-
2018-2023-and-2017-annual-report.pdf. Accessed 2019-03-22. 
 
Chadwick, S.G. 2017. Quantitative analyses of train derailment probability at highway-
rail grade crossings. Doctoral Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering.  
Urbana, IL, USA. 
 
Chadwick, S.G., N. Zhou, and M.R. Saat. 2014. Highway-rail grade crossing safety 
challenges for shared operations of high-speed passenger and heavy freight in the 




Chen, D., C. Xu, and S. Ni. 2017. Data mining on Chinese train accidents to derive 
associated rules. Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and 
Rapid Transit, 231(2): 239 – 252. 
 
Clark, S.L., S. Moulton, S. McCabe, and J. Kubo. 2013. Analytical method to calculate 
risk-based track separation distances for high speed tracks in freight corridors. In: 
Proceedings of the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-way 
Association Annual Conference, Indianapolis, IN, USA. 
 
Clemen, R.T. and T. Reilly. 2001. Making Hard Decisions. CENGAGE Learning, 
Boston, MA, USA.  
 
Cockle, J. 2014. Freight railroads adjacent to high-speed rail – assessing the risk. In: 
Proceedings of the 2014 Joint Rail Conference, Colorado Springs, CO, USA. 
 
D’Ariano, A., M. Pranzo, and I.A. Hansen. 2007. Conflict resolution and train speed 
coordination for solving real-time timetable perturbations. IEEE Transactions on 
Intelligent Transportation Systems, 8(2): 208 – 222. 
 
Delahay, R.J., G.C. Smith, A.M. Barlow, N. Walker, A. Harris, R.S. Clifton-Hadley, and 
C.L. Cheeseman. 2007. Bovine tuberculosis infection in wild mammals in the 
South-West region of England: a survey of prevalence and a semi-quantitative 
assessment of the relative risks to cattle. The Veterinary Journal,  
173(2): 287 – 301. 
 
Dennis, S.M. 2002. Changes in railroad track accident rates. Transportation Quarterly,  
56(4): 161-174. 
 
Department of Transportation Appropriations Act. 2010. Public Law No. 111-5, Division 
A, Title I. URL https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-
111publ117/html/PLAW-111publ117.htm. Accessed 2019-01-31. 
 
Dick, C.T., C.P.L. Barkan, E.R. Chapman, and M.P. Stehly. 2003. Multivariate statistical 
model for predicting occurrence and location of broken rails. Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 1825: 48 – 55. 
 
Dick, C.T., D. Mussanov, and N. Nishio. 2018. Transitioning from flexible to structured 
heavy haul operations to expand the capacity of single-track shared corridors in 
North America. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: 
Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 0(0): 1 – 11. 
 
Dingler, M.H., Y-C. Lai, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2009. Impact of train type heterogeneity on 
single-track railway capacity. Transportation Research Record: Journal of 





Dorrian, J., S.D. Baulk, and D. Dawson. 2011. Work hours, workload, sleep and fatigue 
in Australian Rail Industry employees. Applied Ergonomics, 42(2): 202 – 209. 
 
Elvik, R. and N.G. Voll. 2014. Challenges of improving safety in very safe transport 
systems. Safety Science, 63: 115 – 123. 
 
English, G.W., G. Highan, and M. Bagheri. 2007. Evaluation of Risk Associated with 
Stationary Dangerous Goods Railroad Cars. TranSys Research Ltd.,  
ON, Canada. 
 
Ericson, C.A. 2005. Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety. John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. 
 
European Railway Agency. 2014. Introduction to ETCS Braking Curves. European 
Railway Agency, Valenciennes, France. 
 
European Railway Agency. 2015. Research on Risk Models at the European Level. 
Report 1TNJW41-2. Valenciennes, France. 
 
Evans, A.W. 2000. Fatal train accidents on Britain’s mainline railway. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society), 163(1): 99 – 119. 
 
Evans, A.W. 2007. Rail safety and rail privatisation in Britain. Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 39(3): 510 – 523. 
 
Evans, A.W. 2010. Rail safety and rail privatisation in Japan. Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 42(4): 1296 – 1301. 
 
Evans, A.W. 2011a. Fatal accidents at railway level crossings in Great Britain 1946–
2009. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 43(1): 1837 – 1845. 
 
Evans, A.W. 2011b. Fatal train accidents on Europe’s railways: 1980-2009. Accident 
Analysis and Prevention, 43(1): 391 – 401. 
 
Farrington-Darby, T., L. Pickup, and J.R. Wilson. Safety culture in railway maintenance. 
Safety Science, 43(1): 39 – 60. 
 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 2011. FRA Guide for Preparing Accident–




Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 2015. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail 
Project Alignment Alternatives Analysis Report. URL 
http://www.houstonhsrwatch.org/Documents/Final_Alignment_Alternatives_Anal




Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 2017a. Train Accident Data Download on 
Demand. URL http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/default.aspx.  
Accessed 2018-11-25. 
 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 2017b. In-Depth Data Analysis of Grade 
Crossing Accidents Resulting in Injuries and Fatalities. U.S. Department of 
Transportation Report DOT/FRA/ORD-17-04. Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 2017c. Close Call Reporting. URL 
https://www.fra.dot.gov/c3rs. Accessed 2018-11-25. 
 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 2018. Positive Train Control. URL 
https://www.fra.dot.gov/ptc. Accessed 2018-11-25. 
 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 2019. Notice Regarding Monetary Threshold for 
Reporting Rail Equipment Accidents/Incidents for Calendar Year 2019. URL 
https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/ProcessFile.aspx?doc=Monetary%20
Threshold%20Notice.pdf. Accessed 2019-02-25. 
 
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act. 2015. Public Law No. 114-94. 
URL https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ94/PLAW-114publ94.pdf.  
Accessed 2019-01-31. 
 
Fowler, C., S. Tong, K. Fernandez-Medina, K. Thompson, J. Scoons, and B. Lawton. 
2013. Prospective Study into Harmonised Train Accident Precursors Analysis and 
Management. European Railway Agency Report PPR665.  
Valenciennes, France. 
 
Furtado, F.M.B.A. 2013. U.S. and European freight railways: the differences that matter. 
Journal of Transportation Research Forum, 52(2): 1 – 21. 
 
Gadd, S.G., D. Keeley, and H. Balmforth. 2003. Good practice and pitfalls in risk 
assessment. Health and Safety Executive Research Report 151. Health & Safety 
Laboratory, Broad Lane, Sheffield, United Kingdom. 
 
Gorman, M.F. 2009. Statistical estimation of railroad congestion delay. Transportation 
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 45(3): 446 – 456. 
 
Hadden, J., W. Lewalski, D. Kerr, and C. Ball. 1992. Safety of High Speed Guided 
Ground Transportation Systems: Shared Right-of-Way Safety Issues. U.S. 






Hajibabai, L., M.R. Saat, Y. Ouyang, C.P.L. Barkan, Z. Yang, K. Bowling, K. Somani, 
D. Lauro, and X. Li. 2012. Wayside defect detector data mining to predict 
potential WILD train stops. In: Proceedings of the Annual Conference and 
Exposition of the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way 
Association, Chicago, IL, USA. 
 
Havârneanu, G.M., J-M. Burkhardt, and F. Paran. 2015. A systematic review of the 
literature on safety measures to prevent railway suicides and trespassing 
accidents. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 81(1): 30 – 50. 
 
Hay, W.W. 1982. Railroad Engineering, 2nd ed. John Wiley & Sons, New York,  
NY, USA. 
 
Hong, E-S., I-M. Lee, H-S. Shin, S-W. Nam, and J-S. Kong. 2009. Quantitative risk 
evaluation based on event tree analysis technique: application to the design of 
shield TBM. Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, 24: 269 – 277. 
 
Huang, H.Z., Y. Xu, and X.S. Yao. 2000. Fuzzy fault tree analysis of railway traffic 
safety. In: Proceedings of the Conference on Traffic and Transportation Studies,  
Beijing, China. 
 
Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). 2018. Illinois FY 2019-2024 Proposed 





Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). 2009. IEEE Guide for the 
Calculation of Braking Distances for Rail Transit Vehicles. Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), New York, NY, USA. 
 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 2018. ISO 31000: Risk 
Management. International Organization for Standardization,  
Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
Jacinto C. and C. Silva. 2010. A semi-quantitative assessment of occupational risks using 
bow-tie representation. Safety Science, 48: 973 – 979. 
 
Jafarian, E. and M.A. Rezvani. 2012. Application of fuzzy fault tree analysis for 
evaluation of railway safety risk: an evaluation of root causes for passenger train 
derailment. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: 





Johansson, S. and J.C.O. Nielsen. 2003. Out-of-round railway wheels—wheel-rail contact 
forces and track response derived from field tests and numerical simulations. 
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail 
and Rapid Transit, 217(2): 135 – 146. 
 
Kaplan, S. 1982. Matrix theory formalism for event tree analysis: application to nuclear‐
risk analysis. Risk Analysis, 2(1), 9 – 18. 
 
Kawprasert, A. and C.P.L. Barkan. 2008. Effect of route rationalization on hazardous 
materials transportation risk. Transportation Research Record: Journal of 
Transportation Research Board, 2043: 65 – 72. 
 
Kirkpatrick, S.W., M. Schroeder, and J.W. Simons. 2001. Evaluation of passenger rail 
vehicle crashworthiness. International Journal of Crashworthiness,  
6(1): 95 – 106. 
 
Kratville, W.W. 1997. Car and Locomotive Cyclopedia of American Practice. 6th ed. 
Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corp. New York, NY, USA. 
 
Kyriakidis, M., A. Majumdar, and W.Y. Ochiend. 2018. The human performance railway 
operational index—a novel approach to assess human performance for railway 
operations. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 170: 226 – 243. 
 
Lamorgese, L. and C. Mannino. 2015. An exact decomposition approach for the real-time 
train dispatching problem. Operation Research, 63(1): 48 – 64. 
 
Layden, G. 2014. Development of crash wall design loads from theoretical train impact. 
In Proceedings of the 2014 American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-
way Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, USA. 
 
Li, W., G.S. Roscoe, Z. Zhang, M.R. Saat, and C.P.L Barkan. 2018. Quantitative analysis 
of the derailment characteristics of loaded and empty unit trains. Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board. 2672(10): 
156 – 165. 
 
Li, Y.F., J. Mi, H.Z. Huang, S.P. Zhu, and N. Xiao. 2013. Fault tree analysis of train rear-
end collision accident considering common cause failure. Ekcsploatacja i 
Niezawodnosc – Maintenance and Reliability, 15(4): 403 – 408. 
 
Lin, C.Y. and M.R. Saat. 2014. Semi-quantitative risk assessment of adjacent track 
accidents on shared-use rail corridors. In: Proceedings of the 2014 Joint Rail 
Conferences, Colorado Springs, Colorado, CO, USA. 
 
Lin, C.Y., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2013. Causal analysis of passenger train 
accidents on shared-use rail corridors. In: Proceedings of the World Congress on 
Railway Research, Sydney, Australia. 
174 
 
Lin, C.Y., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2016. Fault tree analysis of adjacent track 
accidents on shared-use rail corridors. Transportation Research Record: Journal 
of Transportation Research Record, 2546: 129 – 136. 
 
Liu, X. 2015. Statistical temporal analysis of freight train derailments rates in the United 
States: 2000 to 2012. Transportation Research Record: Journal of Transportation 
Research Board, 2476: 119 – 125. 
 
Liu, X. 2016. Analysis of collision risk for freight train in the United States. 
Transportation Research Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 
2546: 121 – 128. 
 
Liu, X. 2017a. Optimizing rail defect inspection frequency to reduce the risk of 
hazardous materials transportation by rail. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, 48: 151 – 161. 
 
Liu, X. 2017b. Statistical causal analysis of freight-train derailments in the United States. 
Journal of Transportation Engineering, Part A: Systems, 143(2).  
DOI: 10.1061/JTEPBS.0000014. 
 
Liu, X., C.P.L. Barkan, and M.R. Saat. 2011. Analysis of derailments by accident cause: 
evaluating railroad track upgrades to reduce transportation risk. Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 2261: 178 – 185. 
 
Liu, X. and Y. Hong. 2015. Analysis of railroad tank car releases using a generalized 
binomial model. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 84: 20 – 26. 
 
Liu, X., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2012. Analysis of causes of major train 
derailment and their effect on accident rates. Transportation Research Record: 
Journal of Transportation Research Board, 2289: 154 – 163. 
 
Liu, X., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2013a. Analysis of U.S. freight-train derailment 
severity using zero-truncated negative binomial regression and quantile 
regression. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 59: 87 – 93. 
 
Liu, X., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2013b. Integrated risk reduction framework to 
improve railway hazardous materials transportation safety. Journal of Hazardous 
Material, 260: 131 – 140. 
 
Liu, X., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2013c. Safety effectiveness of integrated risk 
reduction strategies for rail transport of hazardous materials. Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 2374: 102 – 110. 
 
Liu, X., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2014. Probability analysis of multiple-tank-car 
release incidents in railway hazardous materials transportation. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, 276: 442 – 451. 
175 
 
Liu, X., M.R. Saat, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2017. Freight-train derailment rates for railroad 
safety and risk analysis. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 98: 1 – 9. 
 
Madigan, R., D. Golightly, and R. Madders. 2016. Application of Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to UK rail safety of the line 
incidents. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 97: 122 – 131. 
 
Martland, C.D. 2008. Improve on-time performance for long-distance passenger trains 
operating on freight routes. Journal of Transportation Research Forum,  
47(4): 63 – 80. 
 





Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT). 2018b. Focus40: The 2040 










Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT). 2015. State Rail Plan.  
URL https://www.dot.state.mn.us/planning/railplan/. Accessed 2019-03-22. 
 
Modarres, M., M. Kaminskiy, and Y. Krivtsov. 2010. Reliability Engineering and Risk 
Analysis. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, USA. 
 
Mok, S.C. and I. Savage. 2005. Why has safety improved at rail-highway grade 
crossings? Risk Analysis, 25(4): 867 – 881. 
 
Moonis, M., A.J. Wilday, and M.J. Wardman. 2010. Semi-quantitative risk assessment of 
commercial scale supply chain of hydrogen fuel and implications for industry and 
society. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 88: 97 – 108. 
 
Mosleh, A., K.N. Fleming, G.W. Parry, H.M. Paula, D.H. Worledge, and D.M. 
Rasmuson. 1988. Procedures for Treating Common Cause Failures in Safety and 
Reliability Studies: Analytic Background and Techniques. United States Nuclear 




Mosleh, A., D.M. Rasmuson, K.N., and F.M. Marshall. 1998. Guidelines on Modeling 
Common-Cause Failures in Probabilistic Risk Assessment. United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission Report CR-4780. Rockville, MD, USA. 
 
Moyer, P.D., R.W. James, C.H. Bechara, and K.L. Chamberlain. 1994. Safety of High 
Speed Guided Ground Transportation Systems Intrusion Barrier Design Study. 
U.S. Department of Transportation Report DOT/FRA/ORD-95/04. Washington, 
DC, USA. 
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 2011. NASA Accident 




National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). 2018a. Amtrak Five Year Service 





National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). 2018b. Amtrak National Facts. URL 
https://www.amtrak.com/national-facts. Accessed 2019-01-27. 
 
Nash, A. 2003. Best Practices in Shared-Use High-Speed Rail Systems. Mineta 
Transportation Institute Report MTI 02-02. San Jose, CA, USA. 
 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 2015a. Railroad Accident Brief: 
Preliminary Report for Accident Involving Two Freight Trains. URL 
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/DCA14MR00
4_Preliminary_Report.aspx. Accessed 2018-11-25. 
  
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 2015b. Railroad Accident Brief: 
Derailment and Subsequent Collision of Two Metro-North Passenger Trains. 
URL http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/RAB1409.aspx.  
Accessed 2018-11-25. 
 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 2015c. Derailment of Amtrak Passenger 




Nayak, P.R., D.B. Rosenfield, and J.H. Hagopian. 1983. Event Probabilities and Impact 
Zones for Hazardous Materials Accidents on Railroads. U.S. Department of 




Niwa, Y. 2009. A proposal for a new accident analysis method and its application to a 
catastrophic railway accident in Japan. Cognition, Technology & Work,  
11(3): 187 – 204. 
 
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA). 2018. 




Oh, S.M., S.H. Hong, and I.C. Choi. 2004. Railway conflict detection and resolution in 
the Korea railway system. Computers in Railway IX. DOI: 10.2495/CR040681. 
 
Ouyang, M., L. Hong, M.H. Yu, and Q. Fei. 2010. STAMP-based analysis on the railway 
accident and accident spreading: Taking the China-Jiaoji railway accident for 
example. Safety Science, 48(5): 544 – 555. 
 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act. 2008. H.R.6003, 110th United States 
Congress. URL https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/6003.  
Accessed 2019-01-31.  
 
Passenger Rail Reform and Investment Act. 2015. H.R.749, 114th United States 
Congress. URL https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr749/BILLS-
114hr749rfs.pdf. Accessed 2019-01-31. 
 
Peterman, D.R. 2016. The High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) Grant Program: 
Overview. Congressional Research Service Report R44654. Washington,  
DC, USA. 
 
Peterman, D.R. 2017. Amtrak: Overview. Congressional Research Service Report 
R44973. Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Peterman, D.R. 2018. Department of Transportation (DOT) Appropriations: FY2019. 
Congressional Research Service Report R45321. Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Peterman, D.R., J. Frittelli, and W.J. Mallett. 2013. The Development of High Speed Rail 
in the United States: Issues and Recent Events. Congressional Research Service 
Report R42584. Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Pouryousef, H., P. Lautala, and T. White. 2013. Review of capacity measurement 
methodologies: similarities and differences in the U.S. and European railroads. In: 
Proceedings of the 92nd Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, 
Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Rail Safety and Standard Board (RSSB). 2014. Guidance on Identifying Hazards and 




Rail Safety and Standard Board (RSSB). 2018. Safety Management Information System 
(SMIS) database, London, United Kingdom. 
 
Ramzali, N., M.R.M. Lavasani, and J. Ghodousi. 2015. Safety barriers analysis of 
offshore drilling system by employing Fuzzy Event Tree Analysis. Safety Science, 
78: 45 – 59. 
 
Raub, R.A. 2009. Examination of Highway – Rail Grade Crossing Collisions Nationally 
from 1998 to 2007. Transportation Research Record: Journal of Transportation 
Research Board, 2122: 63 – 71. 
 
Reinach, S. and A. Viale. 2006. Application of a human error framework to conduct train 
accident/incident investigations. Accident Analysis and Prevention,  
38(2): 396 – 406. 
 
Reniers, G.L.L., K.D. Jongh, B. Gorrens, D. Lauwers, M.V. Leest, and F. Witlox. 2010. 
Transportation Risk ANalysis tool for hazardous substances (TRANS) – a user-
friendly, semi-quantitative multi-mode hazmat transport route safety risk 
estimation methodology for Flanders. Transportation Research Part D: Transport 
and Environment, 15: 489 – 496. 
 
Resor, R.R. 2003. Catalog of "Common Use" Rail Corridors. U.S. Department of 
Transportation Report DOT-FRA-03-16. Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Ross T. and J. Sumner. 2002. A simple, spreadsheet-based, food safety risk assessment 
tool. International Journal of Food Microbiology, 77: 39 – 53. 
 
Rulens, D. 2008. Rolling Stock and Vehicle Intrusion Protection for High-Speed Rail and 
Adjacent Transportation Systems TM 2.1.7. Parsons Brinckerhoff, New York 
City, NY, USA. 
 
Şahin, I. 2017. Markov chain model for delay distribution in train schedules: Assessing 
the effectiveness of time allowances. Journal of Rail Transport Planning & 
Management, 7(3): 101 – 113. 
 
Saat, M.R. and C.P.L. Barkan. 2013. Investigating Technical Challenges and Research 
Needs Related to Shared Corridors for High-Speed Passenger and Railroad 
Freight Operations. U.S. Department of Transportation Report DOT/FRA/ORD-
13/29. Washington DC, USA. 
 
Saccomanno, F.F. and S.M. El-Hage. 1989. Minimizing derailments of railcars carrying 
dangerous commodities through effective marshaling strategies. Transportation 




Saccomanno, F.F. and S.M. El-Hage. 1991. Establishing derailment profile by position 
for corridor shipment of dangerous goods. Canadian Journal of Civil 
Engineering, 18(1): 67 – 75. 
 
Saccomanno, F.F., L. Fu, and L.F. Miranda-Moreno. 2004. Risk-based model for 
identifying highway-rail grade crossing blackspots. Transportation Research 
Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 1862: 127 – 135. 
 
Saccomanno, F.F., P.Y.J. Park, and L. Fu. 2007. Estimating countermeasure effects for 
reducing collisions at highway-rail grade crossings. Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 39: 406 – 416. 
 
Sadler, J., D. Griffin, A. Gilchrist, J. Austin, O. Kit, and J. Heavisides. 2016. GeoSRM – 
Online geospatial safety risk model for the GB rail network. IET Intelligent 
Transport Systems, 10(1): 17 – 24. 
 
Sakurahara, T., G. Schumock, S. Reihani, E. Kee, and Z. Mohaghegh. 2019. Simulation-
informed probabilistic methodology for common cause failure analysis. 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 185: 84 – 99. 
 
Santos-Reyes, J., and A.N. Beard. 2006. A systemic analysis of the Paddington railway 
accident. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal 
of Rail and Rapid Transit, 220(2): 121 – 151. 
 
Santos-Reyes, J., and A.N. Beard. 2009. A systemic analysis of the Edge Hill railway 
accident. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 41(6): 1133 – 1144. 
 
Savage, I. 2016. Analysis of fatal train-pedestrian collisions in metropolitan Chicago 
2004-2012. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 86(1): 217 – 228.  
 
Shao, F. and K. Li. 2017. A graph model for preventing railway accidents based on the 
maximal information coefficient. International Journal of Modern Physics B,  
31(3): 1750010 (19 pages). 
 
Shih, M.C., C.T. Dick, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2015. Impact of passenger train capacity and 
level of service on shared rail corridors with multiple types of freight trains. 
Transportation Research Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 
2475: 63 – 71. 
 
Shih, M-C., C.T. Dick, D. Mussanov, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2017. A parametric model of 
the train delay distribution based on traffic conflicts. In: Proceedings of the 7th 
International Conference on Railway Operating Modelling and Analysis,  
Lille, France. 
 
Silla, A. and V.P. Kallberg. 2012. The development of railway safety in Finland. 
Accident Analysis and Prevention, 45: 737 – 744. 
180 
 
Silla, A and J. Luoma. 2011. Effect of three countermeasures against the illegal crossing 
of railway tracks. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 43(1): 1089 – 1094. 
 
Simons, J.W. and S.W. Kirkpatrick. 1999. High-speed passenger train crashworthiness 
and occupant survivability. International Journal of Crashworthiness,  
4(2): 121 – 132. 
 
Singh S. and R. Kumar. 2015. Evaluation of human error probability of disc brake unit 
assembly and wheel set maintenance of Railway Bogie. In: Proceedings of the 6th 
International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics and the 
Affiliated Conferences, Las Vegas, NV, USA. 
 
Sogin, S.L., Y-C. Lai, C.T. Dick, and C.P.L. Barkan. 2016. Analyzing the transition from 
single- to double-track railway lines with nonlinear regression analysis. 
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail 
and Rapid Transit, 230(8): 1877 – 1889. 
 
Sørensen, A.Ø ., A.D. Landmark, N.O.E. Olsson, and A.A. Seim. 2017. Method of 
analysis for delay propagation in a single-track network. Journal of Rail 
Transport Planning & Management, 7(1-2): 77 – 97. 
 
Stratman, B., Y. Liu, and S. Mahadevan. 2007. Structural health monitoring of railroad 
wheels using Wheel Impact Load Detectors. Journal of Failure Analysis and 
Prevention, 7(3): 218 – 255. 
 
Sumner J. and T. Ross. 2002. A semi-quantitative seafood safety risk assessment. 
International Journal of Food Microbiology, 77: 55 – 59. 
 
Sussman, D. and M. Coplen. 2000. Fatigue and alertness in the United States railroad 
industry part I: the nature of the problem. Transportation Research Part F: 
Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 3(4): 211 – 220. 
 
Taig, T. and T. Hunt. 2012. Review of LU and RSSB Safety Risk Models. TTAC Ltd. 
Report ORR-ST/11-35. Cheshire, United Kingdom. 
 
Thurston, D.F. 2011. Statistical safe braking analysis. In: Proceedings of the 
ASME/ASCE/IEEE 2011 Joint Rail Conference, Pueblo, CO, USA. 
 
Tyrell, D.C. 2002a. US rail equipment crashworthiness standards. Proceedings of the 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 
216(2): 123 – 130. 
 
Tyrell, D.C. 2002b. Rail passenger equipment accidents and the evaluation of 
crashworthiness strategies. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical 




Tyrell, D.C. and A.B. Perlman. 2003. Evaluation of rail passenger equipment 
crashworthiness strategies. Transportation Research Record: Journal of 
Transportation Research Board, 1825: 8 – 14. 
 
Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (UIC). 2018. High Speed Rail: Fast Track to 
Sustainable Mobility. Union Internationale des Chemins de fer, Paris, France. 
 
Ullman, K.B. and A.J. Bing. 1995. High Speed Passenger Trains in Freight Railroad 
Corridors: Operations and Safety Considerations. U.S. Department of 
Transportation Report DOT/FRA/ORD-95/05. Washington, DC, USA. 
 
Union Pacific Railroad. 2016. Standard Minimum Operating Clearances. Standard 
Drawings 0038G. Omaha, NE, USA. 
 
Van Dyk, B.J., M.S. Dersch, J.R. Edwards, C.R. Ruppert, Jr., and C.P.L. Barkan. 2013. 
Quantifying shared corridor wheel loading variation using wheel impact load 
detectors. In: Proceedings of the 2013 ASME Joint Rail Conference, Knoxville, 
TN, USA. 
 
Wang, B.Z., C.P.L. Barkan, X. Liu, and M.R. Saat. 2019. Trends in U.S. freight train 
accident causes and rates - quantitative approach (working paper). 
 
Wang, M.Y., H. Wang, and Z.G. Liu. 2014. Reach on fault tree analysis of train 
derailment in urban rail transit. International Journal of Business and Social 
Science, 5(8): 128 – 134. 
 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). 2018. FY2020 Proposed 
Budget: Rebuilding American’s Transit.  
URL https://www.wmata.com/about/records/public_docs/upload/FY20-Proposed-
Budget-FINAL-to-WEB-121318_b.pdf. Accessed 2019-03-22. 
 
Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT). 2014. Washington State Rail 
Plan: Integrated Freight and Passenger Rail Plan 2013-2035. URL 
http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F67D73E5-2F2D-40F2-9795-
736131D98106/0/WashingtonStateRailPlan20132035.pdf. Accessed 2019-03-22. 
 
White, T. 2005. Alternatives for railroad traffic simulation analysis. Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of Transportation Research Board, 1916, 34 – 41. 
 
Williams, T., J. Abello, J. Betak, and D. Desimone. 2015a.. Using data visualization to 
analyze grade crossing accidents. In: Proceedings of the 2015 Joint Rail 
Conference, San Jose, CA, USA. 
 
Williams, T., C. Nelson, and J. Betak. 2015b. Applying topic modeling to railroad grade 
crossing accident report text. In: Proceedings of the 2015 Joint Rail Conference, 
San Jose, CA, USA. 
182 
 
Wilson, J.R. 2014. Fundamentals of systems ergonomics/human factors. Applied 
Ergonomics, 45(1): 5 – 13. 
 
Wilson, J.R. and B.J. Norris. 2005. Rail human factors: past, present and future. Applied 
Ergonomics, 36(6): 649 – 660. 
 
Wilson, J.R., T. Farrington-Darby, G. Cox, R. Bye, and R.J. Hockey. 2007. The railway 
as a socio-technical system: human factors at the heart of successful rail 
engineering. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: 
Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 221(1): 101 – 115. 
 





Yang, J., C. Zhao, A. Zhu, D. Yao, and H. Wu. 2016. Reliability estimation for the 
braking systems of high-speed electric multiple units based on Bayes inference 
and the GO method. Journal of Computational and Theoretical Neuroscience,  
13(2): 1314 – 1322. 
 
Zeinab, K., A. Mazloumi, G.N. Saraji, and S. Barideh. 2016. Fatigue and workload in 
short and long-haul train driving. Work, 54(2): 425 – 433. 
 
Zhan, Q., W. Zheng, and B. Zhao. 2017. A hybrid human and organizational analysis 
method for railway accidents based on HFACS-Railway Accidents (HFACS-
RAs). Safety Science, 91: 232 – 250. 
 
Zhang, Z., X. Liu, and K. Holt. 2018. Positive Train Control (PTC) for railway safety in 
the United States: policy developments and critical issues. Utilities Policy,  
51: 33 – 40. 
 
Zhou, J-L. and Y. Lei. 2018. Paths between latent and active errors: Analysis of 407 
railway accidents/incidents’ causes in China. Safety Science, 110: 47 – 58.  
183 
 
APPENDIX A: FRA ACCIDENT CAUSE CODES AND  







Cause Code Accident Cause Code Description
T001 Roadbed Settled or Soft
T099 Other Roadbed Defects
T002 Washout/rain/slide/flood/snow/ice damage to track
T401 Bridge Misalignment or Failure
T402 Flangeway Clogged
T403 Engineering Design or Construction
T110 Wide Gage (due to defective or missing crossties)
T111 Wide Gage (due to defective or missing spikes or other rail fasteners)
T112 Wide Gage (due to loose, broken, or defective gage rods)
T113 Wide Gage (due to worn rails)
T101 Cross Level of Track Irregular (at joints)
T102 Cross Level of Track Irregular (not at joints)
T103 Deviation from Uniform Top of Rail Profile
T104 Distributed Ballast Selection
T105 Insufficient Ballast Selection
T106 Superelevation Improper, Excessive, or Insufficient
T107 Superelevation Runoff Improper
T108 Track Alignment Irregular (other than buckled/sunkink)
T199 Other Track Geometry Defects
Buckled Track 05T T109 Track Alignment Irregular (buckled/sunkink)
T201 Broken Rail - Bolt hole crack or break
T211 Broken Rail - Head and web separation (within joint bar limits)
T213 Joint bar broken (compromise)
T214 Joint bar broken (insulated)
T215 Joint bar broken (noninsulated)
T216 Joint bolts, broken, or missing
T202 Broken Rail - Base
T203 Broken Rail - Weld (plant)
T204 Broken Rail - Weld (field)
T207 Broken Rail - Detail fracture from shelling or head check
T208 Broken Rail - Engine burn fracture
T210 Broken Rail - Head and web separation (outside joint bar limits)
T212 Broken Rail - Horizontal split head
T218 Broken Rail - Piped rail
T219 Rail defect with joint bar repair
T220 Broken Rail - Transverse/compound fissure
T221 Broken Rail - Vertical split head
Other Rail and      
Joint Defects
09T T299 Other rail and joint bar defects (Provide detailed description in narrative)
T307 Spring/power switch mechanism malfunction
T308 Stock rail worn, broken or disconnected
T309 Switch (hand operated) stand mechanism broken, loose, or worn
T310 Switch connecting or operating rod is broken or defective
T311 Switch damaged or out of adjustment
T312 Switch lug/crank broken
T313 Switch out of adjustment because of insufficient rail anchoring
T314 Switch point worn or broken
T315 Switch rod worn, bent, broken, or disconnected
T319 Switch point gapped (between switch point and stock rail)
T304 Railroad crossing frog, worn or broken
T316 Turnout frog (rigid) worn, or broken
T317 Turnout frog (self guarded), worn or broken
T318 Turnout frog (spring) worn, or broken
T404 Catenary System Defect
T205 Defective or missing crossties (use code T110 if results in wide gage)
T206 Defective spikes or missing spikes or other rail fasteners (use code T111 if results in wide gage)
T217 Mismatched rail-head contour
T222 Worn rail
T223 Rail Condition - Dry rail, freshly ground rail
T224 Rail defect originating from bond wire attachment (Provide description in narrative)
T301 Derail, defective
T302 Expansion joint failed or malfunctioned
T303 Guard rail loose/broken or mislocated
T305 Retarder worn, broken, or malfunctioning
T306 Retarder yard skate defective
T399 Other frog, switch and track appliance defects (Provide detailed description in narrative)
T499 Other way and structure defect (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H510 Automatic brake, insufficient (H001) -- see note after cause H599
H511 Automatic brake, excessive (H002)
H512 Automatic brake, failure to use split reduction (H003)
H513 Automatic brake, other improper use (H004)
H514 Failure to allow air brakes to fully release before proceeding (H005)
H515 Failure to properly cut-out brake valves on locomotives (H006)
H516 Failure to properly cut-in brake valves on locomotives (H007)
H517 Dynamic brake, insufficient (H009)
H518 Dynamic brake, excessive (H010)
H519 Dynamic brake, too rapid adjustment (H011)
H520 Dynamic brake, excessive axles (H012)
H521 Dynamic brake, other improper use (H013)
H525 Independent (engine) brake, improper use (except actuation) (H023)














Turnout Defects - 
Switches











Track Geometry (excl. 
Wide Gauge)
Rail Defects at   
Bolted Joint
Joint Bar Defects
Broken Rails                   
or Welds









Cause Code Accident Cause Code Description
H017 Failure to properly secure engine(s) (railroad employee)
H018 Failure to properly secure hand brake on car(s) (railroad employee)
H019 Failure to release hand brakes on car(s) (railroad employee)
H020 Failure to apply sufficient number of hand brakes on car(s) (railroad employee)
H021 Failure to apply hand brakes on car(s) (railroad employee)
H022 Failure to properly secure engine(s) or car(s) (non railroad employee)
H025 Failure to control speed of car using hand brake (railroad employee)
M504 Failure by non-railroad employee, e.g., industry employee, to control speed of car using hand brake
H008 Improper operation of train line air connections (bottling the air)
H099 Use of brakes, other (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H101 Impairment of efficiency or judgment because of drugs or alcohol
H102 Incapacitation due to injury or illness
H103 Employee restricted in work or motion
H104 Employee asleep
H199 Employee physical condition, other (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H201 Blue Signal, absence of
H202 Blue Signal, improperly displayed
H204 Fixed signal, failure to comply
H205 Flagging, improper or failure to flag
H206 Flagging signal, failure to comply
H207 Hand signal, failure to comply
H208 Hand signal improper
H209 Hand signal, failure to give/receive
H215 Block signal, failure to comply
H216 Interlocking signal, failure to comply
H217 Failure to observe hand signals given during a wayside inspection of moving train
H218 Failure to comply with failed equipment detector warning or with applicable train inspection rules.
H219 Fixed signal (other than automatic block or interlocking signal), improperly displayed.
H220 Fixed signal (other than automatic block or interlocking signal), failure to comply.
H221 Automatic block or interlocking signal displaying a stop indication - failure to comply.*
H222 Automatic block or interlocking signal displaying other than a stop indication - failure to comply.*
H299 Other signal causes (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H210 Radio communication, failure to comply
H211 Radio communication, improper
H212 Radio communication, failure to give/receive
H405 Train orders, track warrants, direct traffic control, track bulletins, radio, error in preparation, transmission or delivery
H301 Car(s) shoved out and left out of clear
H302 Cars left foul
H303 Derail, failure to apply or remove
H304 Hazardous materials regulations, failure to comply
H305 Instruction to train/yard crew improper
H306 Shoving movement, absence of man on or at leading end of movement
H307 Shoving movement, man on or at leading end of movement, failure to control
H308 Skate, failure to remove or place
H309 Failure to stretch cars before shoving
H310 Failure to couple
H311 Moving cars while loading ramp/hose/chute/cables/bridge plate, etc., not in proper position
H312 Passed couplers (other than automated classification yard)
H313 Retarder, improper manual operation
H314 Retarder yard skate improperly applied
H315 Portable derail, improperly applied
H316 Manual intervention of classification yard automatic control system modes by operator
H317 Humping or cutting off in motion equipment susceptible to damage, or to cause damage to other equipment
H318 Kicking or dropping cars, inadequate precautions
H399 Other general switching rules (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H401 Failure to stop train in clear
H402 Motor car or on-track equipment rules, failure to comply
H403 Movement of engine(s) or car(s) without authority (railroad employee)
H404 Train order, track warrant, track bulletin, or timetable authority, failure to comply
H406 Train orders, track warrants, direct traffic control, track bulletins, written, error in preparation, transmission or delivery
H499 Other main track authority causes (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H501 Improper train make-up at initial terminal
H502 Improper placement of cars in train between terminals
H503 Buffing or slack action excessive, train handling
H504 Buffing or slack action excessive, train makeup
H505 Lateral drawbar force on curve excessive, train handling
H506 Lateral drawbar force on curve excessive, train makeup
H507 Lateral drawbar force on curve excessive, car geometry (short car/long car combination)
H508 Improper train make-up
H509 Improper train inspection
H522 Throttle (power), improper use (H014)
H523 Throttle (power), too rapid adjustment (H015)
H524 Excessive horsepower (H016)
H599 Other causes relating to train handling or makeup (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H601 Coupling speed excessive
H602 Switching movement, excessive speed
H603 Train on main track inside yard limits, excessive speed
H604 Train outside yard limits, in block signal or interlocking territory, excessive speed
H605 Failure to comply with restricted speed in connection with the restrictive indication of a block or interlocking signal.
H606 Train outside yard limits in nonblock territory, excessive speed
H607 Failure to comply with restricted speed or its equivalent not in connection with a block or interlocking signal.




































Cause Code Accident Cause Code Description
H701 Spring Switch not cleared before reversing
H702 Switch improperly lined
H703 Switch not latched or locked
H704 Switch previously run through
H705 Moveable point switch frog improperly lined
H706 Switch improperly lined, radio controlled
H707 Radio controlled switch not locked effectively (Human Error)
H799 Use of switches, other (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H821 Automatic cab signal, failure to comply
H822 Automatic cab signal cut out
H823 Automatic train-stop device cut out
H824 Automatic train control device cut out
H899 Other causes relating to cab signals (provide detailed description in narrative)
H991 Tampering with safety/protective device(s)
H992 Operation of locomotive by uncertified/unqualified person
H993 Human Factor – track
H994 Human Factor - Signal installation or maintenance error (field)
H995 Human Factor - Motive power and equipment
H996 Oversized loads or Excess Height/Width cars, misrouted or switched.
H997 Motor car or other on-track equipment rules (other than main track authority) - Failure to Comply.
H999 Other train operation/human factors (Provide detailed description in narrative)
H99A Human Factor - Signal - Train Control - Installation or maintenance error (shop).
H99B Human Factor - Signal - Train Control - Operator Input On-board computer incorrect data entry.
H99C Human Factor - Signal - Train Control - Operator Input On-board computer incorrect data provided
H99D Computer system design error (non vendor)
H99E Computer system configuration/management error (non vendor)
Air Hose Defect (Car) 01E E00C Air hose uncoupled or burst
Brake Rigging   
Defect (Car)
02E E07C Rigging down or dragging
E08C Hand brake (including gear) broken or defective
E0HC Hand brake linkage and/or connections broken or defective
E05C Brake valve malfunction (undesired emergency)
E05L Brake valve malfunction (undesired emergency) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E01C Hydraulic hose uncoupled or burst
E02C Broken brake pipe or connections
E03C Obstructed brake pipe (closed angle cock, ice, etc.)
E04C Other brake components damaged, worn, broken, or disconnected
E06C Brake valve malfunction (stuck brake, etc.)
E09C Other brake defects, cars (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E20C Body bolster broken or defective
E21C Center sill broken or bent
E22C Draft sill broken or bent
E23C Center plate broken or defective
E24C Center plate disengaged from truck (car off center)
E25C Center pin broken or missing
E26C Center plate attachment defective
E27C Side sill broken
E29C Other body defects, (CAR) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E30C Knuckle broken or defective
E31C Coupler mismatch, high/low
E32C Coupler drawhead broken or defective
E33C Coupler retainer pin/cross key missing
E34C Draft gear/mechanism broken or defective (including yoke)
E35C Coupler carrier broken or defective
E36C Coupler shank broken or defective (includes defective alignment control)
E37C Failure of articulated connectors
E39C Other coupler and draft system defects, (CAR) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E44C Truck bolster broken
E45C Side frame broken
E40C Side bearing clearance insufficient
E41C Side bearing clearance excessive
E42C Side bearing(s) broken
E43C Side bearing(s) missing
E47C Defective snubbing (including friction and hydraulic)
E48C Broken, missing, or otherwise defective springs (including incorrect repair and/or installation)
E52C Journal (plain) failure from overheating
E53C Journal (roller bearing) failure from overheating
E51C Broken or bent axle between wheel seats
E54C Journal fractured, new cold break
E55C Journal fractured, cold break, previously overheated





E6AC Thermal crack, flange or tread
E64C Worn flange
E65C Worn tread
E66C Damaged flange or tread (flat)
E67C Damaged flange or tread (build up)
E68C Loose wheel
E69C Other wheel defects (CAR) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E11C Broken or defective tiedown equipment
E12C Broken or defective container
E13C Broken or defective trailer






















Handbrake      
Defects (Car)
UDE (Car or Loco)

























Cause Code Accident Cause Code Description
E07L Rigging down or dragging (LOCOMOTIVE)
E40L Side bearing clearance insufficient (LOCOMOTIVE)
E41L Side bearing clearance excessive (LOCOMOTIVE)
E42L Side bearing(s) broken (LOCOMOTIVE)
E43L Side bearing(s) missing (LOCOMOTIVE)
E44L Truck bolster broken (LOCOMOTIVE)
E45L Side frame broken (LOCOMOTIVE)
E46L Truck bolster stiff, improper lateral or improper swiveling (LOCOMOTIVE)
E47L Defective snubbing (LOCOMOTIVE)
E48L Broken, missing, or otherwise defective springs (LOCOMOTIVE)
E49L Other truck component defects, (LOCOMOTIVE) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E4TL Truck hunting (LOCOMOTIVE)
E51L Broken or bent axle between wheel seats (LOCOMOTIVE)
E52L Journal (plain) failure from overheating (LOCOMOTIVE)
E53L Journal (roller bearing) failure from overheating- LOCOMOTIVE
E54L Journal fractured, new cold break (LOCOMOTIVE)
E55L Journal fractured, cold break, previously overheated (LOCOMOTIVE)
E59L Other axle and journal bearing defects (LOCOMOTIVE) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E60L Broken flange (LOCOMOTIVE)
E61L Broken rim (LOCOMOTIVE)
E62L Broken plate (LOCOMOTIVE)
E63L Broken hub (LOCOMOTIVE)
E64L Worn flange (LOCOMOTIVE)
E65L Worn tread (LOCOMOTIVE)
E66L Damaged flange or tread (flat) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E67L Damaged flange or tread (build up) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E68L Loose wheel (LOCOMOTIVE)
E69L Other wheel defects (LOCOMOTIVE) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E6AL Thermal crack, flange or tread (LOCOMOTIVE)
E70L Running gear failure (LOCOMOTIVE)
E77L Broken or defective swing hanger or spring plank (LOCOMOTIVE)
E78L Pantograph defect (LOCOMOTIVE)
E7BL Third rail shoe or shoe beam (LOCOMOTIVE)
E71L Traction motor failure (LOCOMOTIVE)
E72L Crank case or air box explosion (LOCOMOTIVE)
E73L Oil or fuel fire (LOCOMOTIVE)
E74L Electrically caused fire (LOCOMOTIVE)
E76L Remote control equipment inoperative (LOCOMOTIVE)
E7AL On-board computer - failure to respond (LOCOMOTIVE)
E00L Air hose uncoupled or burst (LOCOMOTIVE)
E01L Hydraulic hose uncoupled or burst (LOCOMOTIVE)
E02L Broken brake pipe or connections (LOCOMOTIVE)
E03L Obstructed brake pipe (closed angle cock, ice, etc.) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E04L Other brake components damaged, worn, broken, or disconnected (LOCOMOTIVE)
E06L Brake valve malfunction (stuck brake, etc.) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E08L Hand brake (including gear) broken or defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E09L Other brake defects, (Provide detailed description in narrative) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E0HL Hand brake linkage/Connections broken/defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E10L Computer controlled brake communication failure (LOCOMOTIVE)
E20L Body bolster broken or defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E21L Center sill broken or bent (LOCOMOTIVE)
E22L Draft sill broken or bent (LOCOMOTIVE)
E23L Center plate broken or defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E24L Center plate disengaged from truck unit/off center (LOCOMOTIVE)
E25L Center pin broken or missing (LOCOMOTIVE)
E26L Center plate attachment defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E27L Side sill broken (LOCOMOTIVE)
E29L Other body defects, (LOCOMOTIVE) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E30L Knuckle broken or defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E31L Coupler mismatch, high/low (LOCOMOTIVE)
E32L Coupler drawhead broken or defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E32L Coupler drawhead broken or defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E33L Coupler retainer pin/cross key missing (LOCOMOTIVE)
E34L Draft gear/mechanism broken/defective (including yoke) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E35L Coupler carrier broken or defective (LOCOMOTIVE)
E36L Coupler shank broken or defective (includes defective alignment control) (LOCOMOTIVE)
E37L Failure of articulated connectors (LOCOMOTIVE)
E39L Other coupler and draft system defects, (LOCOMOTIVE) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E79L Other locomotive defects (Provide detail description in narrative)
E99L Other mechanical and electrical failures, (LOCOMOTIVE) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E4AC Gib Clearance (lateral motion excessive)
E49C Other truck component defects, including mismatched side frames (CAR) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E80C Box car plug door open
E81C Box car plug door, attachment defective
E82C Box car plug door, locking lever not in place
E83C Box car door, other than plug, open
E84C Box car door, other than plug, attachment defective
E85C Bottom outlet car door open
E86C Bottom outlet car door attachment defective
E89C Other car door defects (Provide detail description in narrative)
E99C Other mechanical and electrical failures, (CAR) (Provide detailed description in narrative)
E4BC Truck bolster stiff (failure to slew)
E46C Truck bolster stiff, improper swiveling
Track/Train Interaction 
(Hunting) (Car)
20E E4TC Truck hunting
Current Collection 
Equipment (Loco)











Trucks/Bearings/     
Wheels
Loco Electrical and 
Fires
All Other Locomotive 
Defects










Cause Code Accident Cause Code Description
S001 Automatic cab signal displayed false proceed
S002 Automatic cab signal inoperative
S003 Automatic train control system inoperative
S004 Automatic train-stop device inoperative
S005 Block signal displayed false proceed
S006 Classification yard automatic control system switch failure
S007 Classification yard automatic control system retarder failure
S008 Fixed signal improperly displayed (defective)
S009 Interlocking signal displayed false proceed
S010 Power device interlocking failure
S011 Power switch failure
S012 Radio communication equipment failure
S013 Other communication equipment failure
S014 Computer system design error (vendor)
S015 Computer system configuration/management error (vendor)
S016 Classification yard automatic control system - Inadequate or insufficient control (e.g., automatic cycling, other software/programming deficiencies, etc.)
S099 Other signal failures (Provide detailed description in narrative)
S101 Remote control transmitter defective
S102 Remote control transmitter, loss of communication
S103 Radio controlled switch communication failure
S104 Radio controlled switch not locked effectively (Equipment Failure)
M101 Snow, ice, mud, gravel, coal, sand, etc. on track
M402 Object or equipment on or fouling track (motor vehicle - other than highway-rail crossing)
M403 Object or equipment on or fouling track (livestock)
M404 Object or equipment on or fouling track - other than above (for vandalism, see code M503)
M301 Highway user impairment because of drug or alcohol usage (as determined by local authorities, e.g., police)
M302 Highway user inattentiveness
M303 Highway user misjudgment under normal weather and traffic conditions
M304 Highway user cited for violation of highway-rail grade crossing traffic laws
M305 Highway user unawareness due to environmental factors (angle of sun, etc.)
M306 Highway user inability to stop due to extreme weather conditions (dense fog, ice or snow packed road, etc.)
M307 Malfunction, improper operation of train activated warning devices
M308 Highway user deliberately disregarded crossing warning devices
M309 Suicide (Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Accident)
M310 Attempted Suicide (Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Accident)
M399 Other causes (Provide detailed description in narrative)
M201 Load shifted
M202 Load fell from car
M203 Overloaded car
M204 Improperly loaded car
M206 Trailer or container tiedown equipment improperly applied
M207 Overloaded container/trailer on flat car
M208 Improperly loaded container/trailer on flat car
M299 Miscellaneous loading procedures (Provide detailed description in narrative)
M409 Objects such as lading chains or straps fouling switches
M410 Objects such as lading chains or straps fouling wheels
Track-Train Interaction 04M M405 Interaction of lateral/vertical forces (includes harmonic rock off)
M401 Emergency brake application to avoid accident
M406 Fire, other than vandalism, involving on-track equipment
M407 Automatic hump retarder failed to sufficiently slow car due to foreign material on wheels of car being humped
M408 Yard skate slid and failed to stop cars
M411 Passed couplers (automated classification yard)
M501 Interference (other than vandalism) with railroad operations by non-railroad employee
M502 Vandalism of on-track equipment, e.g., brakes released
M503 Vandalism of track or track appliances, e.g., objects placed on track, switch thrown, etc.
M505 Cause under active investigation by reporting railroad (Amended report will be forwarded when reporting railroad’s active investigation has been completed.)
M506 Track damage caused by non-railroad interference with track structure
M507 Investigation complete, cause could not be determined (When using this code, the narrative must include the reason(s) why the cause of the accident/incident could not be determined.)
M509 Suicide (Other Miscellaneous)
M510 Attempted suicide (Other Miscellaneous)
M599 Other miscellaneous causes (Provide detailed description in narrative)
M103 Extreme environmental condition - FLOOD
M104 Extreme environmental condition - DENSE FOG
M105 Extreme environmental condition - EXTREME WIND VELOCITY

















APPENDIX B: FRA-REPORTABLE MAINLINE PASSENGER AND FREIGHT 



















































APPENDIX C: NUMBER OF FRA-REPORTABLE MAINLINE PASSENGER 




1. National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
2. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
3. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation 















SEPTA  Regional Rail
Metrolink (California)
New Jersey Transit
Long Island Railroad
Metro-North Railroad
Amtrak
Number of Accidents
1
2
3
4
